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Scott W. Reed, ISB#81.8 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Phone (208) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765-51 17 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F R S T  JUDIC 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit, unincorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
C O M M U N I T I E S ,  a n o n - p r o f i t  
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., a 
non-profit corporation; NORBERT and 
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and 
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA; 
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON; 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the STATE OF IDAHO 
acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J. 
"GUS" JOHNSON, C-; ELMER 
R., "RICK" CURRIE and KATIE 
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their 
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
1 Case No. CV-06-8574 
) 
) 
) BRIEF OF PETITIONERS I N  OPPOSITION 
) TO INTERVENORS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
























POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, ) 
and HEARTLAND, LLC, ) 
) 
Intewenors/Respondents. ) 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
Intervenors make thee  arguments in support of their motion to dismiss. 
Arguments "A" mootness and "B" timeliness are both grounded upon the claim that 
the November 16th Amended Order of Decision required a second petition for 
review. "C" is that the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan sought by 
Powderhorn Communites, LLC and Heartland, LLC was a legislative matter, not 
a quasi judicial action. As will be shown, none of the three grounds have merit. 
Heading "A" is that the November 9, 2006 Order of Decision from which 
appeal was made was rendered moot by the Amended Order of Decision made 
November 16, 2006. As will be explained further in this response, Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners lacked jurisdiction to enter the November 16th 
Amended Order of Decision. However, for purposes of argument, petitioners will 
assume that the board had the power to amend its November 9th Order of Decision. 
I. Original and Amended Order of Decision were Identical 
Properly Appealed on November 15. 2006 
In the conlplete Amended Order of Decision, no amendments were made on 
November 16th to "I. Course of Proceedings," "111. Applicable Legal Standards," 
"VI. Conclusions of Law" or "VII. Order of Decision." The "Conclusions 
of Law" and the "Order of Decision" are identical on the November 9th and 
November 16th decisions. 
I BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
VI. Conclusions of Law 
6.01 The proposed Comprehensive Plan amendment from Agricultural 
and Timber to Rural is reasonably necessary and appropriate 
given the substantial change that has occurred in the area. 
6.02 The proposed amendment would seem to be consistent with 
similarly located properties in the southern portion of Kootenai 
County. 
6.03 The proposed amendment is consistent with the goals and policies 
of the Comprehensive Plan as outlined in Section IV of this Order. 
VII. ORDER OF DECISION 
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this 
document, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners orders that the 
application for Case No. CP-080-05, a request by Powderhorn 
Communities, for a Comprehensive Plan Map from Agricultural to 
Rural be APPROVED. 
The "Board Analysis" in the November 16th document has all the words in 
the November 9th document and adds one and one-half sentences about distance 
from population centers. 
What petitioners made appeal from is the final Order of Decision which 
approved the request by Powderhorn Communities for a comprehensive plan map 
amendment from Agricultural to Rural. The November 9th Order of Decision is 
not moot; the November 16th Order of Decision is identical. 
1. Mootness Doctrine does not Aoplv 
Intervenors argue that the November 16th Amended Order of Decision 
replaced the November 9th Order of Decision and cite in support McCandless v. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 233  3 
Kmrner, 76 Idaho 510,286 P.2d 334 (1955). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held as quoted in Intervenors Memorandum (p. 77) that a second judgment entered 
after appeal of the first judgment superseded the original judgment which became 
moot so the first appeal therefrom was dismissed. 
Under the procedural record reported in the opinion, the decision is entirely 
correct, but totally distinguishable from this case. In this personal injury lawsuit, 
the jury awarded $3,117.71 on the first cause of action and $8,272.21 on the 
second cause of action. Judgment was entered for $1 1,389.92. Defendantlappellant 
moved for a new trial asserting error in double damages and at the same time filed 
an appeal. 
The trial court denied the motion for new trial upon the condition that the 
judgment be reduced to one award only on the second cause of action of $8,272.21. 
Plaintifflrespondent accepted; judgment was entered for $8,272.21 and 
defendantlappellant filed a second appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the 
second judgment. 
What intervenors' quoted citation recognizes is two-fold. (1) That part of 
the first appeal related to double verdict was satisfied by the trial court's ruling on 
the motion for new trial (2) The second judgment was different from the first 
judgment in an amount and any remaining contentions of error asserted by 
defendant/appelIant were fully addressed when the Court affirmed judgment for 
$8,272.21 on the second appeal. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
Here, the orginal and the second Orders of Decision were identical. 
The November 16th document amended the factual findings but did not alter 
in the slightest the original Order of ~ecision.(') If findings of fact canno; 
constitute an appealable order, then changing the findings of fact cannot constitute 
a different Order of Decision. 
2. November 9.- Order of Decision was Final Jud~ment 
The Amended Order of Decision entered November 16, 2006 made 
significant (and insupportable) changes in the Findings of Fact and in the 
Comprehensive Plan Analysis. The latter is another form of fact findings intended 
to match found facts with the Comprehensive Plan goals. 
The Findings of Fact and Comprehensive Plan Analysis together with the 
Conclusions of Law are the county board of commissioners' equivalent of a trial 
 h he caption on the November 16th document does not accurately reflect the contents: 
CASE NO. CP-08005 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 
ANALYSIS AND AMENDED ORDER OF DECISION 
The correct description of what follows should read like this: 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS AND 
ORIGINAL APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER OF DECISION 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
court memorandum decision or opinion. As such, t h i s  .is not something from 
which an appeal can be made. 
In Hamblen v. Go& 90 Idaho 180, 409 P.2d 429 (1965), defendants filed a 
notice of appeal from the opinion and from the findings and conclusions but not 
from the judgment subsequently entered. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the 
appeal: 
The opinion contains only the reasoning of the trial judge, and the 
authorities considered in arriving at his decision. The findings and 
conclusions are only what they purport to be. They contain the 
conclusion of the court as to the judgment to be entered. They are not 
in form a judgment, and contain no order for the execution of the 
judgment of lien foreclosure therein directed to be entered. They did 
not constitute a final judgment appealable under I.C. $13-201. 
90 Idaho at 182. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Blaine County Investment Co, v. Mays, 521 
Idaho 381, 15 P.2d 734 (1932) made a similar observation: 
A judgment is the Anal determination of the rights of the parties in an 
action or proceeding. (C.S. sec. 6826.) As the judgment is based upon 
the decision, i.e., the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it follows 
that such findings and conclusions cannot be considered as a final 
judgment or order within the meaning of C.S., sec. 7152, from which an 
appeal will lie, and the attempted appeal therefrom is therefore 
dismissed. 
52 Idaho at 384. 
I 
Although Judge Burnett subsequently found a way to bail out a pro se 
plaintiff in Kuglev v. Novhtwest Aviation, Inc., 108 Idaho 884, 702 P.2d 922 (App. 
. 1985), his initial conclusion was the same as the above cases: 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
The attorney's notice of appeal, filed on January 18, 1983, recites that 
the appeal is taken from an amended "memorandum decision" dated 
November 28, 1982. It fails to mention the judgment entered in the 
meantime. A district judge's memorandum decision is not appealable 
unless it disposes of an appeal from the magistrate division. When a 
district court acts as a trial court, an appeal may be taken only from a 
final judgment or  as otherwise provided in Idaho Appellate Rules 11 and 
12. 
105 Idaho at 886. 
In the administrative procedure the last paragraph "VII Order of Decision" 
is the equivalent of a judgment: Both orders of decision approved the request by 
Powderhom Communities for a Comprehensive Plan map amendment from 
"Agricultural" to "Rural." 
3. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Not Applicable 
Intervenors suggest that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies: 
The Board's November 9, 2006, Order was not a final order, it was 
administratively remedied by the Board's subsequent Amended Order 
one week later on November 16, 2006. Thus, Petitioners sought judicial 
review of an agency decision before exhausting all administrative 
remedies in violation of I.C. 467-5271. 
Intervenor Brief, p. 9. 
It is a fundamental predicate to application of the exhaustion of remedies 
defense that there has been an administrative remedy available to the appellant to 
exhaust. There was none in this case. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
At the end of the public hearing on September 14, 2000, Chairman Johnson, 
with the concurrence of the other two commissioners, directed that the public 
hearing would be closed with no more input or cornmunication from the 
appliancant or the public. Transcript, p. 99, L. 14 - 21; p. 103, L. 1 - 3. 
The board and staff then made a site visit on September 25, 2006. Because 
there was communication between representatives of the applicant and two board 
members heard by the public, the board held another public hearing on October 4, 
2006 for the limited purpose of listening to complaints about the site visit, but with 
"no new information." Transcript, p. 212, L. 23 - 25; p. 212, L. 1 - 2. 
That public hearing was closed and Chairman Johnson directed that at 
deliberations the following day, no one was to speak to any of the commissioners. 
Transcript, p. 226, L. 9 - 15; p. 22-27, L. 1 - 9. 
On the following day, the commissioners deliberated among themselves and 
voted two to one to grant the application. Transcript, p. 234, L. 15 - 25. With 
that vote, the administration case was closed awaiting only the written order of 
decision which was made on November 9, 2006. Absolutely no one, applicant, 
public, protestors, supporters or curious onlookers, could have spoken to any of the 
commissioners nor taken any action under the Kootenai County Code nor under 
state law to have any effect on the decision to be made in written form on 
November 9th. After the Order of Decision had been made no outsider could have 
, any influence on the Amended Order of Decision on November 16th. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
The November 9th Order of Decision was the equivalent of a final judgment 
that ended the administrative case, adjudicated the subject matter of the controversy 
and made a final determination of the rights of the applicant and of the protesting 
petitioners. Rake v. Rake, 142 Idaho 83, 85, I23 P.3d 216, (App. 2005). 
Idaho-Best, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho 99 Idaho 51 7, 519, 584 P.2d 1242, 
In Canal/Norcrest/Colunzbus Action Committee Cify of Boise, 136 Idaho 
666, 39 P.3d 606 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed dismissal by the trial 
court on exhaustion of remedies grounds upon determining that the city's approval 
of a conditional use application was a final decision subject to judicial review. 136 
Idaho at 671. So was the Order of Decision on November 9, 2006. 
11. Petition for Review Deprived Board of Jurisdiction to Enter 
Amended Order of Decision 
As a matter of law, the Board of County Commissioners did not have the 
power to take any action of any kind after the Petition of Review was filed on 
November 15,, 2006.. This conclusion follows from a careful reading of 1.R.Civ.P. 
Rule 84 (a) "judicial review of state agency and local government actions." 
The subsections in small letters follow setting forth detailed rules with this 
catchall Rule 84 (a): 
Rule 84 (r). Other procedural rules. 
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Any procedure for judicial review not specified or  covered by these rules 
shall be in accordance with the appropriate rule of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules to the extent the same is not contrary to this Rule 84. . . . 
Rule 84 (m) reserves to the local government the power to enforce any 
decision it may have made: 
Rule 84 (m) 
Stay of proceedings. Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of 
a petition for judicial review with the district court does not 
automatically stay the proceedings and enforcement of the action of an 
agency that is subject to the petition. Unless prohibited by statute, the 
agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon 
appropriate terms. 
"Proceedings" means as related to enforcement. This becomes klear upon 
examining the comparable words in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act:' 
Idaho Code 567-5274 
67-5274. Stay. The filing of the petition for review does not itself stay 
the effectiveness or  enforcement of the agency action. The agency may 
grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms. 
Respondent Kootenai County after the November 9th Order of Decision did 
have the power, unaffected by the appeal, to make the order approving the 
amendment effective and did so by accepting the application for zone change and 
setting a hearing date. This was the action that required the court stay as sought 
and granted. 
Rule 84 (m) and Idaho Code 567-5274 relating to stay were the only 
procedures specified and covered within the meaning of Rule 84 (r). Therefor 
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judicial review would otherwise be covered by the Idaho Appellate Rules governing 
appeals from the District Court to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
There the applicable rule is Rule 13 I.A.R. where the first subsection imposes 
an automatic fourteen day stay: 
Rule 13 (a) Temporary Stay in Civil Action Upon Filing a Notice of 
Appeal or Notice of Cross-Appeal. Unless otherwise ordered by the 
district court, upon the filing of a notice of appeal or notice of cross- 
appeal all proceedings and execution of all judgments, orders or decrees 
in a civil action in the district court, shall be automatically stayed for a 
period of fourteen (14) days. . . . 
The Amended Order of Decision was made one day after the filing of the 
appeal. If this was a "Proceeding" (which it was not), it  is void as having 
occurred within the fourteen day period. It is the county that failed to recognize 
the time restrictions and neglected to re-enter the Amended Order of Decision 
fifteen or more days later. 
Legally, the board of commissioners could not have been done so. Rule 13 
(b) I.A.R. has a laundry list of powers of the District Court [under Rule 84 (r), 
powers of the agency] retained during the pendency of the appeal. None apply to 
cover the Amended Order of Decision. 
Unless within the list of powers (1) through (20), all proceedings are stayed 
until the district court decides the Petition for Review. 
A long line of decisions have ruled upon the loss of jurisdiction after an 
appeal is filed. 
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Once an appeal is taken from the district court, the district court is 
divested of jurisdiction, except to take action in aid of the appeal. Coeur 
d'Alene Turf Club, Inc. v. Cogswell, 93 Idaho 324, 461 P.2d 107 (1969); 
7 Moore's Federal Practice 560-30 [2] (2d ed, 1975); 4 Am.Jur.Zd, 
Appeal and Error $352. The district court properly ruled that the Van 
Tassell's complaint of May 24, 1976 did not state a valid claim; the 
district court therefore did not err in dismissing the action. 
First Security Bank v. Neibauer, 98 Idaho 598, 604, 570 P.2d 276, - 
Hells Canyon contends the district court was without authority to enter 
the September 5 order. We agree. 
In Dolbeer v. Harten, 91 Idaho 141, 417 P.2d 407 (1966) our Supreme 
Court noted: 
"The general rule is that upon an appeal being perfected the trial court 
is divested of jurisdiction of the cause; having lost jurisdiction pending 
an appeal the lower court may not allow amendments; and it is error to 
enter a substituted and supplemental decree after appeal is taken. 
[Footnotes omitted.]" 
91 Idaho at 147-48, 417 P.2d at 413-14. See also Coeur d7A1ene Turf 
Club, Inc. v. Cogswell, 93 Idaho 324,461 P.2d 107 (1969; First Security 
Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 570 P.2d 276 (1977); Avondale Irrigation 
District v. North Idaho Properties, kc, 99 Idaho 30, 577 P.2d 9 (1978). 
The district court therefore had no power or authority -- because it 
lacked jurisdiction -- to reconsider its earlier decision and to enter a 
different ruling in respect to the respondent's motions. 
Hells Canyon Excursions, Inc. v. Oakes, 11 1 Idaho 123, 134-25, 721 P.2d 
223 (App. 1986). 
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Once a notice of appeal has been perfected the district court is divested 
of jurisdiction and the proceedings are stayed during the pendency of 
the appeal. Dolbeer v. Harten, 91 Idaho 141, 144, 417 P.2d 407, 410 
(1966). 
H. V. Engineers, Inc. v. Idaho State Board of Professional Engineers and 
Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, - (1 988). 
The Websters assert that the trial court abused its discretion in not 
granting the Webster's motions to amend their counterclaim and to 
compel the bank to produce documents. We disagree. Because both of 
these motions were made after the Websters had appealed to this Court 
from the judgment and decree of foreclosure, the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to consider these motions. 
First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 268, 805 P.2d 
468 - (1991). 
* * * 
Once an appeal has been filed, the authority of the district court is 
limited; in a civil action, the district court may rule on certain motions 
and take certain actions which are enumerated in I.A.R. 13 (b). Idaho 
Appellate Rule 13 (b) does not provide the district court with the 
authority to rule on a motion to disqualify a judge after an appeal has 
been filed. Thus, the district court correctly ruled that it did not have 
the authority to rule on Christensen's motion. 
Christensen v. Ransom, 123 Idaho 99, 103, 844 P.2d 1349, (APP. 
1993). 
111. Case No. CP-080-05 was Contested Case Subject to 
Quasi-Judicial Standards 
Intervenors assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this challenge to 
the amendment of the Comprehensive Plan because it is a legislative matter. The 
argument following this assertion is supported by lengthy quotations from two 
Florida opinions and footnote citations to three more Florida cases. 
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Florida is a developer's paradise and an environmentalist's hell with 
permanent migration of snowbirds in the hundreds of thousands every year. There 
is real danger that the shoreline may sink under the weight of condominiums even 
before global warming floods the state. The recent news story about the 500 trailer 
park owners being paid over a million dollars each for their beach facing mobile 
home and pads gives some idea of the kind of money that makes for irreparable 
development. 
In examining the decision reported in the Pacific Reporter in general and in 
Idaho in particular, it is apparent that the genera1 practice is very different out west. 
Amendments to a comprehensive plan made for specific properties are appealable 
and challengeable regardless of how these are described by non-lawyers filling in 
application forms. 
There is absolutely no question that the application by Powderhorn 
Communities, LLC and its affiliates to amend the Comprehensive Plan from 
Agricultural to Ruralfiestricted Residential on 3,000 acres was a contested case 
within the meaning of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Idaho Code 67- 
5201 (6). A person aggrieved by a final order of an agency in a contested case is 
entitled as a matter of right to the judicial review. Idaho Code 67-5270 (3). 
The distinction between the city or county created broad and encompassing 
comprehensive plans which must be a legislative act and this amendment for 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS 
a specific tract of land was succinctly explained by the Kansas Supreme Court in 
Golden v. City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130 (Kansas, 1978): 
A city, in enactidg a general zoning ordinance, or a planning commission 
exercising its primary and principal function under K.S.A. 12-704 in 
adopting and annually reviewing a comprehensive plan for development 
of a city, is exercising strictly legislative functions. When, however, the 
focus shifts from the entire city to one specific tract of land for which 
a zoning change is urged, the function becomes more quasi-judicial than 
legislative. While policy is involved, such a proceeding requires a 
weighing of the evidence, a balancing of the equities, an application of 
rules, regulations and ordinances to facts, and a resolution of specific 
issues. Keopf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 120 
(1974); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash3d 292,502 P.2d 327 (1972); 
Fasano Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or. 574, 574 P.2d 23 (1973); and 
See Zoning Amendments -- The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial 
Action, 33 Ohio State Law Journal 130 (1972). 
Intervenors rely upon Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 
1075 (1983), as authority holding that amendments to the comprehensive plan are 
legislative matters' not subject to judicial review. In the quotation in petitioners 
memorandum, those words are included. 105 Idaho at 68. However, the issue 
before that court was the annexation of property with the amendment to the 
comprehensive plan and the rezoning being merely the attendant actions mandated 
by Idaho Code 567-6525, 
Annexation is a legislative action. In Coeuvd ;Ilene Industrial Park Property 
Owners Association, Znc. v. City of Coeur d'rilene, 108 Idaho 843, 702 P.2d 881 
(App. 1983), Judge Burnett for the Court of Appeals noted that annexation 
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authority under Idaho Code $50-222 long predated the enactment of the Local Land 
Use Planning Act, Idaho Code $367-6501 et seq: 
The act' of annexation does not await an exercise of the zoning power. 
See Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983). 
108 Idaho at 845. 
The out-of-Idaho supporting authorities cited in the quotation from Burt 
repeated in Intervenors Brief (pp. 11 - 12) were to the Kansas opinion, Golden v. 
City of Overland Park, supra, and to City of Louisville v. District Court of Boulder, 
190 Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (Colo. 1975). The City of Louisville case involved 
only annexation. 
As it happens, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Condiotti v. Boafd of 
County Commissioners of the County of LaPlata, 983 P.2d 184 (Colo. App. 1999), 
I reversed the trial court's dismissal of a complaint by a property owner challenging 
the county order amending the land use system: 
I 
In our view, the same reasoning should apply to the present situation in 
which an owner is attempting to protect his property from adverse 
effects caused by the adoption of an amendment to a land use system. 
See Piscitelli v. Township Commitfee of Scotch Plains, 103 N.J. Super. 
589 248 A.2d 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 12968) (ownership of 
property in area affected by zoning is sufficient to create standing to 
contest validity of zoning ordinance); Zeltig Land Development Corp. v. 
Rainbridge Townslzip Board of Trustees, 785 Ohio App3d 302, 599 
N.E.2d 383 (1991) (owner had standing to challenge constitutionally of 
zoning as applied to its own property because owner may be limited by 
the zoning or  may be harmed by restrictions placed on the property). 
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In McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993), the 
Idaho Supreme Court, while taking note of Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, supra, 
specifically held that a property owner had standing and the court had jurisdiction 
to consider the challenge to the comprehensive plan and general zoning even 
though the owner had not made a timely appeal at the time of enactment of the 
zoning code: 
Thus, this case is more like Jerome County 1). Holloway, 118 ldaho 681, 
799 P.2d 969 (1990). In Jerome, this Court stated that "the district 
court had jurisdiction to issue its declaratory judgment regarding the 
validity of the 1985 amendment to the [Jerome County] zoning 
ordinance," but appeals involving the issuance of a particular permit 
should be reviewed under the procedures established by the Local 
Planning Act. Jerome, 118 Idaho at 685, 799 P.2d at 973. See Burt v. 
City of Idaho Eirlls, 105 Idaho 65, 66 n. 2, 665 P.2d 1075, 1076 'n. 2 
(1983) ("While we hold that a legislative zoning decision is not subject 
to direct judicial review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of 
collateral actions such as declaratory actions."). 
123 Idaho at 660. 
Although it should not be necessary for all the reasons recited in this 
responding brief, petitioners on Februa;ry 5, 2007 filed an amended petition for 
review an amendment adding a fourth cause of action for declaratory judgment to 
come squarely within the McCuskey precedent. 
In all three adjoining states, the appellate courts have held that property 
owners have the absolute right to challenge amendments to a conlprehensive plan 
or the comprehensive plan itself with no bar as "legislative action." In Ash Gvove 
,Cement Conzpany v. J e f f e o n  County, 943 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1997), the trial court 
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and the Montana Supreme Court looked at and ruled in detail in a declaratory 
judgment action on seeking to overturn a "Local Vicinity Plan" as being 
inconsistent with the county's master plan. 
Intervenors cite Jones v. King County, 74 Wash. App. 467, 874 P.2d 853 
(1 994) as holding that the courts could not consider a suit challenging amendments 
to the comprehensive plan. King County had undertaken an area community 
plan and zoning update commencing in 1988 and reaching final adoption by the 
county council on December 17, 1991. Jones filed suit on January 16, 1972 
alleging that he had not received adequate notice and that the plan had down zoned 
his property. 
The Court of Appeals relied upon a Washington statute RCW 42.36.010 
which specifically excluded from "quasi judicial" all "'. . .legislative actions 
adopting, amending or revising comprehensive, community or neighborhood 
plans."' 874 P.2d at 857. No comparable statute exists in Idaho. 
The Court's holding was that one propetty owner cannot attack in court an 
area wide plan: 
Jones' argument mirrors Raynes' argument. Jones argues that the 
County, by asking landowners to submit rezone requests as a means of 
objecting to the proposed plan and area rezone, effectively created an 
adversarial process with identifiable parties. Under Raynes and RCW 
42.36.010, however, the County's action were clearly area-wide zoning 
and comprehensive plan amendments. Thus, they were legislative 
actions. The method chosen by the Council to acquire input from 
property owners allowed the owners to specifically discuss their own 
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properties. This does not, however, transform the event into a quasi- 
judicial proceeding. 
The difficulty was examined in some detail in Holbvook, Inc. v. Clark 
County, 112 Wash. App. 354, 49 P.3d 142 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2002). In 1993, 
Holbrook bought 75 acres zoned "rural estate" which allowed five acre lots. 
At that time Clark County had initiated development of a comprehensive plan. 
This process continued for two years with all the attendant public hearings and 
published notice finally resulting in adoption. In December of 1994 with the 
Holbrook property classified as forest resource land allowing only 20 acre tracts. 
Holbrook sued claiming due process violations. In affirming dismissal the 
Court wrote: 
No bright line separates judicial from legislative actions. Raynes v. City 
of Leavenworth, 118 Wash.2d 237,243,821 P.2d 1204 (1992). But area- 
wide actions, such as the adoption of comprehensive plans and zoning 
ordinances, involving the exercise of the legislative body's policy-making 
role, are generally considered legislative. See Raynes, 118 Wash.2d at 
245-49,821 P.2d 1204; Jones, 74 W a s h . ~ p ~ .  a t  474-75,874 P.2d 853; see 
also RCW 42.36.010. . . 
As Holbrook points out, there are circumstances in which even 
legislative decisions can give rise to individual constitutional due process 
protections. When one person, or relative few people, are exceptionally 
affected by a decision on individual grounds, then such persons may be 
entitled to basic due process rights, including individual notice. 
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Exactly that circumstance in which legislative decisions - adoption of 
conlprehensive plans -- entitled a few people to sue occurred three years earlier in 
a Washington Supreme Court case, King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth, 
138 Wash.2d 161, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999). The short caption is misleading. 
The suit was an administrative appeal from King County's adoption of a 
comprehensive plan. The petitioners named in the full caption as appellants 
included eight governmental entities, twenty-seven corporations and organizations 
and five individuals. 
Even though the comprehensive plan covered a wide area, the Washington 
Supreme Court held that the environmental groups could challenge portions of the 
plan and that: 
Any individual, partnership, corporation, or  other entity with standing 
may appeal a provision of a county's plan to ensure that it is in 
compliance with the requirements of the GMA (Growth Management 
Act) RCW 36.70A.280 (2)-(3). This appeal process benefits both those 
who seek to limit development and those who seek to protect their 
development rights. 
In the most recent reported case, Low Income Housing Institute v. Lalcewood, 
77 P.3d 653 (Wash. App. Div. 2, 2003) affordable housing advocates successfully 
challenged the City of Lakewood's comprehensive plan resulting in a remand to 
I revise the plan. 77 P.3d at 658. 
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In Oregon, arguably the state with the most extensive and detailed planning 
process (and probably the most litigation), the right of individual residents and of 
developers to sue entities upon the grounds of defective comprehensive plans has 
been recognized. 
With a very similar name, Neighbors for Livability v. City of Beaverton, 168 
Or. App. 501, 4 P.3d 765 (Or. App. 2000), was procedurally very like this case. 
The developers, Sorrento Construction, and others applied to the city to amend the 
comprehensive plan to change the designation of 10 acres fiom residential to 
commercial. 
The non-profit corporation and eight individuals in the neighborhood went 
through the administrative levels and then filed the appeal with the Oregon Court 
of Appeals. The opinion recognized that the challenge was not to a present zone 
change but, as here, to the future intentions of the developer as were fully disclosed 
in the record: 
Although respondent Sorrento Construction's (Sorrento) application and 
the city's decision directly sought and granted only the plan 
amendments, and did not include related zoning changes or specific 
developmental permits, the ultimate objective of both Sorrento and the 
city is to develop a supermarket complex at the Murray site. 
The opinion gave careful consideration to all of the petitioners' claims and 
then affirmed the city's approval without ever suggesting that the amendment was 
, a  legislative action. 
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Warren v. Lane County, 297 Or. 290, 686 P.2d 316 (Or. 1984), provides 
favorable precedent on two grounds. Petitioner Cole, nearby neighbors and others 
appealed administratively the amendment to Comprehensive Plan to allow a 
commercial resort on a 186 acre tract, in the 'Coastal Subarea." 
As here, the Lane County Planning Commission had recommended denial of 
the amendment; the developer appealed and the board of commissioners reversed 
the planning commissio~~. 686 P.2d at 319. Oregon has created a Land Use Board 
of Appeals (LUBA) to which appeal was made and, following affirmance, appeal 
was made to the Oregon Court of Appeals which also affirmed. 
During the pendency of the appeal, Lane County adopted a new 
comprehensive plan which incorporated the change as part of the newly adopted 
plan and not as an amendment. Lane Cohnty and the developers moved to dismiss 
the appeal from the Court of Appeals decision to the Oregon Supreme Court on the 
grounds that the adoption of the new comprehensive plan made the appeal from the 
earlier amendment moot. 
This claim of moobless based on a year later change has far more merit than 
intervenors claim of mootness on a week later appeal. Nonetheless, the Oregon 
Supreme Court rejected the mootness argument: 
In enacting the new plan and adopting a plan amendment for the same 
property in dispute, the Lane County Board of Commissioners 
readopted the same findings of fact and conclusions of law to support an 
exception to Goal 4 as those relied upon in the first plan amendment. 
Because these same findings of fact and conclusions of law form the 
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basis of the county's new comprehensive plan for the subject property, 
the issues raised by petitioners questioning the sufficiency of those 
findings to support the goal exception, plan amendment and zone 
changes are not moot. 
For purposes of judicial review, adopting a new comprehensive plan, 
which, in effect, readopts a prior plan amendment and is enacted on 
essentially the same findings, does not moot a prior appeal challenging 
the adequacy of those findings. 
The petitioners argued that change in a small comprehensive plan had wide 
effects,which affected all residents in the area and was a quasi-judicial change. 686 
P.2d at 323. In Oregon Supreme Court agreed, reversed the dismissal by the Court 
of Appeals for lack of standing and remanded the case back to the LUBA. 
The Kansas Supreme Court analysis in Golden v. City of Overland Park, has 
been followed in Colorado, Montana, Washington and Oregon. That Kansas 
decision was cited in Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 68. The two or 
three year process of adoption of a new comprehensive plan by a city or a county 
for its entire area is a legislative action which should be invnune from challenge 
by a single owner of an isolated parcel. 
The action taken by the city or county on amendment upon application of the 
owners of a specific tract of land for which a zone change will be ultimately sought 
is a quasi-judicial action subject to judicial review. 
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Idaho Code 967-5270 (3) grants an absolute right of judicial review by a 
party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case. The six volumes of agency 
record with hundreds of letters and petition signatures of protest and the two 
volumes of transcript are weighty and solid evidence that this was a contested case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of Decision entered November 9th was a final decision. The final 
part of the Amended Order of Decision made November 16th is identical and 
encompassed in the November 15th Petition for Review. The appeal was from a 
quasi-judicial contested case. The board of co~nmissioners had no jurisdiction to 
act after November 15th. 
The Motion to Dismiss must be denied. 
Respecthlly submitted, this 16th 
Attorney for PlaintiffsPetitioners 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit 
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., 
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and 
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and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
and HEARTLAND, LLC, 
IntervenorsIRespondents. 
COME NOW Applicants Coeur d7Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson, by and 
through their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, pursuant to R C P  24(a) and 24(b), and move the 
Court for entry of an order granting them the right to intervene in this action as 
DefendantslRespondents. This motion is supported by the pleadings and submissions on file herein, 
including the supporting Memorandum filed herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
otr- 
Dated this ,&l- day of February, 2007. 
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Company and H. F. Magnuson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit 
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., 
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and 
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and 
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA, 
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
VS. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting 
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J. 
"GUS" JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN; 
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and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
and HEARTLAND, LLC, 
COME NOW Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson, by and 
tluough their attorney of record, John F. Magnuson, pursuant to IRCP 24(a) and 24(h), and submit 
the following Memorandum in support of their motion for entry of an order granting them the right 
to intervene in this action as DefendantsiRespondents. 
I. APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES. 
IRCP 24(a) provides: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... (2) 
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is 
the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede applicant's ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
See IRCP 24(a). -
IRCP 24(b) provides: 
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ... (2) 
when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or 
fact in common.. .. In exercising its discretion, the Court shall consider whether the 
intenention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the 
original parties. 
See IRCP 24(b) -
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XI. TEIE STATUS OF APPLICANTS COEUR D'ALENE LAND 
COMPANY AND MAGNUSON. 
Through the subject action, PlaintiffsIPetitioners seekjudicial review ofaNovember 9,2006 
Order of Decision entered by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. That Order granted 
a request by Powderhorn Communities, LLC for a Comprehensive Plan Amendment (from 
agricultural to rural) as to approximately 3,000 acres of land located in unincorporated Kootenai 
County.' 
These Applicants (Coeur d' Akene Land Company and Magnuson) own a considerable portion 
of the acreage that was rezoned through the County's November 9, 2006 Order that is currently 
under appeal. See Amended Petition for Judicial Review at 114. 
111. ARGUMENT. 
Pursuant to IRCP 24(a), these Applicants claim an interest in the "transaction which is the 
subject of this action." The Kootenai County Board of Con~missioners igned an Order amending 
the County's Comprehensive Plan to change the designation of these Applicant's properties from 
Agricultural to Rural. In other words, these Applicants own property that was favorably decided 
upon bythe Board through the subject amendment. The County's decision has been appealed herein 
and is the "subject of this action." These Applicants seek to intervene in order to protect their 
interest in that decision. Said interest is real and concrete and consists of actual property ownership 
affected by said decision. 
These Applicants' interests may not be adequately represented by the existing parties. The 
I Powderhorn Communities, LLC was previously granted permission to intervene 
through this Court's Order of December 19,2006. 
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PlaintiffsiPetitioners are adverse to these Applicants' interests. Kootenai County is a political 
subdivision. Its elected officials do not necessarily have the same vested interest in seeing the Order 
upheld as do these Applicants. Moreover, Kootenai County and the present PlaintiffsIPetitioners 
could enter into some amicable resolution, through an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, 
unacceptable to these Applicants which might otherwise impair these Applicants' vested interest in 
the subject decision. 
At this point, theseApplicantsl interests are aligned with those ofPowderhorn Communities, 
LLC. However, properties owned by Powderhorn are not the same properties owned by these 
Applicants. Without conceding the same, arguments that may apply to some portion of 
Powderhorn's properties may not apply to the properties of the Applicants which have heretofore 
had little or nothing to do with agricultural (prior "ayicultural" use of portions of the property is 
alleged by the present Plaintiffs/Petitioners to constitute some basis for reversal of the Board's 
Order)'. 
Further, these Plaintiffsil'etitioners have apparently determined to appeal the subject Order 
not on the merits but in part through an attempted effort to apparently impugn the character of Rand 
Wichman, the former Planning Director for Kootenai County. If it is the intention of the 
PlaintiffsIPetitioners to challenge the subject Order not on law or the facts but rather through an 
unsupported and tangential mud-slinging contest, then these Applicants would sooner argue the 
merits of their own cause.' 
2 This is not to say that these Applicants concede in any way that the attacks launched 
by the PlaintiffsiPetitioners on Mr. Wichman have any merit whatsoever. To the contrary, based 
upon the submissions to date, it would appear that issues raised by thePlaintiffs/Petitioners as to Mr. 
Wichman are either gross mischaracterizations, red herrings, and unsupported by any binding legal 
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At a minimum, permissive intervention is proper under IRCP 24(b). These Applicants have 
established that their "claim or defense in the main action have a question of law or fact in common." 
This intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Kootenai 
County, Plaintiffs/Petitioners, or Powderhorn. These Applicants agree to be bound by the briefing 
schedule in effect or hereafter to be established by the Court. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land 
Company and Magnuson respectfully request that the Court grant them leave to intervene as 
additional as a matter of right or through permission. 
Dated this of February, 2007. 
~ t t b r f e ~  for Applicants $oeur d'Alene Land 
Company and H. F. Magnuson 
authority in this State. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true a onect copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following, via facsimile this &ay of February, 2007: 
Scott W. Reed 
Attomey at Law 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: 208\765-5117 
John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attomey 
Kootenai County Department of 
Legal Services 
451 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur dtAlene, ID 838 16-9000 
Fax: 208\446-1621 
Mischelle Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis, PS 
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center 
71 7 W. Sprague Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0466 
Fax: 509\747-2323 
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JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2350 
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Phone: (208) 667-0100 
Fax: (208) 667-0500 
ISB #4270 
2001 FER 2 1 AH 10: 24 
Attorney for Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSLBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit 
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., 
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and 
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and 
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA, 
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
VS. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting 
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIOhERS; S.J. 
"GUS' JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN; 
ELMER R. "RICK" C U R .  and KATIE 
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their 
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
NO. CV-06-8574 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE OF HEARlNG -- PAGE 1 
and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
and HEARTLAND, LLC, 
TO: PLAINTFFSIPETITIONERS AND YOUR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, SCOTT 
W. REED; 
AND TO: DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS AND YOUR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, JOHN 
CAFFERTY; 
AND TO: INTERVENORSIRESPONDENTS AND YOUR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, 
MISCHELLE FULGHAM AND LUIUNS & ANNIS, PS. 
You and each of you will please take notice that Applicants Coeur d'Alene Land Company 
and H. F. Magnuson will call their Motion to Intervene as of Right andlor Motion for Permissive 
Intervention on for hearing before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge, on February 
27,2007 at 3:30 p.m. at the Kootenai County Courthouse. You are invited to attend and participate 
as you see fit. 
k 
Dated this L(i day of February, 2007. 
, 
ur d'Alene Land 
Company and H. F. Magnuson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and o ~ e c t  copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following, via facsimile this &day of February, 2007: 
Scott W. Reed 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: 208\765-5117 
Mischelle Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis, PS 
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center 
717 W. Sprague Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0466 
Fax: 509\747-2323 
John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attorney 
Kootenai County Department of 
Legal Services 
45 1 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-9000 
Fax: 208\446-1621 
NOTICE OF HEARING -- PAGE 3 
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MlSCHELLE R. FULGHAM 
ISB #4623 
PETER J. SMITH 1V 
1SB #6997 
LUKNS & ANNIS. P.S. 
Ste 102 
250 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d' Alene. ID 838 14-2971 
Teleuhone: (208) 667-05 17 
Facsimile No.: (509) 363-2478 
Attornevs for POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC and HEARTLAND LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF TDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSlSLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unicorporated 
associatton; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit unicorporated 
association; KOOTENAI ENVIRONMENTAL 
ALLIANCE, TNC., a non-profit corporation; 
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMANN; 
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN 
MELKA; MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the STATE OF IDAHO act inn^ through the - 
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOA& OF 
COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON, 
CHATRMAN; ELMER R. "RICK" CURRIE 
and KATIE BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
Defendants, 
and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC, and 
HEARTLAND LLC 
NO. CV-06-8574 
POWDERHORN COivlMLNTIES LLC 
AND HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY 
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POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC and HEARTLAND LLC (hcreinafter 
"Powderhonl") lile this reply memorandum in support of their Motton to Dismiss filed wlth 
this Court on lanuttry 29, 2007. Also on January 29,2007, Powderhorn noted this matter for 
hearing beforc the Court set for February 27,2007. On February 21,2007, just six days before 
the heanng, Powderhom received a 25 page opposition brief. Petitioners' opposition 
arguments are untimely, unnecessarily lengthy, complcx, and in some instances 
incomprehensible. Yet, Powderhom will attempt to reply and more importantly will reiterate 
the unrebutted reasons this Court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the action. Given the stay 
rmposed and the lack of any bond, Powderhorn seeks a prompt dismissal. ' 
THE BOCC'S ORIGINAL ORDER OF DECISION WAS RENDERED MOOT UPON 
THE ENTRY OF THE AMENDED ORDER OF DECISION, AND PETITIONERS' 
S D  
MOOT. 
Petitioners argue that the November 91h Order of Decision and the November 16''' 
Amended Order of Decision are exactly thc same, except for changes to the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.' Thus, the appeal of the Order of Decision should be treated as an appeal 
of the Amended Order of Decision. Petitioners provide no authority for this assertion; rather, 
Petitioners' attempt to distinguish McCandless v. ~ r a m e r ?  
' The two- to three-month time frame to complete this case, which Petitioners represented to the Court and which 
Respondents immediately questioned, has passcd,,and the case is no where near completion. 
The Noven~ber 9" Order of Decision will be refelmd to as the "Order of Decision" and the November 16"' 
Amendad Order of Decision will be referred w as the "Amended Order of Decision." 
Petitioners anempr ro distinguish McCandless is specious. The facts in McCandless and this case are nearly 
identical. ?he only diii~rence is McCandless involved a judgmm entered by the District Court and this case 
involves the tinal decision ofthe 130CC. This difference is immaterial. 
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In McCandless, the jury delivered a judgment in favor of the pla~ntiff. Defendant 
appealed. The judgment was amended by the trial court.4 The defendant failed to appeal the 
ammded judgment. The Idaho Supreme Court held that an appeal of the original judgment did 
not constitute an appeal of the amended judgment because the original judgment was rendered 
moot by the amended judgmcnt. The holding of McCandless ts that an amended judgment or 
order must be appealed. An appeal of the original judgment will not automatically constitute 
an appeal of an amended judgment. 
Here, the Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter "BOCC") entered the Order of 
Decision. Petitioner filed a petition for judicial review of the Order of Decxsion. The BOCC 
amended the Order oTDecision and entered the Amended Order of Decision. As in 
McCandless, the Amended Order of Decision rendered the original Order of Decision moot and 
any appeal from the original Order of Decision was likewise rendered moot. 
The holding in McCandless is supported by the overarching principle of mootness. 
When the Order of Decision was amended, any pending controversy arising out of the Order of 
Decision was nultified.' A judicial determination of Petitioners' appeal of the Order or 
Decision will have no practical effect.6 It is not enough that an actual controversy existed at the 
time Petitioners filed their petition for review. The a c d  controversy must cxist at all stages 
of review, not merely at the time the complaint (petition) was filed.7 Here, the actual 
controvcrsy was rendered moot by the Amended Order of Decision. As a result, the petition for 
judicial review should be dismissed by this Court. 
76 Idaha 510,286 P.2d 334 (1955). 
'See Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 133 P.3d 1240 (2006). 
'See Srufe v Hoylc, 140 Idaho 679.99 P.3d 1069 (2004). 
S e e  Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,459 fn. 10.39 L. Ed. 2d 505,94 S. Ct 1209 (1974). 
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THE APPROVALS ARE NOT IDENTICAL AND PETITIONERS HAVE NOT 
Petitioners inaccurately advised this Court that the November 9,2006, approval and the 
November 11, 2006, approval were identical. See Brief of Petitioners, p. 2. Not only is this 
untrue, but Petitioners know it is untrue. Their Opening Brief documents and discusses the 
differences in the two decisions. See Petitioners' Opening Brief, pp. 16-36, Appendix A, pp. 1- 
The factual findings, a~ialysis, conclusions, and order of decision differences as between 
the November 9, 2006, decision and the November 16,2006, decision are key to the dismissal 
of this appeal. Petitioners have asked this Court to vacate the November 9,2006, BOCC 
approval partly because under 1.C. 67-5270(3), Petitioners claim the BOCC's factual findings, 
inferences, analysis, and conclusions do not support the decision. See Petition, p. 9 and p. 15. 
In their November 15, 2006, petition8, Petitioners specifically and expressly complain that 
several of the BOCC's November 9,2006, findings, analysis, and conclusions do not support 
the outconIe and are grounds for reversal. At paragraph 33, on page 9 of their Petition, 
Petitioners set out the basis for their appeal and allege: 
The Findings of Fact, Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law, 
Comprehensive Plan Analysis, and Order of Decision executed by Chairman 
Johnson and Commissioner Brodie on November 9,2006 contain the following 
Findings of Fact which do not support but are counter to amendment of the 
Comprehensive Plan for the 3,000 acres from Agricultural to Rural: 
Petitioners then go on to list many pages of alleged errors. Because several of the 
alleged errors cited by Petitioners were revised in the BOCC's November 16, 2006, decision, 
this appeal (which relies & on the old November 9,2006, findings, analysis, and 
' Powderhorn only cites and relies upon thePetxtioners' initial Petition as the Petitioners' subsequent attempt to 
file a purported "A~ncndcd Petition" is void and of na lcgal impact. 
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conclusions) is moot. What good does it do to have this Court evaluate the November 9,2006, 
findings in order to see whether they are deficient as Petitioners contend and whether they fail 
to support the Order of Decision as Petitioners' contend, when those old allegedly erroneous 
findings were subsequently replaced? Even if the Court remanded this appeal of the November 
9,2006, decision, such a remand is of no effect because that November 9,2006, decision has 
already been replaced by the November 16,2006, decision-from which there was no appeal. 
Since Petitioners have not timely appeaied the November 16,2006, decision, those findings, 
analysis, conclusions, and order are not before the Court for judicial review. In fact, Petitioners 
claim the Amended Order of Decision is void because the BOCC lacked jurisdiction, so 
Petitioners certainly cannot rely on it in any fashion. 
THE NOVEMBER 1 6 ~ ~  AMENDED ORDER OF DECISION WAS THE FINAL 
ORDER OF THE BOCC, WHICH PETITIONERS HAVE RAILED TO TlMELY 
APPEAL. 
Petitioners argue that the Order of Decision was a final judgment and the Amendcd 
Order of Decision was the equivalent of a trial court's memorandum of decision or opinion. 
Unfortunately, Petitioners provide no authority to support this conclusion and their reasoning is 
difficult to follow. Without any legal authority and without any explanation of why a 
Comprehensive Plan Map Amendment is the same to Petitioners as a trial court memorandu~n, 
they simply charge into the axgument that the Amended Order of Decision could not be 
appealed because it was the equivalent of a memorandum decision or opinion, and, thus, no 
appeal was necessary or possible. 
Petitioners cite Hamhlen v. Goffin support their argument. Hambien is clearly 
distinguishable from the facts in this case. First and most obviously, this is a legislative map 
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amendment approved by elected county officials and Hamblen was an adjudicative trial 
resulting in a judicial decision Erom the court. Second, when Kootenai County's elected 
officials issue their Order of Decision, there is never a judgment to follow Unlike a court, the 
County Commissioners simply do not have that legal decision making authority. 
Specifically, in Namhlen, the trial court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
on October 2, 1964.' Defendant filed a notice of appeal on October 19, 1964." The judgment 
was filed October 23, 1964." The Idaho Supreme Court held that the appeal of the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law was not an appeal of a final judgment and, thus, lhe Supreme Court 
was deprived of jurisdiction over the appeal." 
Petitioners argue that Harnblen is controlling in this case. However, the facts in this 
case are more like to those the City of Preston v. Barter decision. In the City of Preston, the 
Idaho Supreme Court discussed and distinguished Hambfen. 
F the City of Preston v. Baxrer, the trial court entered a memorandum, decision, and 
order which included a specific direction as to the judgment to be entered.I3 The City of 
Preston asserted that the memorandum, decision, and order did not constitute entry of a 
judgment as in ~amblen."  The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and held that the 
memorandum, decision, and order constituted an entry of a judgment.15 The Court 
distinguished ~ a r n b l e n . ' ~  In Hczrnblen, the memorandum and fmdings did not contain the 
' Hamblcn, 90 Idaho at 181,409 P.2d at 429. 
' O  Id. 
/ I  Id. 
Id. 
" 120 Idaho 418,816 P.2d 975 (1991). 
Iq 12. 
'"d. 
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specific d~rcction as to the judgment to be entered.17 However, in Preston, the memorandum, 
decision and order d ~ d  contain a specific direction as to the judgment, thus it was appealable is 
As in the Czty of Preston, the BOCC included a specific duection in both Order of 
Decision and Amended Order of Decision along with its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Under Ciry of Preston, the Order of Decision and Amended Order of Decision were both 
the equivalent of "final judgments" entered by a trial court. As staled above, under 
McCandless, the Amended Order of Decision rendered the Order of Decision moot.'g 
Petitioners' own brief belies their argument that the Amended Order of Decision was 
not the equivalent of a final judgment. Petitioners assert that the Order of Decision was the 
equivalent of a final judgment That could be appealed. They also assert that the Amended 
Order of Decision is "identical" to the Order of Decision. Despite being "identical," Petitioners 
state that only the Order of Decision could be appealed because only it was the equivalent of a 
final judgment. Tf the Order of Decision was the equivalent of a final judgment as Petitioners' 
assert, then the Amended Order of Decision is also the equivalent of a final judgment and can 
also be appealed. Petitioners failed to timely appeal the fmal judgment. 
THE NOVEbIBER 1 6 ~ ~  AMENDED ORDER OF DECJSION DID NOT VIOLATE A 
STAY BECAUSE NO STAY BAD BEES IMPOSED BY THE FILING OF THE 
Petitioners also argue that the BOCC did not have jurisdiction to amend the Order of 
Dccision after an appeal was filed by the Petitioners. Thus, the Arnendcd Order of Decision is 
null and void. In support of this argument, Petitioners engage in a "careful reading" of I.R.C.P. 
Rule 84. 
" Id. at 420, 816 P.2d at 977. 
" Id. 
10 Pelirioners failed to appeal the Anicnded Order of Decision within the statutory time period. 
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Rule 84(a)(I) provides the scope of Rule 84. "When judicial review of an action of a 
state agency or local government is expressly provided by statute but no stated procedure or 
standard of review is provided in that statute, then Rule 84 provides the procedure tbr the 
District Court's judicial review."20 The judicial review of a decision by the BOCC amending 
the comprehenstve plan is expressly provided for by statute, namely Tdaho Code 8 67-6521(d). 
l&ho Code § 67-6521 (d) specifically references the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act as 
governing any judicial review.'' 
Both Rule 84 and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act state that filing of a petition 
does not stay the "proceedin~s," "effectiveness," and "enforcement" of the agency action." 
Petitioners argue that the entry ofthe Amended Order of Decision was outside of the scope of 
Rule 84 because the amendment: of Order of Decision does not fall within the definition of 
"procceding" as that term is used in Rule 84. It 1s Petitioners' posilion that "proceeding" 
relates only to enforcement of the agency decision. In other words, ihe BOCC had the right to 
move forward on the enforcement of the Order of Decision, but it did not have the authority to 
amend tliat decision. This argument fails. 
The language of Rule 84(m) does not support the Petitioners' position that 
'"proceedings' means as related to enforcement." Rule 84(m) expressly provides that there is 
no automatic stay of the '>roceedin~s and enforcement of the action of an agency that is 
subject to the petition" for judiciai review.23 Petitioners' reading of Rule 84(m) would render 
the insertion of the word "proceedings" unnecessary. 
'" I.R.C.P. Rule 84(a)(I). 
Idaho Cod= $67-6521(2). 
22 I.R.C.P. Rule 84(m) (emphasis added); Idaho Code $67-5274. 
21 I.R.C.P. Rl~ le  84(in) (emphasis added). 
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The word "proceedings" is presumed to have bgen inserted for a purpose. This Court 
must interpret any rule or statute as whole and in such a way that does not render a provision 
superfluous. It is only reasonable to conclude that the definition of "proceedings" includes the 
act of amending a prior order by the agency. Any other findjng would result in the constructive 
removal of the word "proceedings" from Rule 84(m). I 
The word "proceedings" is not defined in the 1iaho Rules of Civil Procedure or the 
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. In the context of litigation before a trial court, it is 
generally given a very broad meaning. 
The term ')roceeding" is broader than the w o ~ d  "action. " As ordinarily used, it 
is broad enough to include ail metho& of invoking the act ion of courts and is 
generally applicable to any step taken to obtain the interposition or action of a 
court. A proceedzng has also been definedm some act or acts done in 
furtherance of the enforcement of an existing right, real or imaginary, and may be 
by petition in a court o competent jurisdiction or by a summary remedy 
prescribed by statute.' f 
The definition of "proceedings" should be given a similar broad definition in the context of an 
agency proceeding. 
Finally, LA.R. Rule 13 is contrary to Rule 84. Rule 84(m) expressly provides that no 
automatic stay results when a petition for judicial review is filed. Rule 84(m) creates a 
presumption that after a petition is filed, the administra'tive process continues unless the agency 
or a court deems it necessary to issue a stay. This prevents t11e agency fiom having to s ta t  and 
stop each time a petition for judicial review is filed. This is a reasonable approach where 
public hearings have to be scheduled, notices sent out, 'and public confusion could result it. the 
process stopped and started with each petition for judicial review. In contrast, 1.A.R Rule 13(b) 
mandates a stay upon appeal. The stay is automatic for fourteen (14) days, unless one of the 
24 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions 5 3 (2006). 
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exceptions of I.A.R. 13(b) applies. ?his approach is reasonable in the context of litigation 
where the proceedings in the trial court basically end tipon the rendering of a judgment. 
Under Rule 84(r), where the Idaho Appellate Rules are contrary to any portion of Rule 
84, Rule 84 controls. In this case, the automaiic stay of4:A.R. 13@) is clearly contrary Rule 
84(m). Thus, the amendment of the Order of Decision by the BOCC did not violate any stay 
! 
because no stay was in place. 
THIS LEGISLATIVE MATTER IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
No where in the Petitioners' lengthy arguments ;bposing dismissal do the Petitioners 
ever rebut the single piece of key evidence d&umenting that this is a legislative matter not 
subject to a petition for judicial review. Kootenai County determined this Comprehensive Plan 
Amendment decision was a legislative mattei.?s petitioners simply ignore this evidence and the 
consequences thereof. Having determined and in fact having its designated agent and 
representative document in writing that this i i  a legislative matter, Kootenai County is now 
entitled to a presumption of correctness in that legiklati& dete~mination.~~ Idaho law is well 
established in holding that when govemmenGofficials $sue decisions, particularly when 
{ 
interpreting and applying their own regulatio& and ordinances, the agency determination is 
presumed correct and the court shall not subkitute its jAdgment for that of the government 
agency."' Thus, the County's legislative det-inati?nishall not be substituted or reje~ted.~' 
. , 
25 County Planner Mark Mussman wrote: "$he request involves numerous pieces of property. 
Because this is a leeislative matter, specific property owner authorization is not required." 
R.Vol. 1,p. 131. ,I 
. . 
26 There is a strong presumption that the ac;ions of c&ny officials, where they have 
interpreted and applied their own ordinances, are valid; Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71 
(Idaho 2003) i 
i ' 
27 Evans v. Bd. of Cornm'Rs (in Re Bd. of ~ohty ~om$Rs), 137 Idaho 428,43 I (Idaho 2002) 
holding this Court will not substitute its judgment for +at of the agency as to the weight of the 
' i 
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or Kansas) is apparently entertaining for ~etijioners, it is not necessary or legally relevant in 
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direct judicial review." In Burt, citing ~ o o ~ i r  v. Boardof County Commissioners ofAda 
I . . , , 
~ o u n t y ~ ?  the Idaho Supreme Court held "Le~is la t ive~~t ion s sllielded from direct judicial 
review by 'its high visibility and widely felt impact, ontbe theory that appropriate remedy can 
, ., 
be had at the polls.' "3'. Consistent with ldatio case 1134 , , and the above cited Court's analysis, 
j 
this legislative action had extremely "high viiibility and , Widely . felt impact."32 Also consistent 
i 8 ,  
with the Court's legislative analysis in Burt, <s the fact that the public spoke at the polls and 
, ., 
obtained its "appropriate remedy" in that co&nissiqne$ Brodie and Johnson were voted out of 
! ! 
office. Thus, regardless what the jurisdiction: of Florid4 tolds, pursuant to relevant on point 
, ' 1  :, 
'Idaho precedent, no further judicial review isinecessiryich : 1 .  allowed of this admittedly legislative 
! , . matter. I . ,. , ,  . 
, : , . coN~Lvsia~i 
. . , . '! . . . . 
Powderhorn is entitled to a prompt diAmissiliof:@is appeal. The Court lacks 
! ,! .; 
/ I  / 
jurisdiction. First, the only Order appealed bb petition&, the November 9 Order, is moot. . : 
evidence on questions of fact, citing1.C. Ij 6'$5279(1);1;amar COT. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 
Idaho 36, 39,981 P.2d 1.146, 1149 (1999). / . . . , . . 
$ ', f 
. . ,  
2R id. i: : .! :. 
" Burt v. Idaho Fa/ls, LO5 Idaho 65,68,665 b.ld 1075 (@ah0 , ,. 19831, 
! . , i i 
"Cooper v. Board of County ~ommissioners'of~da~d&ty, 101 Idaho 407,409,614 P.2d 947, 
949 (1980) : ,  ! , . .. 
Id. i ., .. . . ; i  
32 The Application's "high visibility" resulted in six v o b e s  of public testimony, extensive 
print and television media coverage, and public hearin@iwt.hat ran past midnight. The 
Application had a "widely felt impact'' in that it invqlv& the entire area of the Powderhorn 
Peninsula, including several thousand acres, approxi'm+ely 186 pieces of property, owned by 
approximately 50 different individuals and entities, ii 
I: : 
1: J .. , !I  / 
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HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN! / :' 
SUPPORT OF MOTTON TO DISMISS: 11 j : , , I   / , : :  
1 ,, 
K:\P\FOXXO24912\0ODDRPLDG\REDLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTILN TO ~ ~ S ~ $ ~ - O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - M W - M R F . D O C  2/23/07 4:52:50 PM 
i 




would have no practical effect because the appealed . dlfldion ,. has already been amended and 
. ,. . 
. . replaced. , . ,  
: 
Second, the County's Amcnded 0rdei of , i.e., its "final decision" dated 
, , * . ' , a  t 
November 16,2006, was never appealed. ~ h b  228-d&!dbe period for appealing the County's 
! . .  . , I : /  , , . 
final decision has expired. As the  mended timely appealed, this Court lacks 
j: 
jurisdiction to judicially review it. 
Third, Petitioners have appealed a not subject to judicial review. 
Given the Court's lack of fairness and judicial efficiency 
, ; . .  . 
. . ;i 
require prompt dismissal. Because the stay &pqsc? ?&inst . I Powderhorn by this Court is 
: : , 
without the protection of a bond or any this Court lacks jurisdiction 
i 
'over this appeal, it is necessary for ~owdeihdrn appeal dismissed without further 
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for Intervenors/ftespondents 
m Communities, LLC and 
: , 1 "  
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC AkD . i . ,  ; 
HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORAI$DUK% 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS: ,121 ., ;. 
, , .. 
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I hereby certify that on the day of Fkbruary, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
and colrect copy of the foregoing docunlent by themethod indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: . .. , 
:,' ; : . . 
Scott W. Reed ., . a i . Hand-delivered 
Attorney at Law .?IZli ' First-class Mait 
401 Front St 'D : Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box A B ' Facsimile - 208-765-5 117 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16 , . .. 
. . 
John A. Cafferty iU , : Hand-delivered 
Kootenai County Legal Services 9151 : First-class Mail 
P. 0. Box 9000 : I Overnight Mail 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83816 
, . iiB. 
, ,  ; 
Facsimile - 208-446-1 62 1 
, ,  , 
. . .  
John F. Magnuson . .-a Handdelivered 
Attorney At Law : First-class Mail 
1250 Northwood Center Ct Suite A , 'Q , ! ' , , Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box 2350 ' Facsimile - 208-667-0500 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83816 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC AND : .: / , i 
HEARTLAND LLC'S REPLY MEMORANDU 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS: 13 
K:~7FOXX024912\00005\PLDG\RBPLY 1N SUPPORT OF MOTION SS.O22307-MRF-MRP,DOC 2/23/07 4:52:50 PM 
MISCHELL.3 R. FULGHAM 
ISB #4623 
PETER J. SEII:~H IV 
ISB #6997 
LUKINS & ..\h'NIS. P.S 
Ste 102 
250 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 838 14-2971 
Teleuhone: (?08) 667-0517 
Facsimile Nc-.: 1'509) 363-2478 
Attorneys foi: Intervenors Powderhorn Communities LLC and Heartland LLC 
IN 1 HI: DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AM) FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl 
NEIGHBOR3 FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, E non-profit unioorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNI"'IES, a non-profit unicorporated 
association; ICOIOTENAI ENVIRONMENTAI 
ALLIANCE, INC., a non-profit corporation; 
NORBERT ~ n d  BEVERLY TWILLMAW; 
GREG and J.\hET TORLINE; SUSAN 
MELm, MIiRLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
KOOTENAI:COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the STATj3 OF IDAHO acting through the 
KOOTENAICOUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON, 
CllARMAb: ELMER R. "RICK CURRIE - - -
and KATIE IiRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official 7apacities; and KATE BRODIE, 




OBJECTION TO AMENDED PETITION 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEWMOTION TO 
STRIKE AMENDED PETITION 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC, and 
HEARTLAK D LLC 
OBJECTION r0 AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVEW/MOTION TO STRIKE: 1 
I 
INTFKVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC and HEARTLAND LLC 
object to Plaintiffs proposed Amended Petition for Judicial Review. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15 the 
Plaintiffs arrendment is improper and should be stricken from the pleadings in this matter. 
The Rule provides: 
Rule ]$(a). Amended and supplemental pleadings - Amendments. 
A pa? may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course a t  any time 
before a responsive pleading is sewed or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the 
trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within twenty (20) days 
after it IS served. Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of 
court car by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be f~eely 
give11 when justice so requkes, and the court may make such order for the 
payment of costs as it deems proper. A party shall plead in response to an 
amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original 
pleatKing or within ten (1 0) days after service of the amended pleading, 
whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
I.R.C.P. IS(:.%)  emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs c o ~ l d  not amend their Petition "once as a matter of course at any time" because 
"responsive pleadings," including Powderhorn's Motion to Dismiss, had already been filed and 
served. As ::r result, Plaintiffs could & amend "by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party."' Neither has occurred. Thus, the Amended Petition is invalid and should be 
stricken ??or3 the pleadings. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 27th day of February, 2007. 
OBJECTIOlc TO AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW/M(lTION TO STRIKE: 2 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
Attorneys for Intervenors Powderhorn 
Communities LLC and Heartland LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I her1:by certify that on the 27th day of February, 2007,I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Scott YN. Reed Hand-delivered 
Atttmey at Law 
401 Front St Overnight Mail 
P. (1. Box A U Facsimile - 208-765-5 11 7 
Coaw d' Alene, ID 83816 
Joh I A. Cafferty Hand-delivered 
Koc~teilai County Legal Services Jf First-class Mail 
I?. 0. Box 9000 Overnight Mail 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 8 16 Facsimile - 208-446-1621 
J o h ~  F. Magnuson U Hand-delivered 
Att~~rney At Law First-class Mail 
1250 Northwood Center Ct., Suite A 0 Overnight Mail 
P. 0 .130~  2350 Cl Facsimile - 208-667-0500 
Cot ur d'Alene, ID 83816 
0BJBCTIOE.T TO AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVLEW/M~3TLON TO STRIKE: 3 
MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM 
ISB #4623 
PETER J. SMITH IV 
ISB #6997 
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
Ste 102 
250 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 838 14-2971 
Telephone: (208) 667-05 17 
Facsimile No.: (509) 363-2478 
STATE OF iClAHG 
COUI.II\! OF KOCiTEN4I 
FILEC 
Attomevs for Av~licants Heartland LLC and Powderhom Communities LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unicorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES. a non-vrofit unicornorated 
association: KOOTENA~ENVIRONMENTALI 
NO. CV-06-8574 
ORDER RE MOTION TO INTERVENE 
ALLIANCE, INC., a non-profit corporation; 
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMANN; 
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN 
MELKA; MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
KOOTENAI COUNTY. a aolitical subdivision / 
of the STATE OF 1 ~ ~ ~ 0 ' a c t i n e  throueh the I 
personally and individually, 
Defendants, 
The application of Heartland LLC and Powderhorn Communities LLC, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 24, to intervene in this action as Respondenmefendant, having duly and regularly 
ORDER RE MOTION TO INTERVENE: 1 
K:\F\FOXX024912\0000S\PLDG\ORDER G ANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE-121406-JKM-MRF.DOC 12114106 
come before this Court and the parties having filed a Stipulation Re Motion to Intervene with 
this Court. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicants Heartland LLC and Powderhorn . . 
%3'< r-F4 Communities LLC are grante leave to intervene and shall be so reflected in the caption of this 
case. 
,LW&"I 
DATED this a day of &&ber, 2 0 7  
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
& 2-3-1 
I hereby certify that on the 2 day of- I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Mischelle R Fuleham Hand-delivered 
Lukins & ~ n n i s ; ~ . ~ .  First-class Mail 
7 17 W Sprague Ave., Suite 1600 Overnight Mail 
Spokane, WA 99201-0466 Facsimile - 509-363-2478 
Scott W. Reed Hand-delivered 
Attorney at Law First-class Mail 
401 Front St C] Overnight Mail 
P. 0 .  Box A 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816 Facsimile - 208-765-5 1 17 
John A. Cafferty Hand-delivered 
Kootenai County Legal Services First-class Mail 
P. 0. Box 9000 C] Overnight Mail 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 7 Facsimile - 208-446-1621 
ORDER RE MOTION TO INTERVENE: 2 
K:~F\FOXX024912\00005~PLDG\ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE-121406-JKM-MRF.DOC 12/14/06 
Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Phone (208) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765-51 17 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIR 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE ) Case No. CV-06-8574 
GROWTH, a non-profit, unincorporated ) 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL ) 
C 0 M M UNIT I E S . a n o n - D r o f i t  RESPONSE OF PLAINTIFFS/PETITIONERS 
unincorporated assohation; KOOTENAI j TO INTERVENORSIRESPONDENT 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE. INC.. a POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC AND 
non-profit corporation; NORBERT and 
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and 
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA; 
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON; 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the STATE OF IDAHO 
acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J. 
"GUS" JOHNSON, C-, ELMER 
R., "RICK" CURRIE and KATIE 
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their 
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
DefendantslRespondents, 
and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
and HEARTLAND, LLC, and COEUR 
D'ALENE LAND COMPANY and H. F. 
MAGNUSON, 
j HEARTLAND, LLC OBJECTION . TO 
) AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 























RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO AMENDED 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Intervenors/Respondents Powderhorn Communities, LLC and Heartland, LLC 
have objected to and moved to strike the Amended Petition for Review adding a 
Fourth Cause of Action for Declaratory Judgment as filed February 5, 2007. The 
basis for the objection is that Powderhorn's Motion to Dismiss was a "responsive 
pleading" therefor, under Rule 15 (a) 1.R.Civ.P. requiring leave of the Court or 
consent of the parties before filing. 
"Responsive pleadings" are these pleadings identified in Rule 7 (a) 1.R.Civ.P. 
It is universally held in federal courts referring to Rule 15 F.R.Civ.P., which is 
identical to Rule 15 I.R.Civ.P., that a motion to dismiss or any other motion such 
as a motion to intervene is not a "responsive pleading." Attached hereto is a copy 
of Sections 1482 and 1483, pp. 580 through 589, Vol., 6, Wright-Miller-Kane 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, fully reporting applicable law upon 
the subject. 
The Objection and Motion to Stike should be denied. 
Dated this 5th day of March, 2007. 
Scott W. Reed 
Attorney for Petitioners/Plaintiffs 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO AMENDED 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the above and foregoing is sent by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this 5th day of March, 2007 to: 
JOHN CAFFERTY, ESQ. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY DEPT. OF 
LEGAL SERVICES 
45 1 GOVERNMENT WAY 
P. 0. BOX 9000 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 838 16-9000 
FAX (208) 446-1621 
MISCHELLE FULGHAM 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
1600 WASHINGTON TRUST 
FINANCIAL CENTER 
71 7 WEST SPRAGUE AVFiNUE 
SPOKANE, WA 99204-0466 
FAX (509) 747-2323 
JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P. 0. BOX 2350 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO AMENDED 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
4 1481 -=s UNDW R- 15(a) 
Rule 15 
plaintiffs right to amend the complaint as of course to include a 
claim against both the original defendants and the new defendant? 
Although there do not appear to be any reported decisions dealing 
with this question, a literal application of the language in the 
Pallant opinion indicates that plaintiff would be able to amend 
without leave of court even as to the original defendants. 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that the liberal amendment as 
of course policy of Rule 15(a) should not be extended this far. A 
rule permitting the revival of the right to amend might become a 
mechanism for abuse by encouraging plaintiff to add nominal 
parties to keep his right to amend alive and by providing a 
potential source of harassment. Indeed, although plaintiffs abili. 
ty to amend is strictly limited by the time restrictions imposed by 
Rule 15(a), if he can extend that time period substantially there 
may be situations in which defendant has relied on the original 
pleading (by responding to it, for example) and would be disadvan- 
taged by the delayed amendment. Even though these concerns 
probably are rather remote and the district court has the authori- 
ty to correct any prejudice by imposing costs or conditions on 
motion by defendant: the sounder approach is to require a motion 
for leave to amend so that the court may consider the possible 
effects of the proposed amendment on the other parties to the 
action. This should not be unduly burdensome on plaintiff 
much as Rule 15(a) specifically provides that leave to amend s 
be freely granted. 
9 1482. - Effect of a Motion for Leave to Amend Dur- 
ing the Time for Amendment as  of Course 
If a party erroneously moves for leave to amend before th 
5. Imp= oonditions VerneU ri. U.S. Postal Serv.. C.A.Sth, 
See 9 1486. 1987, 819 F.Zd 108. 
1. Ignore motion Stewart v.  RCA Colporation, C.A.7th. 
1986. 790 F.2d 624. 
Portion of pededrian's memorandum in 
to ~ e d ~ ~ > ~  motion Zeidi v. Ehrlich, CkBth, 1984,732 F.2d 
to dismiss action under Federal Tort '"*. 
name United Sbtes as defendant, 126x6) motion to &miss and pl 
should have been construed a. motion tiffs in tbei. briefs responding to tba 
to amand the complaint, when no r e  motion indicated that they wished to 
sponsive pleading had been served. file an  amended complaint. The 
580 
Ch.4 ~ C T  OF MOTION TO -D $ 1482 
Rule 15 
motion to amend before the period for amendment as of course has 
expired does so inadvertently and treating the amendment as if it 
had been made under the first sentence of Rule 15(a) avoids c-', 
penalizing the pleader for not understanding the rule. W 
However, since a motion is not a responsive pleading within c'-! 
the meaning of Rule 15(a),2 the question remains whether a party 
desiring to amend a pleading may elect to proceed first by leave of 
court, preserving the right to amend as of course. The language 
of Rule 15(a) does not prevent a party from requesting leave to 
amend before exercising the right to amend as of course; it only 
prohibits the service of amendments as of course when the speci- 
fied time for interposing them has elapsed. Nonetheless, in In re 
Watauga Steam Laundry,3 the court held that plaintiff waived its 
right to serve an amendment as of course by first seeking the 
court's permission to alter its pleading. In that suit plaintiffs 
attorney notified defendant's counsel of the day and hour when he 
would move for leave to amend and the court, after hearing 
arguments on the motion, denied plaintiffs request. He then fded 
the same amendment with the clerk as an amendment without 
leave of court in an apparent attempt to avoid the effect of the 
prior adverse ruling. The court held that to allow plaintiff to 
amend would prejudice defendant, who had prepared for the 
hearing on the motion and had presented arguments opposing 
plaintiffs motion, as well as result in a waste of judicial time. In 
murt granted defendants' rnoti-d Johnson v. Walsh, D.C.Mo.1946. 65 
the Ninth Circuit reversed on the F.Supp. 157. 
gmun-3 that the motion to dismiss did simmonr, co.". Cantor, D . c , P ~ . I ~ ~ ~ ,  3 
not cowtitUte a responsive pleading F.R,D, 197, 
and thus plaintiffs could amend as a 
matter of ~inht. But campare -- ~ " - ~  
KLrk v. U.S., CA.9th 1956, 232 F.2d Net Worth Tax '' 
763. D.C.Wis.1972, 66 F.R.D. 141 (motion 
to amend denied without prejudice). 
Petemon &IS, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A. 
7th. 1961. 188 F.2d 193. But see 
~ ~ 
R~~~~~ ", ~ i ~ d  T~ ~ a,, ~ . ~ . s t h ,  Centifanti v. Nix,C.A.3d, 1989, 866F.Zd 
1947, 159 F.2d 239. 1422 
Butler v. McDounell-Douglas Saudi 2. Motion not responsive pleading 
Actbia Corp., D.C.Ohio 1981. 93 see g 1475. 
F.R.D. ash. 
Dema v. Feddor, D.C.Il1.1979, 470 
F.Supp. 152, &inned without opinion 
C.k?th, 1981, 661 F.2d 937, certiorari 
denied 102 S.Ct. 1433, 455 U.S. 941, 
71 LEd.53 651. 
Jones v. Electrodyne Co., D.C.Mo.1963, 
224 F.Supp. 599. 
3. In re Wabuga ease 
D.C.Tenn.1947, 7 F.R.D. 657. 
See also 
Vars v. International Bhd. of Bailer- 
makers, Iron Shipbuilders, Black- 
smiths, Forgers & Helpers, D.C.Com. 
1962, 204 F.Supp. 245. 
fi 1482 AMENDMENTS UNDEX RULE  IS(^) 
Rule 15 
short, plaintiff, by proceeding first by motion, was viewed 
having waived his right to amend without leave. 
interpretation appears sound in view of the court's earlier ruling 
on motion. No doubt the Watauga court felt that there 
was little reason for allowing a party to avoid an adverse ruling by 
the court by reasserting the same amendment as of course after 
the merits of the amendment have been considered and rejected. 
$ 1483. -Termination of the Right to Amend as of 
Course 
I. Dis)iscussion elsewhere motion constituted 
court's discretion. 
See 8 1475. New York City Bd. 
2, Defined in light d Rule T(a1 Zd, 1983, 709 F2d 
nied 104 S.Ct. 537, 
Rekeveg v. Federal Mut. los. Co., D.C. L,Ed,Zd ,17, 
Ind.1961, 27 F,RD. 431, 
Plaintiff was not entitled to amend 
See elso voi. 5, 5s 1183-1188. 
Ch. 4 TERMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO AMEND 9 11483 
Rule 15 
claims, third-party claims, or counterclaims--may be amended 
without leave of court before respozwes are served.' And if the 
court orders a reply to an answer or third-party answer, the 
original defendant or the third-party defendant may amend the 
answer as of course before the repIy is ioterposed. 
WiIson p.. Crowe-Bnds Co.. C.A.8tb Kais 7. Breier, D.C.Wis.1970, 312 
1977, 666 F.Zd 870, certiorari denied F.Supp. 19. 
9.3 s.ct. 51a. 434u.s. 968,54 L . E ~ . z ~  watseoeo, v. D.C. 
456. N.Y.1964. 232 FSUDO. 3R. 
. ~., 
Fuhrer 7. hhrer ,  C.A.7th. 1961, 292 steiner ". %entieth c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ F ~ ~  ~ i l ~  
F.2d 140. Corp., D.C.Ca1.1963, 140 F.Supp. 906. 
Peckham 7. Sfanlon, C.A.7th7 1957, 241 U.S. v. MacEvoy, D.CN.3.1950, 10 
F.2d 761. F.RI). 323~ . . .. 
Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A. Park-Ia Theatres, Inc. v. Parmount- 
7th. 1951, 188 F.2d 193. Richards Theatres, he., D.C.De1.1949, 
%gem v. G i r d  Trust Co., CA.6th. F.R.D, 267. 
1947, 159 F.2d 239. Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp., D.C. 
~ o f i o  v.   or be^ Sees.. hc. D.C.N.Y. N.Y.19493 9 *.R.D. 204. 
1986, 699 FS&~. 1563. Porter v. Montaldo's, D.C.Ohio 1946, ?I 
Under Rule 15(aI permitting amend- F.Supp. 372. 
ment of the eomplaiot 89 of ~ i g h t  only Johnson v. Waish. D.C.Mo.1946, 65 
before s responsive ~ i e a d i n a  is  F.SUPP. 157. 
served, plaintiffs who- served a n  
amended complaint on the same day 
that defendant served the answer to 
the original complaint were not enti- 
tled to amend their complaint as of 
right, since the amendment did not 
become effective until two days later 
when the amendment was f ied  in the 
district court. Donner v. Sulcus Com- 
puter Corp., D.C.Ga.1984, 103 F E D .  
648. 
Cunard Line Ltd v. Ahney, D.C.N.Y. 
1982, 640 F.Supp. 657. 
De La W a d d u l  v. W a n e  State 
Univ., D.C.Mich.1980, 482 F.Supp. 
1388. 
De Maherbe v. International Union of 
Elevator Constructom, D.C Ca1.1977, 
488 F.Supp. 1121. 
Keman v. Warren. D.CWis.lS71, 328 
F.Supp. 525, & i e d  Without opinion 
sub nom. Niehol v, Ke-. 1972.92 
Pallant v. Sinatre., D.C.N.Y.1945, 7 
F.R.D. 293. 
Simmons Co. v. Cantor, D.C.Pa.1943, 3 
F.R.D. 197. 
Kuhn v. Pacific Mut  Life Ins. Co., D.C. 
N.Y.1941, 37 F.Supp. 102. 
Gaumont v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Ine., 
D.C.ii.Y.1941, 2 F.R.D. 45. 
U.S. for Use & Benefit of Darfman v. 
Standard Sur. & Cas. Co., D.C.N.Y. 
1940, 1 F.R.D. 239. 
Bugpeln & Smith. Ine. v. Standard 
Brands, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1939, 27 
F.Supp. 399. 
4. Couoterclaim amended 
Blaurn. Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., D.C. 
N.Y.1965, 268 F.Supp. 416, 430. 
Van D e e  v. Alurninvm Air Seal Mfg. 
Co., D.C.Obio 1951. I1 F.R.D. 558. 
See also 
S.Q. 735, 404 U.S. 1055, ~ . E d 2 d  B m e r  v. RopLoc Prods. Co., D.C. 
743. Ohio 1949, 9 F.R.D. 208. 
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Rule 15 Indeed, a motion involving any of the Rule 12I.b) defenses normally c'4 
But  when no responsive pleading is allowed, the right to must be made before serving a responsive pleading, whenever such 
amend as of course is limited to 20 days after the service of the a pleading is permitted.8 Consequently, courts have held that the 
original pleading.' For example, in one suit in which defendant filing of a motion to dismiss will not prevent a party from 
fded an answer containing a counterclaim and served it on plain- subsequently amending without leave of court.8 Similarly, an 
tiff and plaintiff filed his reply, the court held that since the reply 
was responsive only to the counterclaim and no responsive plead- 
8. Rule 12(b) motion Ohio Cas. I?. Co. v. Farmera Bank, 
See voL 5, 5 1361. CA.Gth, 1949, 178 F.2d 570. ing $ permitted to the answer, defendant could amend the 
9. After motion to dismiss Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, C.A. , . noncounterclaim portion of his answer without leave of court at Ist, 1948, 165 F.2d 815. 
any time within 20 days after it had been ~erved.~ Jafree 7. Barber, C.A.Tth, 1982, 689 Hantover, Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. d 
. The language of Rule 7(a) indicates that a motion is not a Volentieti & C., D.C.Mo.1988, 688 
responsive pleading? This fact is important because certain mo- 
La Ban v. Twomey, CA.7th 1975, 513 p . ~ ~ ~ ~ .  1377, 1380, citing wright 
tions may be made before, interposing a respon~ive pleading. Miller. 
Walgren Hawe', CA1st* 482 Fidenan A 0  v. Honeywell lnc., D.C.N.Y. 
6. Answer amended Hagee v. City of Evanatnn, D.C.IU.1982, F.2d 95, 96 n. & 1980, 501 F.Supp. 1029, 1032, citing 
95 F.R.D. 344, citing Wright & Mill. 
Lynn v. Cahen, D.C.N.Y.1973, 359 Wright & Miller. 
er. Reis s. Richardson, C.A.D.C.1971, 455 v, U,S. Department of Defense, F.Supp. 565. 
Move Organization v. City of Philadel- F.Zd 1287, 1289 n. 2. D.C.N.H.1976, 71 F.R.D. 349. 
6. Illwtrative case phia, D.C.Pa.1981, 89 F.R.D. 521,523, Smith "' Blackledge, C.k4th* 1971. 451 Sohns v. Dabl, D.C.Va.1975,392 F.Supp. 
B~~ v. R O ~ L O C  prods, Co.. D.C. citing Wright & F.2d 1201,1203 n. 2, citing Wright & 1208, 1219, citing wright & 
Ohio 1949, 9 F3.D. 208. Johnson v. Duval County Teachers McNeiU v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 
Credit Union, D.C.Fla.1980, 507 
1. Motion not rwpoashe  pleading F,SU~P. 307. 
When f*ed no answer Or D.C.IU.1975, 65 F.R.D. 584. 
other pleading in a civil rights action 
AUen v. Veterans Administratio% C.A. &gan v. Harhert Constr. Cop., D.C. prior to the entry of an order h. 
Beck v. Athens Bldg. Loan & Savs. 
9th. 1984, 749 F.2d 1386. 
rnissiDg the but moved ta ASS)n, D.C.Pa.1974, 65 F.R.D. 691. 
N.Y.1980, 507 F.Supp. 254. 
Textor v. Board of %gents of N. mino* K~IIY ". ~ ieh l and  ~ i s t . ,  D.C.S.C. miss the complaint far failing to state Worcester County Nat. Bank v. Cahn, 
Univ., C.A.7th, 1983, 711 F.2d 1387. 1978, 463 F.Supp. 216. 
a claim for relief and in their meme D.C.N.Y.1969, 48 F.R.D. 285. 
1391 n. citing Wright & &idgess v. Youree, D.C,Okl.l977, 436 
randam briefs plaintiffs indicated B ~ W O ~ ,  he. ".D ~ L U X ~  G~ ~ carp., D.C. 
Barksdale v. King, CA.Sth, 1983, 699 F,Supp. 458. 
that they *shed a e  an mended N.Y.1965, 268 F S U ~ ~ .  416. 
- 
F.2d 744. Kameman v. P&co as.. D.C.N.Y.1977, amend an of course and had the t order right to of Martin F,R.D. v. Hunt, D.C.Mass.1961, 29 
MeGruder v. Phelps, C.A.Sth, 1979, 608 75 F.R.D. 673. dismissal was improper. Nolen v. 
F.2d 1023. Fitzharris, C.k9th, 1971, 450 F.2d Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., D.C. Bates v. Western Elec., D.C.Pa.1976, Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431. 
Smith v, Blackledge, C.A.4th, 1971, 451 420 F.s"P~, 521, 
F.2d 1201,1203 n. 2, citing Wright The of defendant to amend ti,e 
Smith v. California, C.A.Sth, 1964, 336 Ginsburg v. Stern, D.C.Pa2956, 19 
miller. counterclaim and crass.efaim as s 
F.R.D. 238, a f f i e d  in part on other 
Richerdson v. U.S., C.A9th, 1964, 336 
grounds C.A.3d. 1957, 242 F.2d 379. 
Nol& v. F i t z M ,  C.A9th, 1971, 450 matter of right was timely when no 
F.2d 958. response had been fded to the crma Amos v. Prom, Inc., D.C.1ow.s 1953, 115 
~~,.k,,vi~h ,. Vasad ~orp., D.C.Pa.1985, claim and counterclaim but merely a F.Supp. 127. Breier s. Northern California 80wling 
617 F.SUPP. 142. motion to dismiss and strike the Roprietors' kss'n, C.A.gth, 1963, 316 Whitternore v. Continental Mius, D.C. 
same. Cone Mills Cop. v. A.G. 5tes, Me.1951, 98 F.Supp. 387. Madden v. Beland, D.C.Ga.1985, 106 
he., D.C.Ga.1974, 377 F.Supp. 222. 
F.R.D. 520. Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A7th, 1961, 292 
wesob Oil Co,, mdi- Roberts v. Husky lndw., InCCC D I ) G T ~ .  See also 
en& D.C.Minn.1983, 568 F.Supp. 556. F".D. 479. Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A. Johnson 7. Bollinger, 1987, 356 S.E.2d 
Chodoa pederal B~~~~ ,,I hvedjga. Oskierko v. Southwestern Horizans, 7th. 1959, 188 F.2d 193. 378, 382, 86 N.C.App. 1, citing 
tion, D,C.N,Y.1982, 559 F.Supp. 69, In'.* DC'IU.1973r F'R'D. 365' Kelly v. Delaware River Joint CommVn, Wright 6t Miller. 
certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 741. 459 Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. fns. Co., D.C. CA.3d, 1951, 187 F.2d 93, certiorari Sonnedle v. Stedef, Inc, D.C.App.ls82, 
U.S. 1111, 74 L.Ed.2d 962. Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431. denied 72 S.Ct. 25, 342 U.S. 812, 96 449 A.2d 1087,1089, e i w g  Wright & 
Harfee v. Hsgen, D.C.N.Y.1982, 538 Porter v. Montaldo's, D.C.Ohi0 1946,71 Miller. 
F.Supp. 389. F.Supp. 372. 585 
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~ l e  15 
mendment as of right may be niade after a motion to strike is 
led.'O Nor does a summary judgment motion made before re- 
ponding have any effect on a party's ability to amend under the 
ust sentence of Rule 15(a)." Motions of this type are not ''re 
ponsive pleadings" in any sense. As stated by the district court 
lut oompsre 11. Summw judgment mation .- 
m rendaots moved to dismiss the Zaidi v. Ehrlich, C.A.5th. 198473ZF.2d 
I but befow a deci- 1218, 1220, citing Wright 8r Miuer. 
sion ,=on and without obtaining Clardy v. Duke Univ., C.A.lth, 1962 
fomuu leave of court or the mitten 299 F.2d 368. 
Consent of defendants plaintiff a  irk v. U.8, c.kgth, 1956, 232 F.2d 
second amended complaiat, if the 163, 
t i s t  amended complaint were db 
*d, plaintiff woald not be al- Ragen v. Girard 'Rust Co.. C.A.Gth, 
lowed, ff i  8 matter of right, to submit 159 F.Zd 239' 
his second amended complaint. Williams v. Wilkerson, D.C.Va.1981, 90 
Smart 7. Ellis Trucking Co., D.C. F.R.D. 168, 170, citiag Wright 8 
Mich.1976,409 F.Supp. 123, judgment Miller. 
affmned in part, reversed in Part ~ a n ~ i n g  v. Greensville Memorial 
~ . ~ . 6 t h ,  1918,580 F.2d 216. certiorari HOSP., D.C.V~.IB~~,  470 F.SUW. 66% 
denied 99 S.Ct. 1497.440 U.S. 968.59 First Fed, Savs, & Loan if Fay- 
L.EdSd 770. etteville s. Federal Rome Loan Bank 
10, After motion to strike 
Car Carries, Iac. v, Ford Motor Co.. 
C.A.?th, 1984,745 F.Zd 1101, certiora- 
ri denied 105 S C t  1758, 470 US. V ~ , ~ , " , " , & f ~ , ~  gE",68 
1064, 84 L.Ed.2d 821. 
, -. Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Paramout- 
.eion of a prison -ate's motion xichar& meatres, bc., D.C.Del.1949, 
.~nsider, in which be s p e & d y  F,~.D. 267, 
reterred to a First Amendment r&- 
gious 2ipht to grow a beard in prison. see atso 
would be treated ffi an amerdment to Miller v. American Export t i e s ,  k., 
a complaint in a civil rights action C,A,2d, 1963, 313 ~ 2 4  ~ 1 8 ,  
alleging that he had been forced by 
piison authorities to shave his beard ~ , t  ., 
in d a t i o n  of the Eighth Amend- In the case of In re Wata,,ga 
men& when at the time the inmate 
fded the motion to ~econsider, defen- 
dants had yet to fde a respome to the 
pieading, and when defendants' mc- 
tion to strike the F b t  Amendment 
claim demonstrated their actual no- tion is not regar 
tice of the claim, therefore, remand pleadiag, . . 
was appropriate for the district court tion is wBtmed 
to address the inmate's free exercise 
by its f,,m, it 
of religion claim. Mwre v. Florida, This is parti 
C.A.llth, 1983, 703 F.2d 516. 
Neifeld v. Steiabeg, C.A.3d. 1971, 438 
F.2d 423, 425 n. 3. 
586 
a. 4 TERM~ATXON OF THE R~GRT TO A M E ~  5 1483 
Rule 16 
in Park-In Theatres, he. v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc.: '2 
It responds to nothing in the preceding pleading and assumes 
there are no controverted material facts to which a response 
&odd be made. If such controverted materid facts exist and to 
which a response should be made, then the motion for snmmary 
judgment must fail. The motion in general assumes the corned- 
ness of the facts theretofore alleged and that there is nothing to 
be added by response and that, notwithstanding the correctness 
of the prior facts, the judgment should he entered? 
Similarly, an amendment without leave of court has been made 
after defendant successfully ffied a removal petition but did not 
m e r  the e o m p l a i ~ t . ~ ~  
Although it is clear that an amendment as of course may be 
served after a motion directed to the pleadings has been made, the 
question often arises whether the first sentence of Rule 15(a) 
continues to be operative once the motion to dismiss is granted. 
Ideally, if it is at all possible that the party against whom the 
dismissal is directed can correct the defect in the pleading or state 
a claim for relief, the court should dismiss with leave to amend.Is 
See slso under Rules 81a) and B(e) Md for mis- 
Wangle Conduit &Cable Co. v. Nation- 
al Eiec. Prods. Carp., D.C.Del.1941.38 
F.Supp. 533, reversed on other 
grounds C.A.3d, 1942, 125 F.2d 1098, 
certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1046, 316 
U S  676, 86 L.Ed. 1750. 
12. Park-In Theatres csse 
joinder of parties, the cwrt of appeals 
held that the remedy of dismissal for 
pleading errors was viewed with dis- 
favor and remanded the w e  for some 
less find disposition at least permit 
ting  lai in tiff to amend. Nagler v. 
Admiral Corp., C.A.2d. 1957,248 F.2d 
319. 
D.C.Del.1949, 9 F.R.D. 267. When the dbtrict court dismissed a 
13. Responds to nothing complaint on a motion for judgment 
9 F.KD. a t  288 (per Rodney, 3.). on the pleadings, but recogoized that 
a claim for damages might eaist re- 
14 Amendment after removal sulting from the fraud allege* in th- - - --
R.F.D. Group Ltd. v. Rubber reply, it should have conditioned its 
Fabrimtom, Inc., D.C.N.Y.1g71, 323 dismissal M We fsilure of plsintiff to 
F.Supp. 521. reframe his complaint to state a 
eiaim for relief. Dowoey v. Palmer, 
15. Dismhal with leave to amend CA.Zd 1940, 114 E2d 
Bdou  v. General Elec. Co., Ck l s t .  
1968. 393 F.2d 398. See also 
187. U.S. ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen. C.A. 
Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citmen Tth, 1956,237 P.2d 953, certiorari d e  
Can Corp., C.A.5th, 1961, 288 F.2d nied 77 S.CL 1049, 363 U.S. 964, 1 
SQ L.Ed.2d 914. 
when the district mart granted a mo Kubn v. Paciftc Mut. Life Ins. Co.. D.C. 
tion to &miss for improper pleading N.Y.1941. 31 F.Supp. 102. 
587 
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Rule 15 Rule 15 .:-\i 
This will afford the party against whom the dismissal is and a b a t  judgment have been entered, or a substantial period of 
. the option of amending the pleading or of having a j time has elapsed since the dismissal, an amendment may be made 
cn 
against him and taking an ap~eal.'~ Dismiss only by leave of court.1s As stated by one court: cu 
leave to amend is consistent withthe mandate set fo 
damages and equitable relief because Czeremcha v. Iateraatio&l Asr'n of 
15(a) that amendments should be freely granted. In of defendants' alleged conapiraey to Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 
puts the adverse party on notice that further proc deprive plaintgf of his civil rights, MGCIO, C.A.llth, 1964, 724 F.2d 
action are possible, whereas an order that does the district court dismissed the com- 1552, 1556, citing Wright & Miller. 
include that right leaves the party who success plaint because of want of prosecution .- 
'smiss the original pleading in doubt whether his opponent can before the r e spo~ ive  pleading was 
Con. ".
Erled. The court af appeals noted that 5th, 1979, 599 F.2d 659, 662. citing 
-end under Rule 15(a). Of course, if repleading could not st the time of dismissal, plaintiff was Wright & 
&ly correct the defects in th coniined to prison, not represented by Elfenbein v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., C.A. 
should dismiss the action witho counsel, and had no notlce that the zd. 1978, 590 F .Z~ 4.15. 
In practice a distinction appears to have bee ease would be called or m y  action taken on the date of dismissal, and United Steelworkers of America, AFL 
courts. In general it has been held that a party sus&ed plaintiffs that CIO v. Meaker Bros. Indus., Inc., C.A. 
course within a reasonable time after an ord he wm entitled to amend his 8th. 197% 457 F.2d 91. 
has been entered, inasmuch as no r !?laint as of right after dismksal if no Kauffman u. Moss, C.A.3d, 1970, 420 
has been s e ~ e d . 1 ~  However, if both an order responsive pleading was filed. F . Z ~  1270, certiorari d e & d  91. s.ct. 
Peckham v. Scadon. l9S7, 93, 400 U.S. 846, 27 L.Ed.2d 64. 
Neal v. Brockway, 1978, 385 A.?d 1069, doctrine of 241 F.2d 761. When a judgment dismirsing the origi- 
Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A. ilomplaintwithoutleave to amend 
Miller. ?th. 1951, 188 F.2d 193. 
909, 18 L.Ed.2d 627. had been ordered, but the clerk had 
Compare When the district court dismissed plain- failed to enter the order as a fmal 
Smith v. California, C.A.9th. 1964, 336 
Although defendant violated the appli. F,2d 530, 
tiffs complaint with leave to amend judgment, the court held that the 
cable rule by filing an amended coun- within 30 days and plaintiff tendered clerk's failure to perform a mhistari- 
terclaim withoUt leave of mu*. the F an amended ,complaint mare than a el function did not prevent the order 
violation did not warrant dismissal of F.2d 140. month late, the mut of appeals held of dismissal from standing as a iinal 
that p W t i f I  could fde the amend- judgment, thus termbating the right 
ment without leave of court inasmuch to amend as of course. Swan v. 
- as a responsive pleading had not been Board of Higher Educ. of City of New 
fded. Ohio &. h. Co. v. Farmers York CA.2d. 1963, 319 F.2d 56. 
.urnstance$, the h u e  of noncompli- 
with was moot. Home 
Bank' C.A6th' 1949' 17' F'2d 570' Ciardy v. Duke Univ., C.A.dth, 1962, 
Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, C.A. 299 F.2d 368. 
Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Con., D.C.08. F.2d 530. Ist, 1948, 165 F.2d 615. 
1977. 74 F.R.D. 93. CasseU v. Michaux, C.A.D.C.1956, 240 Hagee v. City of Ev-ton. D.C.IU.1962, F,2d 406. F.2d 265. 
16. Appeal waives 95 F.R.D. 344, 346, citing Wright & 
Miller. Kelly v. Delaware River Joint Comm'n, University Club v. City of New York C.A.Sd, 1951. 167 F2d 93, ceitiorari 
C.A.2d. 1988, 842 F.2d 37, 51, citing Martin v. Hunt, D.C.Mass.1961, 29 denied 72 S,Ct, 25, U,S, 812, 96 
w,.igh* & ~ $ 1 1 ~ ~  (Opportunity to F.R.D. 14. L.Ed 614, 
amend was waived when appeal tak- F.Zd 140. See also 
en). Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, C.A. 
Cohen 7. Geosbro Hotel Co.. C.A.9th. loth, 1950, 160 F.2d 519. 
17. No leave to replead 1968, 259 F.2d 76. 
Markert v. Swift & Ca., CA.Zd, 1949, 
19. Amendment only with leave 
complaint and denied leave to frle an 228, 
173 F.2d 517. 
amended complaint, the court of e p  The priaoneys right to amend a civil Lumber &, Leventhal, C,k 
held that the district court did rights cumplaint as a matter of course ist, 1948, 165 F,2d 815. 
not commit error when no amend- ended with the entry of a judgment of 
regardless or its could dismksal Fearon 7.  Henderson, C.A. U.S. v. Newbury Mfg. Co., C.A.lst, 1941, 




plaintiff did not file an amenbment pleadings of pro se plaintiff would 
but, rather, filed new allegations in be read broadly. Jackson v. Strayer 
a separate pleading, as no respon- College, D.C.D.C.1996, 941 F.Supp. 
sive pleading had been filed and 192. 
5 1483. Amendments as of Course-Termination of 
the Right to Amend as of Course 
n. 3. Amendment before answer 
Golden Budha Corp. v. Cana- 
dian Land Co. of America, N.V., 
C.A.Zd, 1991, 931 F.2d 196, 202, 
citing Wright, Miller & Kane. 
Prisoner would be permitted to 
unilaterally withdraw procedural 
due process claim asserted in fed- 
eral complaint and pursue claim in 
state court, when federal action 
which had been dismissed was be- 
ing remanded for further action, 
and defendants had yet to file a 
responsive pleading. Street v. Fair, 
C.A.lst, 1990,918 F.2d 269. 
n. 7. Motion not  responsive 
pleading 
Doe v. U.S., C.A.gth, 1995, 58 
F.3d 494. 
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar 
Workers Local Union 392 of the 
United Food & Commercial Work- 
ers Int'l Union, C.A.4th, 1993, 10 
F.3d 1064. 
Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Com- 
munity School Dist., D.C.Iowa 1997, 
. 963 F.Supp. 805. 
Borowstci v. International Busi- 
ness Machines Corp., D.C.Vt.1996, 
928 F.SUDU. 424. - * 
Fox .v. Sierra Devel. Co., 
D.C.Nev.1995, 876 F.Supp. 1169 
(motion for more definite 
statement). 
Heritage Bank & Trust V. 
Landon, Utah App.1989, 770 P.2d 
1009, 1010, citing Wright, Miller 
ik Kane. ~. 
n. 9. After motion to  dismiss 
Plaintiff was free to amend his 
complaint a t  any time prior to the 
entry of judgment on defendant's 
motion to dismiss when defendant 
did not file an answeror any other 
document that  could be deemed a 
pleading; and the approximately 
one-year period that elapsed be- 
tween the filing of the motion to 
dismiss and the entry of judgment 
afforded plaintif? ample opportunity 
to do so. Stein v. Royal Bank of 
Canada, C.A.lst, 2001, 239 F.3d 
389, 392, citing Wright, Miller & 
Kane. 
In a Title VII action against the 
, government, plaintiff employee 
, . could amend hiscomplaint as a 
matter of right, even though tho 
district court had entered a final 
judgment dismissing the complaint, 
when the court of appeals had re- 
versed and remanded and the gov- 
ernment had filed only a motion to 
dismiss or in the alternative for 
summary judgment; the court of ap- 
peals reversal and remand effec- 
tivelyreturned the case to the pre- 
judffentstage a t  which plaintiff 
cou d amend once as a matter of 
right before the government filed a 
res onsive pleading. Bowden v. 
u .2 ,  C.A.D.C.1999, 176 F.3d 552. 
Government's motion to dis- 
miss petition for writ of habeas 
corpus was not "responsive plead- 
ing," and, therefore, prisoner's ob- 
jection to motion could serve as -- 
timely amendment to his initial 
petition. Willis v. Collins, C.A,5th, 
1993, 989 F.2d 187. 
Motions to dismiss and for sum- 
mary judgment do not qualify as 
responsive pleadings for purposes 
of determining whether plaintiff 
may amend the complaint as  of 
right. Adams v. Quattlebaum, 
D.C.D.C.2004,219 F.R.D. 195. 
Petitioner seeking confirmation 
of an arbitration award was entitled 
to amend its petition without leave 
of court when the respondent moved 
to dismiss and cross-moved to va- 
cate the arbitration award, but d ~ d  
not serve a responsive pleading. In 
the Matter-of Arbitration Between 
Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Yuzhnoye 
Design Office, D.C.N.Y.2001, 164 
F.Supp.2d 397,400, oiting Wright, 
Miller & Kane. 
Alexander v. Fujitsu Business 
Communication Sys, ,  Inc., 
D.C.N.H.1993,818 F.Supp. 462. 
Bowers v. Robinson, 1993, 429 
S.E.2d 799, 800, 311 S.C. 412, eit- 
ing  Wright, Miller iE Kane. 
n. 10. After motion to  strike 
Taj Mahal Enterprises, Ltd. v. 
TERMINATION OF TI 
ump, D.C.N.J.1990, 745.F.Supp. 
0, 245, citing Wright; Miller & 
n. 15. Dismissal with leave to  
amend 
Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 
C.A.lOth, 1994,40 F.3d 1119, 1131, 
quoting Wright, Miller & Iiane. 
Nordica USA, Inc. v. Deloitte & 
Touche, D.C.Vt.1993, 839 F.Supp. 
1082, 1093, citing Wright, Miller 
& Kane. 
n. 19. Amendment only with 
leave 
Even though plaintiffs amend- 
ment as of right was not extin- 
guished when the district court 
dismissed as to some but not all 
) defendants, since the dismissal was 
not a final judgment, the district 
i. court, which like plaintiff was under 
; .the misimpression that a final or- 
'' der had issued, did not abuse its 
: . diseretibn by denying plaintiffs 
,: subsequent motion f o r  leave to 
amend, when' plaintiff failed to at- 
tach the proposed amended,com- , , 
plaint to its motion for reconsldera- , 
tion and failed to take the necessary , 
steps to make the proposed amend- 
ment part of the record on appeal. 
Crestview Village Apartments v. 
U.S. Department of Housing & Ur- 
' ban Devel., C.A.7th, 2004,383 F.3d 1 
552. 
Graue Mill Devel, Corp. v. CO- 
lonid Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, " 
C.A.7th, 1991, 927 F.2d 988. 0 
In re Baseball Bat Antitrust n 
Litigation, D.C.Kan.1999, 75 tl 
F.Supp.2d 1189. 9' 
Right to amend complaint as of . a 
right at  any time before responsive h 
pleading is filed terminates once a D 
5 1484. Amendlnents With Le 
General 
If no prejudice is found, the] 
gianted.'3.' 
A more restrictive attitude tow 
proceed in the manner prescribec 
fied if it becomes necessary to 
totally disregarding the requirem 
'=.'Leave normally granted 63  
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, l4 
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union tic 
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plaintiffs right to amend the complaint as of course to include a 
claim against both the original defendants and the new defendant? 
Although there do not appear to he any reported decisions dealing 
with this question, a literal application of the language in the 
Pallant opinion indicates that plaintiff would be able to amend 
without leave of court even as to the original defendants. 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that the liberal amendment as 
of course policy of Rule 15(a) should not be extended this far. A 
rule permitting the revival of the right to amend might become a 
mechanism for abuse by encouraging plaintiff to add nominal 
parties to keep his right to amend alive and by providing a 
potential source of harassment. Indeed, although plaintiffs ahili- 
ty to amend is strictly limited by the time restrictions imposed by 
Rule 15(a), if he can extend that time period substantially there 
may be situations in which defendant has relied on the original 
pleading (by responding to it, for example) and would be disadvan- 
taged by the delayed amendment. Even though these concerns 
probably are rather remote and the district court has the authori- 
ty to correct any prejudice by imposing costs or conditions on 
motion by defendant," the sounder approach is to require a motion 
for leave to amend so that the court may consider the possible 
effects of the proposed amendment on the other parties to the 
action. This should not be unduly burdensome on plaintiff inas- 
much as Rule 15(a) specifically provides that leave to amend shall 
be freely granted. 
4 1482. - Effect of a Motion for Leave to Amend Dur- 
ing the Time for Amendment as of Course 
If a party erroneously moves for leave to amend before the 
time for amending as of course has expired, several courts have 
held that the amendment should not be handled as a matter 
addressed to the court's discretion but should be allowed as of 
right.' This seems sound since in most cases, a party who makes a 
5. Impose conditions 
S-0 6 16% 
Verne11 v. U.S. Postal Sew., C.Abth, 
1987, 819 F.2d 108. - " * * 
1. Ignore motion Stewart v. RCA Corporation, C.A.7th. 
1986, 790 F.2d 624. 
Portinn of pedestrian's memorandum in 
oD,,asition to postal Service~s motion Zaidi v. Ehrlich, C.A.5th 1984,732 F.Zd 
t ikismhs action under Federal Tort 1218. 
Claims Act, requesting that pedestri- In Nolen v. Fitzharris, CA.9th. 1971, 
an be allowed to amend complaint to 450 F.2d 958, defendants Tied a Rule 
name United States as defendant, 126H6) motion to dismiss and plain- 
should have been coastrued as motion tiffs in their brief3 responding to that 
to amend the complaint, when no r e  motion indicated that they wished to 
spansive piesding had been served. N e  an amended complaint. The 
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motion to amend before the period for amendment as of course has cv 
expired does so inadvertently and treating the amendment as if it 
had been made under the first sentence of Rule 15(a) avoids 
penalizing the pleader for not understanding the rule. 
However, since a motion is not a responsive pleading within 
the meaning of Rule 15(a)? the question remains whether a party 
desiring to amend a pleading may elect to proceed first by leave of 
court, preserving the right to amend as of course. The language 
of Rule 15(a) does not prevent a party from requesting leave to 
amend before exercising the right to amend as of course; it only 
prohibits the service of amendments as of course when the speci- 
fied time for interposing them has elapsed. Nonetheless, in In re 
Watauga Steam Laundry,3 the court held that plaintiff waived its 
right to serve an amendment as of course by first seeking the 
court's permission to alter its pleading. In that suit plaintiffs 
attorney notified defendant's counsel of the day and hour when he 
would move for leave to amend and the court, after hearing 
arguments on the motion, denied plaintiffs request. He then filed 
the same amendment with the clerk as an amendment without 
leave of court in an apparent attempt to avoid the effect of the 
prior adverse ruling. The court held that to allow plaintiff to 
amend would prejudice defendant, who had prepared for the 
hearing on the motion and had presented arguments opposing 
plaintiffs motion, as well as result in a waste of judicial time. In 
court granted defendants' motion and Johnson v. Welsh, D.C.Mo.1946, 65 
the Ninth Circuit reversed on the F.Supp. 157. 
giound that the motion to dismiss did Simmons a. v, Cantor, D.C.Pa.1943, 3 
not constitute a responsive pleading F,R,D, 197. 
and thus plaintiffs could amend as a 
matter of rieht. But compare - 
Kirk v. US., C.A.Sth, 1956, 232 F.2d Net Worth Tax League '. Wisconsin, 
763. D.C.Wh.1972. 56 F.R.D. 141 (motion 
to amend denied without prejrrdiee). 
P e t e m  Steels, Inc, v. Seidmon, C.A. 
7th. 1951, 188 F.2d 193. But see 
Rogers v. Girard Trust a,, C.A,6&, Catifanti v. Nh, C.A.Sd, 1989, 865F.2d 
1947, 159 F.2d 239. 1422. 
Butler v. McDonnell-Douglas Saudi 2. Motion not responsive pleading 
Arabia Carp.. D.C.Ohia 1981, 93 See s 1475. 
F.R.D. 384. 
3. In re Watauga case 
Dema v. Feddor, D.C.lll.1979. 470 
F.%pp. 152, affirmed without opinion D.CTenn'1947' F'R'D' 657' 
C.k7&, 1981,661 F.2d 937, certiorari See also 
denied 102 S.Ct. 1433, 455 U.S. 941, vars ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ a  ~ h d ,  of ~ ~ i l ~ ~ .  
71 L.Ed2d 651. makers, Iron Shipbuilders, Black- 
Jones v. Electrodvne Co.. D.C.Mo.1963, smiths. Forgers & Helpers, D.C.Com. 
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short, plaintiff, by proceeding first by motion, Was viewed as 
having waived his right ta amend without leave. 
The Watauga Steam Laundry decision may be criticized on 
the ground that inasmuch as the rule gives a party an absolute 
right to amend, he should not lose that right simply because he 
. mistakenly moves for leave to amend. Indeed, even if the court 
believes that leave originally was requested in order to inconve- 
I. ~ i e n c e  or harass the opposing party, which rarely will be demon- 
;rable, this possibility should not cause the court to disregard the 
liberal amendment policy embodied in Rule 15(a). Thus, the 
Watauga court's decision appears inconsistent with the policy 
behind the rule. Perhaps its holding that plaintiff had waived his 
right to amend as of course actually masks a judicial detemina- 
tion that the claim sought to be added was not meritorious. This 
interpretation appears sound in view of the court's earlier ruling 
on motion. No doubt the Watauga court felt that there 
was little reason for allowing a party to avoid an adverse ruling by 
the court by reasserting the same amendment as of course after 
the merits of the amendment have been considered and rejected. 
4 1483. - Termination of t he  Right to Amend as of 
Caurse 
The first sentence of Rule 15(a) specifically limits a party's 
ability to amend without leave of court to the time "before a 
, - responsive is served." As is discussed elsewhere,' the 
term "responsive pleading" as used in Rule 15(a) must be inter- 
preted in conjunction with the description of the pleadings allowed 
in federal court actions set forth in Rule ?(a)." It is axiomatic that 
the complaint may be amended as of course at any time before the 
answer is served." Similarty, other affirmative p l e a d i n v o s s -  
1. Disoussion elsearhere motion constituted an abuse of th 
court's discretion. Washington 
See $ 1475. New York City Bd. of Estimate, C 
2. Defined in light of Rule 7(a) 2d. 1983, 709 F.2d 792, certiorari 
Rekeweg v. Federnl Mut. Ins. Co., D.C. 
nied I04 S.Ct 537, 464 U.S. 1013, 
Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431. 
L.Ed.2d 717. 
Plaintiff was not entitled to amend his 
See also vol. 5, $5 1183-1188. civil rights complaint as of right be 
3. Amendment before w w e r  cause some defendants had not Sled 
Since the employer had not yet an- 
responsive pleadings in that plaintiff 
swered the 
already had amended hie complaint 
at the time %he once. Glaros v. Perse, C.A.lst. 1980, 
ee's flrst attempt to amend to add two 
628 F.2d 679. 
individuals as defendants, the em- Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. m i -  
ployee was entitled to amend as a fornia, C.A,9th, 1980, 623 F.Zd 613, 




claims, third-party claims, or counterclaims-may be amended 
without leave of court before responses are servedl And if the 
court orders a reply to an answer or third-party answer, the 
original defendant or the third-party defendant may amend the 
answer as of course before the repjy is interposed. 
Wilson v. Crouse-Hin& Co., C.A,8th, 
1977, 556 F.Zd 870, certiorari denied 
98 S.Ct. 513, 434 U.S. 968, 54 L.Ed.2d 
455. 
Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A.7th, 1961, 292 
F.Zd 140. 
Peckham v. Scadon, C.A.7th, 1957, 241 
F.2d 761. 
Peterson Steels, h e .  v. Seidmon, C.A. 
7th. 1961. 188 F.2d 193. 
Rogers v. Girard k t  Co., C.A.Gth, 
1947, 159 F.2d 239. 
Bosio v. Norbny Secs., Inc., D.C.N.Y. 
1985, 599 F.Supp. 1563. 
Under Rule 15(a) permitting amend- 
ment of the earnplaint as of right only 
before a responsive pleading is 
served, plaintiffs who served an 
amended complaint on the same day 
that defendant =wed the answer to 
the original complaint were not enti- 
tied to amend their complaint as of 
right, since the amendment did not 
become effective until two days inter 
when the amendment was f i  in the 
district wurt  Donner v. Sulcus Com- 
puter Co~p., D.C.Ga.198A 103 F.RD. 
648. 
Cunard Line Ltd. v. Abney, D.C.N.Y. 
1982, 540 F.Supp. 657. 
De La M a d d u l  v. Wayne State 
Univ., D.C.Mich.lgS0, 482 F.Supp. 
1388. 
Kois v. Breier, D.C.Wis.1970, 312 
F.Supp. 19. 
Watsco, Inc. v. Henry Valve Co., D.C. 
N.Y.1964, 232 F.Supp. 38. 
Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fm Film 
Corp., D.C.Cd.1953, 140 F.Supp. 906. 
U.S. v. MacEvoy. D.C.N.J.1950, 10 
F.R.D. 323. 
Park-In Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount. 
Richards Theatres, Inc, D.C.De1.1949, 
9 F.R.D. 267. 
Cohn v. Columbia Pictures Corp.. D.C. 
N.Y.1949, 9 F.fU). 204. 
Porter v. Mootaldo's, D.COhio 1946, 71 
F.Supp. 372. 
Johnson v. Walsh, D.C.Mo.1946, 65 
F.Supp. 157. 
Pallant v. Sinatra, D.C.N.Y.1945, 7 
F.R.D. 293. 
Simmons Co v. Cantor, D.C.Pa.1943, 3 
F.R.D. 197. 
Kuhn v. Pacific MM. Life Jns. Co.. D.C. 
N.Y.1941, 37 F.Supp. 102. 
Gaumont v. Warner Bras. Pictures, lne.. 
D.C.N.Y.1941, 2 F.R.D. 45. 
US. for Use & Benefit of Dorfman v. 
Standard Sur. & Cas. Co.. D.C.N.Y. 
1940, 1 F.R.D. 239. 
Buggeln & Smith, Inc. v Standard 
Brands, Inc.. D.C.N.Y.1939. 27 
F.Supp. 399. 
De Mdherbe v. International Union of 4. &unterclaim amended 
CoDbtNcton3 D'cCal'1977' 
Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Gorp., D.C. 438 F.Supp. 1121. 
N.Y.1985, 268 F.Supp. 416, 430. 
Gilmore v. Wibhorek, D.C.IU.1976.411 VaD Dene Air Seal 
F.Suoo. 491. " -. --- Co.. D.C.Ohio 1951, 11 F.R.D. 558. 
Kennan v. Warren, D.C.Wis.lg?t, 328 
F.Supp. 5%. dfmed without o~inion 
sub norn. N ~ C ~ O I  ". K ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  1972. 92 See also 
S.Ct. 735, 404 U.S. 1055, 30 L.Ed.2d Brunner v. RopLoc Prods. Co., D.C. 
743. Ohio 1949, 9 F.R.D. 208. 
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But when no responsive pleading is allowed, the right to 
amend as of course is limited to 20 days after the s e ~ c e  of the 
original pleading.6 For example, in one suit in which defendant 
filed an answer containing a counterclaim and served it on plain- 
tiff and plaintiff filed his reply, the court held that since the reply 
was responsive only to the counterclaim and no responsive plead- 
ing is permitted to the answer, defendant could amend the 
noncounterclaim portion of his answer without leave of court at 
any time within 20 days after it had been served.@ 
The language of Rule 7(a) indicates that a motion is not a 
responsive pleading.? This fact is important because certain mo- 
tions may be made before interposing a responsive pleading. 
5. Answer amended Hagee v. City of Evanston, D.C.Ul.1982, 
L~~~ v. Cohen, D.C.N.Y.1973, 359 
95 F.R.D. 344, citing Wright 
e,'. F.Supp. 565. 
Move Organization v. City of Philadel- 
6. illustrative case phia, D.C.Pa.1981, 89 F.R.D. 521,523, 
B~~~~~~ ". R O ~ L ~ C  prods. CO., D.C. citing Wright Miner. 
Ohio 1949, 9 F.R.D. 208. Johnson v. Duval County Teachers 
Credit Union, D.C.Fla.1980, 507 
7. Motion not responsive pleading F,s,,~~, 307. 
Allen v. Veterans Administration, C.A. nogan .,. ~ ~ ~ b ~ r t  Const?. Gorp., D.C. 
9 t h  1984, 749 F.2d 1386. N.Y.1980, 507 F.Supp. 254. 
Textor v. Board of Regents of N. minois ~ e l l y  v. Richland School Dist., D.C.S.C. 
Univ., C.A.7th. 1983, 711 F.2d 1387, 1978, 463 F.Supp. 216. 
1391 n. citing Wright Brjdgess v. Youree, D.C.Okl.1977, 436 
Barksdale v. King, C.A.Sth, 1983, 699 F , s ~ ~ ~ ,  458. 
F.2d 744. Kameman v. Pskeo Cos., D.C.N.Y.1977, 
Mdjruder v. Phelps, C.A.5th, 1979,608 75 F.R.D. 673. 
F.2d 1023. Bates v. Western Elec., D.C.Pa.1976. 
Smith v. Blackledge, C.A.dth, 1971,451 420 p.supp. 521. 
F.2d 1205 1203 n. 2, citing Wright The motion of defendant to amend the 
Miller. and erossslaim ss a 
Nolen v. Fitrharris, C.A.9th. 1971. 450 matter of right was timely when no 
F.2d 958. response had been filed to the eross. 
Markovieh v. Vxad Corp., D.C.Pa.1985, claim and counterclaim but merely a 
617 F.Supp. 142. motion to dismiss and strike the 
Madden v. Cleland, D.C.Ga.1985, 105 Same. 'One Mills 
". A.G' Estes' 
F.R.D. 520. he.,  DC.Ga.1974, 377 F.Supp. 222. 
Minnesota Standard Oil Ca,, (Indi. 
Roberts v. Husky hdus., Inc., D.C.Tem. 
anal, D.C.Minn.1983.568 F.Supp. 556. 71 F'R.D' 479' 
Chodos v. Federal Bureau of 1nvestiga- 
Oskierko v. Southwestern Horiaons 
tion, D.C.N.Y.1982, 559 F.Supp. 69, In'., D-C.n1.1973, F.R'D. 365' 
certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 741, 459 Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., D.C 
U.S. 1111, 74 L.Ed.2d 962. lnd.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431. 
Harlee v. Hagen, D.C.N.Y.1962, 538 Porter v. Montaldo's, D.C.Ohio 1946,71 
F.Supp. 389. F.Supp. 372. 
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Indeed, a motion involving any of the Rule 126) defenses normally 
must be made before serving a responsive pIeading, whenever such 
a pleading is ~ermi t ted .~  Consequently, courts have held that the 
filing of a motion to dismiss will not prevent a party from 
subsequently amending without leave of court.g Similarly, an 
8. R& 12@1 motion Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Bank, 
See "01. 5, 5 1361. C.A.Gth, 1949, 178 F.2d 570. 
9. After motion to  dismiss Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, C.A. 
1st. 1948, 165 F.2d 815. 
Jafree v. Barber, C.A.7th, 1982, 689 
F.2d 640. Hantover, Inc. v. Omet, S.N.C. of 
Volentieri & C., D.C.Mo.1988, 688 
La Batt v. Twomey, C.A.7th, 1975. 513 p.supp. 1377, 1380, w,.ight & 
F.2d 641. xa:xan- 
C.&.".z'. 
walgren v. Howes, C.A1et, lg7% 482 Fidenas AG v. Honeywell Ioc., D.C.N.Y. 
F2d 95, 96 n. citing Wright a 1980, 501 F.Supp. 1029, 1032, citing 
Miller. Wright & Wer. 
Reiss v. Richardson, C.A.D.C.1971, 455 ~ ~ 1 1  ". U.S. nepariment nefense, 
F.2d 1287, 1289 n. 2. D.C.N.H.1976, 71 F.R.D. 349. 
Smith v. Blackledge. C.A.4thr 1971,451 sohns V. D&I, D.C.Va.1975.392 F.s"P~. 
F.2d 1201,1203 n. 2, citing Wright fm8, 1219, citing wright rnller. 
Mill*- ..--.. 
McNeiil v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 
When fded answer Or D.C.Il1.1975, 65 F.R.D. 584. 
other oleadine in a civil rizhts actir- ,A. 
prior lo an-order dis- Beck v. Athens Bldg. Loan & Saw. 
missing the but moved to dis. Assh, D.C.Pa.1974, 65 F.R.D. 691. 
mi65 the comphint for failing to state Worcester Countv N a t  Bank v. Cohn. .- 
a claim for relief and in their mem* D.C.N.Y.1969, i 8  F.R.D. 285. 
randum briefs plaintiffs indicated Blazon, h c .  v. D e L w  Game Gorp., D.C. 
that they wished to fde an amended N.Y.1965, 268 F.Supp. 416, 
camplaint, plaintiffs had the right to Martin Hunt, D,C.Msss,1961, 29 
amend as of course and the order -c "A 
dismissal was improper. Noien v. 
Fitzharris, C.A.Sth, 1971, 450 F.2d 
958. 
Smith v. California, CA.9th. 1964, 336 
F.Zd 530. 
Richardson v. U.S., C.A.Sth, 1964, 336 
F.2d 265. 
Breier v. Northern California Bowling 
Proprieton' Ass'n, C.A.Sth, 1963, 316 
F.2d 787. 
Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A.7th. 1961, 292 
F.2d 140. 
F.R.D. 14. 
Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., D.C. 
Ind.1961, 27 F.R.D. 431. 
Ginsburg v. Stern, D.C.Pa.1956, 19 
F.R.D. 238, s f f i e d  in part on other 
grounds C.A.3d. 1957, 242 F.2d 379. 
Amos v. Prom, Inc., D.C.1owa 1953, 115 
FSupp. 127. 
Whitternore v. Continental Mills, D.C. 
Me.1951, 98 F.Supp. 387. 
See also 
Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, C.A. Johnson v, Bollinger, 1987, 356 S.E.2d 
7th, 1951, 188 F.2d 193. 318, 382, 86 N.C.App. 1, ci t ing 
Kelly v. Delaware River Joint Comm'm a ... 
C.A.Sd, 1951, 187 F.2d 93, certiorari Sonneville v. Stedef, Inc., D.C.App.1962, 
denied 72 S.Ct. 25, 342 U.S. 812, 96 449 A.2d 1087, 1089, citing Wright & 
L.Fd. 614. Miller. 
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mendment as of right may be made a f t e r  a mot ion  to strike is 
iIed.'"or does a summary judgment  motion made before re. 
panding have any effect on a party's ability to amend u n d e r  the 
irst sen tence  of Rule 15(a)." Motions of this type are not "re. 
,pensive pleadings" in any sense. As stated by the district court 
3ut compare 11. Summary judgment motion 
&%?"-defendants moved to dismiss the 
i d complaint but before a deci. 
6 ,  ,,ereon and without obtaining 
f~ lave of court or the written 
eons... of defendants plaintiff filed a 
second amendd complaint, if the 
first amended complaint were dw- 
missed, plaintiff would not be a6 
lowed, ss a matter of right, to submit 
hi, seesnd amended complaint. 
Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co.. D.C. 
Mich.1916,409 F.Supp. 129, jildgment 
sffirmed in part, reversed in part 
C.A.Bth, 1978, 580 F.2d 215, certiorari 
denied 99 S.Ct. 1497, 440 U.S. 958,59 
L.Ed.2d 770. 
10. After motion to  stcike 
CBI Oarriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 
C.A.7th. 1984,745 F.2d 1101. certiora- 
ri denied 105 S.Ct. 1758. 470 U.S. 
1054, 84 L.Ed.7.d 821. 
%+portion of a prison inmate's motion 
*consider, in which he specificails 
.ed to s Fint  Amendment reli- 
g,,*s right to grow a beard in prison, 
would be treated as an amendment to 
a complaint in a civil rights action 
alleging that he had been forced by 
authorities to shave his beard 
in violation of the Eighth Amend- 
ment, when at the time the inmate 
f d d  the motion to reconsider, defen- 
daats had yet to Tic a response to the 
pleading, and when defendants' m o  
tion to strike the First Amendment 
daim demonstrated their actual no- 
tice of the claim, therefore, remand 
waa appropriate for the district murt 
to addren the inmate's free exercise 
of religion claim. Moore v. Florida. 
C.A.1ltb. 1983 103 F.2d 516. 
Neifeld v. Steinbere. C.A~3d. 1971, 438 
Zaidi v. Ehrlich, C.A.Sth, 1984,732 F2d 
1218, 1220, citing Wright & Miller. 
Clardy v. Duke Univ., CA.4th, 1962, 
299 F.2d 368. 
Kirk v. U.S., C.A.Sth, 1956, 232 F2d 
763. 
Rogers v. Girard T m t  Co., C.A.Gth, 
1947, 159 F.2d 239. 
Williams v. Wilkerson, DC.Va.1981. 90 
FRD. 168, 170, citiag Wright & 
Miller. 
Manning v.  Grsensville Memorial 
Hasp., D.C.Va.1979, 470 F.Supp 662. 
First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'o of Fay 
etteville v. Federal Home Loan Bank 
Bd., D.C.Ark.1977, 426 F.Supp. 454. 
affirmed on the merits C.A.Bth, 1978, 
570 F.2d 693. 
Van Dette v. Aluminum Air Seal Mfg. 
Co., D.C.Ohia 1951. 11 F.R.D. 558. 
Park-In Theatres, Ine. v. Parmount- 
Richards Theatres. Inc., D.C.Del.1949, 
9 F.R.D. 267. 
See ako 
Miller v. American Export Lines, Im., 
C.A.2d, 1963, 313 F.2d 218. 
But see 
In the care of In re Watauga Steam 
Laundry, D.C.Tenn.1947, 7 F.R.D. 
657,660, the court held that a motion 
for summary judgment terminsfed 
petitioner's ability to amend as Of 
course. It  stated: "Ordiarily a m* 
tion is not regarded as s respowive 
pleading. . . . But when the mo 
tion is construed by its effect and not 
by its form, it msy be a res~onsive 
pleading. This is p & i ~ d a r t ~  true 
where the effect of granting the nfo- 
tion is to dispase of the case on its 
F.2d 423, 425 n . j .  merits." 
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in Pkk-In Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount-Richards  Theatres, Inc.: '2 
It responds to  nothing in the  preceding pleading and  assumes 
there are no controverted material facts to  which a response 
should be  made. If such controverted material facts exist and  to 
which a response should be  made, then the  motion for summary 
judgment must fail. The motion in  general assumes the correct- 
ness of the  facts theretofore alleged and tha t  there is nothing to 
be added by response and that, notwithstanding the  correctness 
of the  prior fa&, the  judgment should be entered.'3 
Similar ly ,  an amendment without leave of court has b e e n  m a d e  
a f t e r  defendant successfully filed a removal petition but did not 
a n s w e r  the complaint.'6 
Although it is c l e a r  that an amendment as of course  m a y  b e  
served after a mot ion  directed to the plead'mgs has been made, the 
quest ion often arises whether the first sen tence  of Ru le  15(a) 
continues to be opera t ive  once the motion to dismiss is granted. 
Ideally, if it is at all possible that the party against whom the 
dismissal is directed can correct the defect in the pleading or state 
a claim for  relief, the court should dismiss with leave to amend.'" 
Sea also under Rdeh 8(a) and 8(e) and for mie 
Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. Nation- 
al Elee Pmds. Corp., D.C.De1.1941, 38 
F.Supp. 533, reversed on other 
grounds C.k3d, 1942, 125 F.2d 1008, 
certiorari denied 62 S.Ct. 1046 316 
U.S. 676, 86 L.Ed. 1150. 
12. Park-In Theatres case 
joinder of parties, the court of appeals 
held that the remedy of dismissal for 
pleading enors was viewed with dis- 
favor and remanded the case for some 
less final disposition at least pennit- 
ting plaintiff to amend. Nagler v. 
Admird Corn., C.A.Zd, 1951,248 FZd 
319. 
D.C.De1.1949, 9 F.R.D. 261. When the district court dismissed a 
13. Rwponds t o  nothing complaint on a motion for judgment 
9 F.R.D. at 268 (per Rodney. 53. on the pleadings. but recognized that a claim for damages might exist r* 
14. Amendment after removal sulting from the fraud alleged in the 
R.F.D. croup ~ t d .  ". reply, it should have conditioned its 
pabricators, I ~ ~ . . ,  ~ ~.IV.y.1971, 323 dismissal on the failure of plaintiff to 
F.Supp. 521. reframe his complaint to state a 
claim for reliel. Domey v. Palmer, 
with leave to amend C.A.2d. 1940. 114 F.2d 116. 
Ballou v. Generat Elec. Co., C.A.lst, 
1988 298 F2d 398. See also . .. ., . -. . .-
Breier v. Northern California Bowling 
Proprietors' Adn, C.A.9th. 1963, 316 
F.Zd 787. 
Lone Star Motor Import, Ine v. Citroen 
Cars Corp., CA.Sth. 1961, 288 F.2d 
69. 
Willingham v. fieeland Indus., Inc., 
C.A.6th. 1969, 415 F.2d 755. 
U.S. en =I. Atterbury v. Rsgen. C.A. 
7th. 1956.237 F.2d 953, certiorari d e  
nied 77 S.Ct. 1049, 353 U.S. 964, 1 
L.Ed.2d 914. 
When the district court granted a mc, Kuhn v. Paciiic Mut. Life Ins. Co.. D.C. 
tion to dismiss for improper pleading N.Y.1941, 37 F.Supp. 102. 
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Rule 15 Rule 15 32 
This will afford the party against whom the dismissal is granted and a f i a l  judgment have been entered, or a substantial period of .'A 
. the option of amending the pleading or of having a judgment time has elapsed since the dismissal, an amendment may be made 
entered against him and taking an appeal.'B Dismissing with only by leave of court.1s As stated by one court: 
C V  
leave to amend is consistent with the mandate set forth in Rule damage and equitable relief because Czeremcha v. International Ass'n of 
15(a) that amendments should be freely granted. In addition, it of defendants' alleged conspiracy to Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 
puts the adverse party on notice that further proceedings in the deprive plaintiff of his civil rights, AFWO, C.A.llth, 1984, 724 F.2d 
action are possible, whereas an order that does not specifically the district court dismissed the com- 1552, 1556, citing Wtight & NIilIer. 
include that right leaves the party who successfully moved to plaint became of want of prosrmtian 
before the responsive pleading was Euon Carp. v. Maryland Cas. Ca., C.A. dismiss the original pleading in doubt whether his opponent can The of appeals noted that 5 th  1979, 599 F.2d 659, 662, citing 
,end under Rule 15(a). Of course, if repleading could not at  the time of dismissal, plaintiff was Wright & Miller. 
:sibly correct the defects in the party's claim, then the court confined to prism, not represented by Elfenbein v. ~ u l f  & W. Indus., lnc., C.A. 
;uld dismiss the action without leave to replead.'" counsel, and had no notice that the 2d, 1978, 590 ~ . 2 d  445. 
w e  would be called or any action 
In practice a distinction appears to have been drawn by the taken on the dab  of dhmissd, United Steelworkers of America, AFL- 
courts. In general it has been held that a party may amend as of con~ntion that CIO V. Mesker Bros. Indus., Ine., C.A. 
course within a reasonable time after an order dismissing the he was entitied to amend his corn. Sth, 1972. 457 F.2d 91. 
complaint has been entered, inasmuch as no responsive pleading pkint as Of "ght after if no Kauffman v. Moss, C.A.Bd, 1910, 420 
has been s e ~ e d . ' ~  However, if both an order dismissing the action responsive pleading was filed. F . Z ~  1270, certiorari denied 91 Peckham v. Scanloo, C.A.7th, 1957, 93, p00 U.S. 846, 27 L . E ~ . z ~  84.
Neal v. Brockway, 1978,385 A,% 1069. doetrine of abstention. Sarfaty v. No- 241 F.2d 761. 
1070, 136 Vt. 119, citing Wright & wak, CA.7th. 1966,369 F.2d 256, cer- 
When a judgment dismissing the arigi- 
Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon. C.A. rial complaint without leave to 
m e r .  tiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 1691, 387 U.S. 7th, 1951, 188 F.Zd 193. 
909, 18 L.Ed.2d 627. had been ordered, but the clerk had 
Compare When the district court dismissed plain- failed to enter the order as a final 
Smith v. California, C.A9th, 1964, 336 
Although defendant violated the applf F,2d 530, 
tiffs complaint with leave to amend judgment, the court held that the 
cable mle by fding an amended coun- within 30 days and plaintiff b d e r e d  
clerk's failure to perform a ministeri- 
terelaim without leave of court, the Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A.7th. 1961, 292 
an amended complaint more than a al function did not prevent the order 
violation did not warrant dismissal of F.2d 140. month late, the caul* of appeals held of dismkal from standing as a final 
the amended counterclaim Mosler v M/K Ventures Int'l Inc, D.C. that plaintiff could flle the amend- 
judgment, thus terminating the right 
when defendant had since refiled the U1.1984, 103 F.R.D. 385, 387, citing ment without leave of court inasmuch to amend as of course. Swan v. 
eounterclairn with a motion to allow Wtight & MiIIer. as a responsive pleading had not been Board of Higher Educ. of City of New 
. -- it filed as amended; under the cir- Amend after order filled. Ohio Cas. IN. Co. v. Farmers 
York, CA.2d, 1963, 319 F.Zd 56. 
w t a n c e s ,  the i sue  of noncompli- 
Bank, C.A6th, 1949, 178 F.2d 570. 
Clardy v. Dnke Univ., C.A.4th. 1962, 
ante the rule was moot, some Smith v. California, C.A.gth, 1964, 336 Keene Lumber Ca. v. Leventhal, C.A. 299 ~ . 2 d  368. 
Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Carp., D.C.Ga. F.2d 530. Ist, 1948, 165 F.2d 815. 
1977, 74 F.R.D. 93. Richardson v. US., C.A.gth, 1964, 336 Case11 Y .  Micham, C.A.D.C.1956, 240 Hagee v. City of Evanston. D.C.IlI.1982, F,2d 406, F.2d 265. 
16. Appeal waives 95 F.R.D. 344, 346, citing Wright & 
Case v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. Miller. Kelly v. Delaware River Joint Cammh, 
University Ciub v. City d New York, C.A.5th, 1961, 294 F,Zd 676, 
C.A.2L 1988, 842 F.2d 37, 37, citing Martin ", Hunt, D,c~Mass,1961, Z9 
C.A.3d 1951, 187 F.2d 93, certiorari 
wright & &filler (opportunity to Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, C.A.7th. 1961, 292 F.R.D. 14. 
denied 72 S.Ct. 25. 342 U.S. 812, 96 
amend was waived when appeal tak- F.2d 140. 
L.Ed. 614. 
See 8190 
en). 222 East Chestnut St. Corp. v. Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, C.A. 
Lakefront Realty Corp., C.A.7th. W e n  v. Gensbm Hotel Co.. CA.Sth, loth, 1950, 180 F . Z ~  519. 
17. No leave to replead 1958. 256 F.2d 513, eenior& denied 1958, 259 F.2d 78. 
When the district court dismissed the 79 s.c~. ~ 2 ,  358 U.S. 907, 3 ~.Ed..2d Markert v. Swift & Ca., C.A.Zd, 1949, ' 19. Amendment only with leave 
complaint and denied leave to f i e  an 228, 
173 F.2d 517. 
amended complaint, the court of ap- 
peals held that the htrict 
U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Bibb, C.A.7th2 1958, 
The p-ner's right amend a civil Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, C.A. 
rights complaint as a matter of course lst, 1948, 165 F.2d 815, 
not commit error when no amend- 255 F.Zd 772. ended with the entry of a judgment of 
ment, repardless of its phrasing, could In a suit by a penitentiary inmate dismissal. Feeronv. Henderson, C.A. U.S. v. Newbury Mfg. Co., C.A.lst, 1941, 
be presented that would avoid the against the warden and others for Zd, 1985, 756 F.2d 267. 123 F.2d 453. 
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Rule 15 CH. 
plaintiff did not file an amendment pleadings of pro se plaintiff would 
but, rather, filed new allegations in be read broadly. Jackson v. Strayer 
a separate pleading, as no respon- College, D.C.D.C.1996, 941 F.Supp. 
sive pleading had been filed and 192. 
8 1483. Amendments as of Course-Termination of 
the Right to Amend as of Course 
n. 3. Amendment before answer 
Golden Budha Corp. v. Cana- 
dian Land Co. of America, N.V., 
C.A.2d, 1991, 931 F.2d 196, 202, 
citing Wright, lMiller & Kane. 
Prisoner would be permitted to 
unilaterally withdraw procedural 
due process claim asserted in fed- 
eral complaint and pursue claim in 
state court, when federal action 
which had been dismissed was be- 
ing remanded for further action, 
and defendants had vet to file a -. - 
responsive pleading. street v. Fair, 
C.A.lst, 1990, 918 F.2d 269. 
n. 7. Motion not  responsive 
pleading 
Doe v. U.S., C.A.gth, 1995, 58 
F.3d 494. 
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar 
Workers Local Union 392 of the 
United Food & Commercial Work- 
ers int'l Union, C.A.4th, 1993, 10 
F.3d 1064 
~ockhar t  v. Cedar Raplds Com- 
munity School Dist., D.C.Iowa 1997, 
968 F.Supp. 805. 
Borowsld v. International Busi- 
ness Machines Corp., D.C.Vt.1996, 
928 F.SUDD. 424 . . 
Fox v.  Sierra Devel. Co., 
D.C.Nev.1995, 876 F.Supp. 1169 
(motion for more definite 
statement) 
~~ ..-.,.
Heritage Bank & Trust v. 
Landon, App.1989, 770 P.2d 
1009, 1010, citing Wright, Miller 
& Kane. 
n. 9. After motion to dismiss 
Plaintiff was free to amend his 
complaint at  any time prior to the 
entry of judgment on defendant's 
motion to dismiss when defendant 
did not file an answer or any other 
document that could be deemed a 
pleading; and the approximately 
one-year period that elapsed be- 
tween the filing of the motion to 
dismiss and the entry of judgment 
afforded plaintiff ample opportunity 
to do so. Stein v. Royal Bank of 
Canada, C.A.lst, 2001, 239 F.3d 
389, 392, citing Wright, Miller & 
Kane. 
In a Title VII action against the 
government, plaintiff employee 
could amend his complaint as a 
matter of right, even though the 
distr~ct court had entered a final 
judgment dismissing the complaint, 
when the court of appeals had re- 
versed and remanded and the gov- 
ernment had filed only a motion to 
dismiss or in the alternative for 
summary judgment; the court of ap- 
peals reversal and remand effec- 
tively returned the case to the pre- 
~udgment stage a t  which plaintiff 
could amend once as a matter of 
right before the government filed a 
res onsive pleading. Bowden v. 
u.J,  C.A.D.C.1999, 176 F.3d 552. 
Government's mot~on to dis- 
miss petltion for writ of habeas 
corpus was not "responsive plead- 
ing," and, therefore, prisoner's ob- 
jection to motion could serve as 
timely amendment to his initial 
petition. Willis v. Collins, C.A.5th, 
1993, 989 F.2d 187. 
Motions to dismiss and for sum- 
mary judgment do not qualify as 
responsive pleadings for purposes 
of determining whether nlaintiff 
may amend the complaiAt as of 
right. Adams v. Quattlebaum, 
D.C.D.C.2004.219 F.R.D. 195 
Petitioner seeking confirmation 
of an arbitration award was entitled 
to amend its petition without leave 
of court when the res~ondent moved 
to dismiss and cross-moved to va- 
cate the arbitration award, but did 
not serve a responsive pleading. In 
the Matter of Arbitration Between 
Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. Yuzhnoye 
Design Office, D.C.N.Y.2001, 164 
F.Supp.2d 397,400, citing Wright, 
Miller & Kane. 
Alexander v. Fujitsu Bus~ness 
Communication Sys., Inc., 
D.C.N.H.1998,818 F.Supp. 462. 
Bowers v. Robinson, 1993, 429 
S.E.2d 799, 800, 311 S.C. 412, cit- 
ing  Wright, Miller & Kane. 
n. 10. After motion to strike 
Taj Mahal Enterprises, Ltd. v. 
Trump, D.C.N.J.1990, 745 F.Supp. 
240. 245, citing Wright, Miller 
Kane. 
n. 15. Dismissal with leave t o  
amend 
Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 
CA.lOth, 1994,40 F.3d 1119, 1131, 
quoting Wright, Miller & Kane. 
Nordica USA, Inc. v. Deloitte & 
Touche, D.C.Vt.1993, 839 F.Supp. 






& Kane. 1 n. 19. Amendment only with .. - 
leave 
Even though plaintSs amend- 
ment as of right was not extin- 
guished when the district court 
dismissed as to some but not all 
defendants, since the lsmissal was 
not a final judgment, the district 
court, which like plaintiff was under 
the misimpression that a final or- 
der had issued, did not abuse its 
discretion by denying plaintiffs 
subsequent motion for leave to 
amend, when plaintiff failed to at- 
tach the proposed amended com- 
plaint to its motion for reconsidera- 
tion and failed to take the necessary 
steps to  make the proposed amend- 
ment part of the record on appeal. 
Crestview Village Apartments v. 
U.S. Department of Housing & Ur- 
ban --- Devel., C.A.7th, 2004,383 F.3d 
3325. 
Graue Mill Devel. Corp. v. GO- 
lonial Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 
C.A.7th, 1991, 927 F.2d 988. 
In re Baseball Bat Antitrust 
Litigation, D.C.Kan.1999, 75 
F.Supp.2d 1189. 
Right to amend complaint as of 
right at  any time before responsive 
pleading is filed terminates once a 
8 1484. Amendments With LI 
General 
If no prejudice is found, thc 
g~anted.'~.' 
A more restrictive attitude toy 
proceed in the manner prescribe 
fied if it becomes necessary t c  
totally disregarding the requirer 
13.'Lcave normally granted 6 
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, 1 
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union t' 
JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2350 
1250 Northwood Center Court, Suite A 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14 
Phone: (208) 667-0100 
Fax: (208) 667-0500 
ISB #4270 
Attorney for Intervenors 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAI-10, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit 
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., 
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and 
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and 
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA; 
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting 
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J. 
"GUS" JOIHNSON, CHAIRMAN; 
ELMER R. "RICK CURRIE and KATIE 
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their 
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
NO. CV-06-8574 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
INTERVENE (COEUR D'ALENE 
LAND COMPANY AND H. F. 
MAGNUSON) 
ORDER GRANTNG MOTION TO INTERVENE 
(COELJR D'ALENE LAND COMPANY AND 
H. F. MAGNUSON) -- PAGE 1 
and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
and HEARTLAND, LLC, 
Intervenors/Responde~lts. 
The Court, being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders and finds as follows: 
(1) Coetlr d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson moved the Court to intervene as 
additional Defendants. Said t~fotion came or1 for hearing before the Court on February 27,2007 at 
(2) No objection was interposed in response by Plaintiffs, Defendants, or Intervenors 
Powderhorn Commtmities, LLC and Heartland, LLC 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of Coeur d'Alene Land Compaliy and H. F. 
Magnuson for permissive intervention be, and the same hereby is, granted 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated this -x day of March, 2007. 
, -I 
CHAM FS W HOSACK 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE 
(COEUR D'ALENE LAND COMPANY AND 
H. F. MAGNUSON) -- PAGE 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following, via facsimile this day of March, 2007: 
Scott W. Reed 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box A 
Coeilr d' Alene, ID 838 16 
Fax: 208\765-5117 
Mischelle Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis, PS 
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center 
717 W. Sprague Avenue 
Spolcane, WA 9920 1-0466 
Fax: 509\747-2323 
John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attorney John F. Magnuson 
Kootenai County Department of Attorney at Law 
Legal Services P.O. Box 2350 
45 1 Government Way Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16 
P.O. Box 9000 Fax: 2081667-0500 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-9000 
Fax: 208\446-1621 
CDALAND WMORD MTERVENE.wpd 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE 
(COEUR D'ALENE LAND COMPANY AND 
H. F. MAGNUSON) -- PAGE 3 
MISCXELLE R. FULGHAM 
ISB #4623 
PETER J. SMITH IV 
ISB #6997 
LUKTNS & ANNIS. P.S. 
Ste. 102 
250 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur dlAlene. a3 83814-2971 
Televhone: 1208) 667-0517 
Facsimile No.: (509) 363-2478 
Attornevs for Intervenors Powderhorn Communities LLC and Heartland LLC 
TN THE DISTRiCT COURT OF THE FTRST JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O W Y  OF KOOTENAl 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSUSLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unlcorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit unicorporaled 
association; KOOTENAT ENVIRONMENTAL 
ALLIANCE, MC., a non-profit corporation; 
NORBERT and BEVERLY T W I L L M m ;  
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN 
MELKA; MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political subdivis~on 
of the STATE OF IDAHO acting through the 
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON, 
CHAIRMAN; ELMER R. "RICK CUFWE 
and KATIE BRODJE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities, and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and ~ndividually, 
Defendants, 
and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC, and 
HXARTLAND LLC 
NO. CV-06-8574 
NOTICE OF HEARING 6 . c  
NOTICE OF HEARING: I 
NOTICE IS kEREBY GIVEN that on Tuesday, June 5,2007, at the hour of 3:30 p.m., 
or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, in the Courtroom of the above entitled Court, 
324 West Garden Avenue, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, before the Hoi~orable Charles W. Hosack, 
intervenors Powderhom Communities LLC and Heartland LLC will call on for hearing their 
Objection to Amended Petition for Judicial ReviewIMotion to Strike Amended Petition, filed 
with the court on February 27,2007. 
DATED this a day oEMaroh, 2007. 
LUKXNS & ANNIS, P.S. 
BY 
PETER J. SMITH N 
TSB #6997 
Attorneys for lnteivenors Powderhom 
Commuiities LLC and ndIeartland LLC 
NOTICE OF HEARING: 2 
. - .- --.. -.a. nra hmr nnc 1116107 
CERTIFJCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 2007, I caused to be sewed a true and 
following: 
correct copy of the foregoing the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
Scott W. Reed 0 Hand-delivered 
Attorney at Law @ First-class Mail 
401 F& st 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816 
D overnight Mail 
iJ Facsimile- 208-765-51 17 
John A. Cafferty Cl Band-delivered 
Kootenai County Legal Services First-Class Mail 
P. 0. Box 9000 U Overnight Mail 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 0 Facsimile - 208-446-1 62 1 
John F. Magnuson 0 Hand-delivered 
Altomey At Law First-class Mail 
1250 Northwood Center Ct Suite A O Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box 2350 0 Facsimile - 208-667-0500 
Coeur dlAtene, ID 838 16 
NOTICE OF I-TEARING: 3 
STATE GF IDAJ-10 
i'c!(!il;y !'F EcOTEN,?,I ) ss 
Ti__i ' ; .  
Kootenai County Department of Legal Services 
John A. Cafferty, Senior Staff Attorney ISB # 5607 pf- 
PO Box 9000 1 , 1 p1.i 3: 22 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 6-9000 
Phone: (208) 446-1620 
Fax: (208) 446-1621 
jcafferty@kcgov.us 
Attorney for Respondents 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit, unincorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit 
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., a 
non-profit corporation; NORBERT and 
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and 
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA; 
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
vs. I 
KOOTENAl COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the STATE OF IDAHO 
acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J. 
"GUS" JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN; ELMER 
R. "RICK CURRIE and KATIE BRODIE,, 
COMMISSIONERS, in their official 
capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 1 
H:\Planning\Powderhorn\Distrkl Court\Respondents' Brief.DOC 
CASE NO. CV-06-8574 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
and, 
HEARTLAND LLC and POWDERHORN 
COMMUNITIES, LLC, and COEUR 
D'ALENE LAND COMPANY and H.F. 
MAGNUSON, 
COME NOW, the Respondents, Kootenai County and others, by and through 
their attorney of record, Kootenai County Legal Services, John A. Cafferty, and hereby 
respond to Petitioners' hereinafter "NEIGHBORS, brief filed on February 14, 2007 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Neighbors, in their opening brief, accurately lay out the procedural history of this 
case. Respondents will not reiterate the history here but instead adopt by reference the 
course of proceedings as articulated by Neighbors. 
II. ISSUES PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT ON APPEAL 
The only issues properly before this Court, sitting in its appellate capacity 
pursuant to ldaho Code $67-5270 (the ldaho Administrative Procedures Act) and 
I.R.C.P. 84, are the issues raised before the Board of County Commissioners. An 
action for declaratory judgment is not properly joined with an appellate review of a cold 
record. 
[I.C.] Section 67-5277 states that, "judicial review of disputed issues 
of fact must be confined to the agency record for judicial review as 
defined in this chapter, supplemented by additional evidence taken 
pursuant to $67-5276, ldaho Code.". . . The district judge thus 
should not have permitted additional evidence or, assuming that 
Urrutia and Reed had established good reasons for the evidentiary 
failure before the agency, the district judge should have remanded 
the matter to the Board for additional fact finding. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF: 2 
H:\Pianning\Powderhorn\District Court\Respondents' Brief.DOC 
Urrutia v. Blaine County Board of Cornrnissioners, 134 ldaho 353, 360, 2 P.3d 738, 
It is not the role of the reviewing court to weigh the evidence. The 
Court must defer to the agency's decisions that are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 ldaho 784, 790, 
Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived. See Roell v. 
Boise City, 134 ldaho 214, 999 P.2d 251 (2000), and Whitehawk v. State, 119 
ldaho 168, 804 P.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1991). Additionally, ldaho case law makes it 
clear that constitutional issues not raised before a Board of Commissioners will 
not be considered on appeal. See Butters v. Hauser, 125 ldaho 79,82,867 P.2d 
953,956 (1 993). See also Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Frernont 
County, 2006 WL 34221 68 (2006) attached. 
Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The ldaho Administrative Procedures Act [(I.A.P.A.)] 
governs the review of local zoning decisions." Price V. 
Payette County Bd. of County Corn'rs, 131 ldaho 426,429, 
958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998) (citing Corner v. Counfy of Twin 
Falls, 130 ldaho 433, 437,942 P.2d 557, 561 (1997)). In an 
appeal from the decision of a district court acting in its 
appellate capacity under the I.A.P.A., this Court reviews the 
agency record independently of the district court's decision. 
Id. (citations omitted); Howard v. Canyon Counfy Bd. of 
Cornrn'rs, 128 ldaho 479,480, 915 P.2d 709,710 (1996) 
(citation omitted). Interpretation of an ordinance, like 
construction of a statute, is an issue of law and therefore an 
appellate court exercises free review of the district court's 
decision. See State v. Nelson, 119 ldaho 444, 446, 807 P.2d 
1282, 1284 (Ct. App. 1991). 
This Court, however, does not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence 
presented. I.C. 5 67- 5279(1). Rather, this Court defers to 
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the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Price, 131 ldaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586 (citing 
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 ldaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 
1262, 1265 (1 998)) (citing South Fork Coalition v. Board of 
Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 11 7 ldaho 857,860,792 
P.2d 882, 885 (1990)). "In other words, the agency's factual 
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even 
where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 
long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record." Id. 
The Board's zoning decision may only be overturned 
where its findings: (a) violate statutory or constitutional 
provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) 
are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing I.C. fj 67- 
5279(3)). The party attacking the Board's decision must first 
show that the Board erred in a manner specified in ldaho 
Code § 67-5279(3), and then it must show that its substantial 
right has been prejudiced. Id. (citing Angstman v. City of 
Boise, 128 ldaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409,412 (Ct. App. 
1996)). Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 
ldaho 192,46 P.3d 9 (2002). 
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but 
less than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." 
Brewer v. Lacrosse Health & Rehab, 138 ldaho 859,861, 
862, 71 P.3d 458,460,461, (2003) citing Jensen v. City of 
Pocatello, 135 ldaho 406, 412, 18 P.3d 21 1, 21 7 (2000), 
citing Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 ldaho 513, 515, 975 
P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Due Process. 
It is a well established principle that this Court will not pass on constitutional 
issues unless absolutely necessary for determination of a case. See Posey v. Bunney, 
98 ldaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977); Curtis v. Child, 95 ldaho 63, 501 P.2d 1374 (1972); 
Swensen v. Buildings, lnc., 93 ldaho 466, 463 P.2d 932 (1 970); and Olsen v. J.A. 
Freeman Company, 11 7 ldaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). 
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In Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 ldaho 784, 118 P.3d' 
116 (2005), the ldaho Supreme Court held that alleged ex parte contacts of a County 
Commissioner were not grounds for remand and recusal, absent some'facts or 
inferences to establish a bias. See Davisco v. Gooding County at 124, 792. The 
Court's determination in Davisco is in staying with the logic found by the Supreme Court 
in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, Idaho, 137 ldaho 428,50 P.3d 
443 (2002), (a case where an alleged improper site visit occurred), wherein the Court 
stated: 
The record does not indicate that any factual disputes would 
be resolved by sending this case back to the Board for a 
decision to be made without the benefit of a viewing, or 
based upon a viewing, at which interested parties are 
present. The Board was not acting upon a cold appellate 
record to make its decision, as was the case in Comer; 
rather, it was the original deciding body. There was 
substantial evidence presented at the hearing upon which 
the Board could have based its decision, wholly 
' 
independently from the visit to the property. In our review of 
the proceedings, we are to "consider the proceedings as a 
whole, and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and 
resultant decisions in light of practical considerations with an 
emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of 
reasoned decision-making." ldaho Code 967-6535, We find 
that whatever knowledge the Board may have gained from 
visiting the property was not necessary to form the basis of 
its decision, as the hearing yielded substantially the same 
evidence as could have been garnered during the visit. 
Also, interested persons were provided a fair opportunity to 
present and rebut evidence at the hearing. Consequently, 
the appellants cannot show that a substantial right of theirs 
has been prejudiced by the Board's visit to the site. Evans 
at 433, 448. 
The Commissioners' visit to the site should be treated as the Supreme 
Court treated the Board of Commissioners of Cassia County in the Evans case 
The facts in the record clearly support the decision reached by the Board, and 
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the entire visit was tape recorded. Additionally, the record was reopened to 
address the site visit issue. It cannot be argued that Neighbors were not afforded 
their due process opportunity to rebut the issue at the public hearings. 
In light of the ldaho Supreme Court's line of cases dealing with site visits, 
the due process issue can, and properly should, be resolved without engaging in 
constitutional debate, 
Even if the Court takes-up Neighbors' constitutional arguments, Kootenai County 
still prevails. 
(0)ur Supreme Court held that a deprivation of due process 
resulted from, (a) failure to give notice of a second meeting 
of zoning authorities (after a public hearing), when a 
rezoning request was considered and staff views were 
discussed; (b) failure to keep a transcribable verbatim record 
of the proceedings before the zoning authorities; and, (c) 
failure to make specific written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, upon which the decision on the rezoning 
request was based. 
Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 ldaho 407 at 41 1,614 
P.2d 947 at 951 (1980). 
The Court in Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 ldaho 626, 
651 P.2d 560 at 563 (Ct. App. 1982), went on to state the additional requisite factors in 
affording due process, "we believe that all the factors mentioned in Cooper, together 
with the opportunity to present and rebut evidence, meet the standards for due process 
requirements under Matthews v. Eldridge." [424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct 893,47 L.Ed.2d 
18(1976)]. ". . .[A]ccordingly, we hold that notice, opportunity to present and to rebut 
evidence, preparation of specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the 
keeping of a transcribable record comprise a common core of procedural due process 
requirements, constitutionally mandated in all cases where zoning authorities are 
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requested to change the land use authorized for a particular parcel of property." Gay at' 
In Aberdeen Springfield Canal Company v. Peiper, 133 ldaho 82, 982 P.2d 91 7 
(1 999), the ldaho Supreme Court laid out in greater detail the requirements for 
procedural due process: 
Procedural due process requires that "there must be some 
process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily 
deprived of his rights in violation of the State or Federal 
Constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant 
is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard." 
State V. Rhoades, 121 ldaho 63,72,822 P.2d 960,969 
(1991), (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust 
Company, 339 U.S. 306,313,70 S. Ct. 652,656,94 L. Ed. 
865,872 (1950); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,550, 85 
S. Ct. 1187, 1190, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62,65(1965)). The 
opportunity to be heard must occur "at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the due 
process requirement. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 
ldaho 923, 927, 950 P.2d 1262, 1266 (1998), (quoting 
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 ldaho 568, 573, 798 P.2d 27,32 
(1990)). Due process is not a concept to be applied rigidly in 
every matter. Rather, it "is a flexible concept calling for such 
procedural protections as are warranted by the particular 
situation." City of Boise v. Industrial Cornmission, 129 ldaho 
906,910,935 P.2d 169, 173 (1997), (quoting In Re Wilson, 
128 ldaho 161, 167, 91 1 P.2d 754, 760 (1 996)). 
Finally, in Angstman v. City of Boise, the Court stated: 
"Due process safeguards apply to quasi-judicial 
proceedings, such as those conducted by zoning boards in 
considering whether to grant a conditional use permit." 
Chambers v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 125 
ldaho 11 5,118,867 P.2d 989,992 (1994). In such 
situations, due process requires: (a) notice of the 
proceedings, (b) a transcribable verbatim record of the 
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proceedings, (c) specific, written findings of fact, and, (d) an 
opportunity to be present and rebut evidence. citing 
Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 
101 ldaho 407,615 P.2d 947 (1 980) and Gay v. County 
Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 ldaho 626, 651 
P.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1982). Angstman does not claim that the 
Council denied him any of these enumerated due process 
requirements. Indeed, the record shows that he was given 
notice of all relevant proceedings; verbatim records were 
made available to him, as were specific written findings of 
fact by the Planning & Zoning Commission and the Council; 
and, Angstman was given an opportunity to present and 
rebut evidence at each hearing. 
Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 ldaho 575, at 578,917 P.2d 409, at 412 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Neighbors were afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. In addition to 
the opportunity afforded to Neighbors to be present, present testimony and rebut 
evidence, there was also a transcribable record prepared. These proceedings are part 
of this record, as a transcribed verbatim record of all proceedings was created, and 
specific written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared as a result of 
the Board of County Commissioners' hearing 
The Evans v. Board of commissioners of Cassia County, Idaho, decision is 
factually and legally on all fours with the present matter, and this Court should apply the 
same reasoning, logic, and come to the same conclusions, to-wit: Neighbors were 
afforded all due process that was necessary, and any error that occurred was harmless, 
and therefore Neighbors did not suffer any reversible harm. 
B. The Decision of the Board o f  County Commissioners is 
Supported by Substantial, though Conflicting Evidence. 
As noted above "[slubstantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less 
than a preponderance. It is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion." Brewer v. Lacrosse Health & Rehab, supra, internal citations 
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omitted. 
The petitioners confuse the standard of review on substantial evidence. While 
there is definitely conflicting evidence within the record, the Board of County 
Commissioners, as the finders of fact, were the proper body to weigh that evidence and 
determine credibility and what weight to give that evidence. 
While the petitioner may not agree with the weight that the Board of County 
Commissioners chose to give the testimony presented, it cannot say that there were not 
facts in the record to support the decision made by the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
This Court, sitting in its appellate capacity, should not substitute itself for the 
finder of fact. "The Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact." See I.C. $67-5279(1) (1989). Payeffe 
River Property Owner's Association v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, 132 
ldaho 551,976 P.2d 477, at 544,480 (S. Ct. 1999). 
CONCLUSION 
A petition for Judicial Review (appeal) of the Board of County Commissioners' 
Decision (governed by the IDAPA and the LLUPA) is not proper to join with an action for 
Declaratory Judgment. Neighbors were afforded all of the due process required by 
ldaho law. The decision reached by the Board of County Commissioners was 
supported by the facts in the record 
DATED this /'/'day of March. 2007. 
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Cowan v. Board o f  Com'rs o f  Fremont 
County idaho.2006. 
Supreme Court o f  ldaho, 
ldaho Falls, October 2006 Term. 
Robert G. COWAN, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross 
Respondent, 
v. 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF FREMONT 
COUNTY, ldaho and the Individual Commissioners 
Donald Trupp, as sticcessor to Glen Davis, William 
Forbush and Gordon Smith, as successor to Richard 
Baker, Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants. 
No. 30061. 
Nov. 29,2006 
Background: Adjoining landowner petitioned for 
review o f  county board o f  commissioner's approval 
of preliminary and final plat for proposed 
subdivisibn. The District Court o f  the Seventh 
Judicial District Court, Fremont County, Brent J ,  
Moss, J., affirmed. Adjoinitig laiidowner appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Burdick, J., held 
that: 
(6) procedural due process rights o f  adjoining 
landowner were not violated by zoning commission 
limiting public comment at hearing on final plat: 
(7) defective meeting notices did not prejudice 
adjoining landowner's substantial rights; and 
(8) wetlands protection provision in county 
development code was not void for vagueness. 
Affirmed. 
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findings o f  [act and conclusions o f  law, and 
conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead 
what is needed is a clear statement o f  what, 
specifical!~, the decisionmaking body believes, 
after hearing and considering all of the evidence, to 
be the relevant and i~iiportant facts upon which its 
decision is based. 
361 k180 Intention o f  Legislature 
361 k18 1 i n  General 
3 6 l k I X l ( l )  k .  In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
The objective o f  statutory construction is to derive 
the intent ofthe legislature. 
1251 Statutes 361 -188 
361 Statutes 
361 '41 Constiiiction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules o f  Construction 
361 k187 Meaning of Language 
361k188 k .  I n  General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Statutes 361 -190 
361 Statutes 
36 1 VI  Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules o f  Construction 
361 k187 Meaning of Language 
36 lk l90 k. Existence of Ambiguity. 
Most Cited Cases 
Where a statute is unambiguous, statutory 
construction is  unnecessary and courts are free to 
apply the plain meaning. 
1261 Zoning and Planning 414 -439 
1231 Appenl and Error  30 -842(1) 4 14 Zoning and Planning 
414VIli Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
30 Appeal and Error 414Vlll(C) Proceedings to Procure 
30XVl  iieview 4i4k436 tiearing and Determination 
;OXVl(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 414k439 k .  Findings, Conclilsions, 
General Minutes, or Records. Most Cited Cases 
30k838 Questions Considered County planning and zoning commission was not 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether required by tlie Local Land Use Planning Act 
Questions Are o f  Law or o f  Fact (LLUPA) io prepare written findings and 
30k842(1) k .  In General. Most conclusions to support its recommendation to 
Cited Cases approve preliminary and final plat of proposed 
The interpretation o f  a statute is a question of law subdivision, given that it lacked authority to finally 
over which the Supreme Court exercises free review. approve or deny the application for ihe subdivision. 
West's I.C.A. $ 3  67-6504,67-6535(b). 
1241 Statutes 361 -181(1) 
j271 Consiiiuiionoi Lnw 92 -278.2(2) 
361 Statutes 
36 1 V I  Construction and Operation 92 Constitutional Law 
361 Vl(A) General Rules o f  Construction 92x11 Due Process of Law 
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92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning 
Regulations 
92k278.2(2) k. Proceedings and Review. 
Most Cited Cases 
Zoning and Planning 414 -439 
414 Zoning and Planning 
414Vll l  Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
414Vlll(C) Proceedings to Procure 
4i4k436 iiearing and Determination 
414k439 k .  Findings, Conclusions, 
Minutes, or Records. Most Cited Cases 
County board o f  commissioners' written findings 
and conclusions supporting its decision to approve 
preliminary and final plat o f  proposed subdivision 
complied with requirements o f  Local Land Use 
Planning Act (LLUPA), and thus, did not violate 
opponent's due process rights, given that board's 
findings and conclusions included the criteria and 
standards it considered relevant, provided detailed 
facts, and explained its rationale for its decision. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's I.C.A. 
67-6535(b). 
1281 Con$tit~rt ional Law 92 -251.6 
92 Constitritional Law 
92x11 Doe Process of Law 
92k251.6 k. Notice and Hearing. Most Cited 
Cases 
Procedural due process requires some process to 
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived 
of his rights in violation o i  ihr stare or federal 
constitutions; such requiremetit is {net when the 
defendant. is provided with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, which must occur at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
1291 Constitutional Law 92 *278.2(2) 
Zoning a l ~ d  Planning 414 "21436.1 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
414VIll(C) Proceedings to Procure 
414k436 Hearing and Determination 
414k436.1 k. In  General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Procedural due process rights o f  opponeni o f  
proposed subdivision were not violated by county 
planning and zoning commission limiting public 
comments to a few minutes per speaker at liearing 
on final plat; opponent's attorney spoke at length 
and presen~ed evidence during preliminary plat 
hearing and during appeals and opponent also had 
opportunity to speak at preliminary plat hearing. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
130) Constitutional Law 92 -278.2(2) 
92 Constitutional Law 
92x11 Due Process o f  Law 
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning 
Regulations 
92k278.2(2) k. Proceedings and Review. 
Most Cited Cases 
Zoning and Planning 414 -434 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4 14VIll Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14VIII(C) Proceedings to Procure 
414k434 k .  Notice. Most Cited Cases 
Defective notices for county board of 
commissioners' public meetings on proposed 
subdivision did not prejudice substantial rights of 
opponent o f  subdivision, in violation of due 
process, given that opponent had notice o f  
meetings, anended meetings with counsel, and had 
opportunity to speak against the subdivision 
application. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
92 Constitutional Law 1311 Constitutional Law 92 -251.4 
92x11 Due Proccss o f  Law 
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning 92 Constitutional Law 
Reeuiations 92x11 Due Process of Law 
92k?78.?(2) k. Proceedings and Review. 92k25l.4 k, vagueness or Overbreadth. Most 
Most Cited Cases Cited Cases 
Statutes that are found to be vague, indefinite or 
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uncertain are in violation of the constitutional due 
process provisions found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or 
Article I, section I 3  of the ldaho Constitution. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's I.C.A. Const. 
Art. I, 5 13. 
1321 Constitutional Law  92 -251.4 
92 Constitutional Law 
JLA~I Due Process of Law 
92k25 1.4 k. Vagueness or Overbreadth. Most 
Cited Cases 
Although most decisions invoking the "void for 
vagueness" doctrine of due process deal with 
criminal statutes and ordinances, the doctrine 
applies equally well to civi l  ordinances; however, 
greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a 
civil or non-criminal statute as opposed to a 
criminal statute under the doctrine. U.S.C.A. 
Consl.Amend. 14; West's I.C.A. Const. Art. I, $ 13. 
1331 Consl i tut io~ial  i a w  92 -278.2(1) 
92 Constitutional Law 
92x11 Due Process o f  Law 
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning 
Regulations 
92k278.2(1) k. In  General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Zoning and Planning414 -86 
4 14 Zoning and Planning 
4 1411 Validity of Zoning Regulatio~is 
41411(B) Regulations as to Particular Matters 
414k86 k. Permits and Certificates. Most 
Cited Cases 
Wetlalids protection requirement in county 
development code that required all developments to 
demonstrate compliance with "state and federal 
wetlands protection requirements" was not "void 
for vagueness" in violatio~i o f  due process; county 
could not anticipate which state and federal 
requirements might apply to a given development 
until an application was submitted. U.S.C.A, 
Const.Amend. 14; ?"iestUs I.C.4. Const. Art. I, S: !3. 
1341 Constitutional Law 92 -251.6 
92 Constiiuiionai Law 
92x11 Due Process o f  Law 
92k251.6 k. Notice and Hearing. Most Cited 
Cases 
Although due process entitles a person to an 
impartial and disinterested tribunal, there must be a 
showing o f  actual bias before disqualifying a 
decision ~naker even when a litigant maintains a 
decision maker has deprived the proceedings o f  the 
appearance o f  fairness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
1351 Zoning and Planning 414 -438 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4 14V 11 l Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
414V111(C) Proceedings to Procure 
414k436 Hearing and Determination 
414k438 k.  Reference; 
Recommendation or Report o f  Officer or Board, in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
County board o f  commissioners' decision allowing 
applicant for subdivision approval to rely on zoning 
administrator's report as evidence o f  compliance 
with county development code requirements was 
not arbitrary and capricious, even though county 
development code placed the burden o f  proof on 
applicant to show compliance with development 
code and comprehensive plan, given that applicant 
still had burden of persuasion. 
1361 Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5 
4 14 Zoning and Planning 
4 i4V i l i  Perniiis, Ceriiticaies and Approvals 
414Vlll(A) In General 
414k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial 
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans. 
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases 
Developer's failisre to provide a "master plan" for 
developinent of contiguous lots did not require 
county board o f  commissioners to disapprove 
applicatioli for subd~vision, given that board found 
that the development area consisted o f  two 
contiguous, separately-owned parcels, and county 
development county allowed, but did not mandate, 
disapprovai o f  subdivision for an applicant's Failure 
to submit master development plan. 
j37l Zoning and Planning 414 -382.6 
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provisiori ol' the Act. Federal Water Pollution o f  commissioners' approval o f  final plat for 
Control Act. $402, 33 U.S.C.A. $ 1342. subdivision, and thus, board was not entitled to 
award o f  attorney fees and costs on appeal. West's 
1441 Zon ing  and Planning 414 -381.5 I.C.A. $9  12-117, 12-121. 
414 Zoning and Planning 
4l4V111 Permits, Certificates and Approvals 
4 14Vl l I (A)  I n  Gerieral 
4 l4k778 Grounds for Grant or Denial 
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans, 
Conforni ir j  to Regulations. Most Cited Cases 
Cou~ i t y  board o f  commissioners' determination that 
proposed subdivision had positive relative 
performance standard values for slope protection, 
wi ld l i fe  habitat, and visually sensitive areas under 
the county development code was supported by 
substantial arid competent evidence, and thus, 
supported board's approval o f  final plat for 
proposed subdivision, given that board was entitled 
to rely on z o n i n g  administrator's point awards, 
development was not on natural resource inventory 
map, and development area was not delineated by 
U.S. Forest Service as visually sensitive area. 
* I252  Hopkins, Roden, Crockett, Hansen & 
Hoopes, ldaho Falls, for appellants. C. Timothy 
f lopkins argued. 
Karl  Harry Lewies, Fremont County Prosecuting 
Attorney, St. Anthony, for respondent Knrl  L'---* , t U L a i  
Lewies argued. 
BURDICK,  Justice. 
Appellant Robert Cowan (Cowan) appeals from a 
district court decision affirming the Fremont County 
Board o f  Commissioners' (the Board) approval o f  
the preliniinary and final plats for the proposed 
Eagle's Nest Ranch subdivision (Eagle's Nest). We 
affirm. 
I. F A C T U A L  A N D  PROCE1)URAL 
B A C K G R O U N D  
1451 Zon ing  and P lan r~ ing  414 -729 This appeal involves several petitions for review, al l  
filed by Cowan, which the district court 
414 Zoning and Planning consolidated. I t  concerns two applications filed by 
414X Judicial Review or Relief Dr .  Dean Bawden (Bawden) to subdivide and 
4 14X(D) Determination develop home sites on a parcel located adjacent to 
414k729 k. Cosu. Most Cited Cases Cowan's property and near Island Park Reservoir i n  
Opponent o f  proposed subdivision did not prevail Fremont County, Idaho. 
on appeal o f  final plat approval by county board o f  
com~iiissioners. and tlius, vins not entitled to award Bawden purchased two separate parcels o f  land in 
o f  attorney fees and costs on appeal. 'J:est5s I.C.A. $ 2000 either personally o i  throiigh l i i s  family or 
12-1 17. business entities. The land owned by Bawden o r  
his family or business is rectangular and consists o f  
1461 Costs 102 @"260(5) 147 acres. Bawden has retained the sixty-one acre 
parcel for residential and agricultural use. 
102 Costs However, he proposed to develop the eighty-six 
102X On  Appeal or Error acre parcel into residential lots with road access. 
10213259 Darnages and Penalties for Additionally, Bawden's son, Eric, owns a parcel 
l'rivolous Appeal and Delay northwest o f  the Eaglc's Nest development. This 
102k260 Right and Grounds parcel was separated from Eagle's Nest pursuant to 
102k260(5) k. Nature and Form of a Class I permit issued by the C ~ u n t y . ' : ~ '  
Judgment, Action, or Proceedings for Review. Most 
Ci ied Cases 
Opponen! o f  proposed s~.lbdivirion did not act FN! .  P. Class 1 permit allows applicants to 
entirely without reasonable basis i n  fact or law in split lots. See Fremonl County 
appealing district court's affirmance o f  county board Development Code (FCDC) Ch. 
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A. The First Application 
On April 24, 2000, Bawden tiled his f i r3  
application for a Class I f  permit with Fremont 
County, seeking to subdivide the eighty-six acre 
parcel o f  land into twenty-nine lots.FN2 The 
Fremont County Planning and Zoning Commission 
(P & Z) considered Bawden's application and 
preliminary plat at a public hearing in June o f  that 
year. P & Z recommended approval o f  the plat to 
the Board and issued Bawden a permit. Cowan 
appealed this decision to the Board. In  August 
2000, the Board heard Cowan's appeal and later 
held a closed work session to consider the matter. 
This meeting, howevei, was incorrectly noticed as 
an executive session. Later that same month, the 
Board approved Bawden's application for a permit, 
but remanded the matter to P & Z to consider the 
issue o f  whether the proposed development site 
would eliminate historically existing access to 
public lands. 
EN2. A Class I1 permit is required for 
silbdivisions under the FCDC. See FCDC 
Ch. lIl(B)(3)(a). 
Later, in September 2000. Cowan filed two separate 
petitions for judicial review of the Board's decisioli 
and filed a lawsuit alleging that the Board violated 
Idaho's Open Meetings Act when i t  held the 
incorrectly noticed meeting to consider Bawden's 
application. On May 21, 2001 the district court 
determined that the Board had violated the Open 
Meetings Act. 
In  November 2000, P & Z lleld a public meeting lo 
address the issue of whether the development would 
eliminate historically existing access to public 
lands. Bawden, at that meeting, declared his 
intention to leave open access to the public. P & Z 
then found the issue was moot. At that meeting P 
& Z also considered and recommended approval of 
Bawden's final plat for phases I and II o f  the 
drvelopmzn~. Cowan appealed this decision to the 
Board; however, his appeal was postponed 
indefinitely and never heard becausex1253 irr May, 
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2001, Bawden decided to not pursue the first 
application any further. 
Meanwhile, in January 2001, the Board held a 
second meeting and once again approved Bawden's 
preliminary plat.'N' Afrer the Board issued its 
written findings o f  fact, conclilsions o f  law and 
decision, Cowan filed a second petition for judicial 
review. In May 2001, the district court issued its 
decision in Cowan's first petition for judicial 
review, declaring that the Board's incorrect notice 
for its August 23, 2000, meeting voided its Augr~st 
28, 2000 decision and ordered the Board to 
schedule a new hearing. In the midst o f  this, 
Bawden sent letlers to the Board and Cowan 
witIidrawiii$ this application. Since then the Board 
has taken no action on the first applicalion. 
F N 3  I t  appears that the Board concedes 
this meeting was held in an effort to cure 
the defect in the prior notice. In  their 
brief, the Respondents write: "A couple of 
months later, in January 2001, recogniz i~~g 
rhat ;IS August work meeting hod likely 
violared rhe open meering l av ,  the Board 
held a repeat work meeting ...." (Emphasis 
added). 
B. Tlie Second Application 
On May 17, 2001, Bawden filed a new application 
and preliminary plat with Fremont County; this 
time he sought to subdivide and develop twenty 
residential lots. The following month P & Z held a 
lhearing to consider Bawden's second application 
and plat and recommended that the application be 
approved. Once again, Cowan appealed P & Z's 
decision to the Board. Bawden then submitted his 
final plat to P & Z for review. On July 16, 2001, 
before the Board heard Cowan's appeal o f  the 
prelitninary plat. P & Z considered and 
recommended Bawden's final plat to the Board for 
i~pproval. Cowall then appealed that decision as 
well. 
Gn July 30; 2001. the Board held a hearing on 
Cowan's appeal of the preliminary plat. Cowan's 
attorney was present at this meeting and submitted a 
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written brief objecting to the notice the Board had 
provided for tlie meeting, indicating that the notice 
failed to include several items the FCDC requires o f  
al l  notices. After a work session in Arigust 2001, 
the Board approved Bawden's preliminary plat and 
issued a written decision on Septeniber 10, 2001 
Cowan filed a petition for judicial review o f  this 
decision. On  September l I, 200 1 ,  the Board lield 
a hearing and considered and approved Bawden's 
final plat conditioned on Bawden entering into a 
development agreement as the FCGC required. On  
October 9, 2001 the Board issued a written decision 
and on October 22, 2001 the Board and the 
developer executed a development agreement. 
Cowan once again filed a petition for review, and 
because all four o f  the petitions contained common 
questions o f  law and fact tlie district coun 
consolidated the petitions. 
On  August 19, 2003, the district court issued its 
memorandum decision on Cowan's four petitions 
for judicial review. The district court determined 
that Cowan's arguments relating to the first 
application were moot. As to his arguments 
regarding the second application, i t  affirmed the 
Board's decision in part. but remanded to the Board 
for a determination o f  whether Bawden's application 
complied with the FCDC's provisio~is coticerning 
state and federal wetlands protection. The district 
court also awarded Cowan attorney's fees because 
although the district court found tliat Cowan had not 
prevailed on the issues relating to the second 
application, he liad prevailed "in forcing the County 
to follow rhe law and its own ordinance-something 
it should have done without Cowan's persistence." 
Cowan then filed a notice o f  appeal o f  the district 
court's decision and Fremont County liled a 
cross-appeal. tlowever, on November IS. 2003, 
this Court suspended Cowan's appeal. 
Meanwhile, on remand from the district court, tlie 
Board held a public hearing In January 2004, to 
determine whether Bawden's second application 
complied with the state and federal wetlands 
protection provisions adopted by the FCDC. After 
hearing testimony and taking evidence the Board 
took the matter under advisernetit pending briefing 
by the parties. On  March 22, 2004, the Board 
issued written findings and conclrisions and found 
that the proposed subdivision complied with the 
FCDC's wetlands protection provision. Cowan 
then filed his fifth petition for jridicial review. On  
June 16. * I254  2005, the district court issued its 
memorandum decision on this petition for judicial 
review, aff i rming the Board's decision. Cowan 
then proceeded wi th the instant appeal. 
II. S T A N D A R D  OF R E V I E W  
[l][2][3]1J][S][6] The L.ocal Land Use Planning 
Act  (LLUI'A) allows an affected person to seek 
judicial review o f  an approval or denial o f  a land 
use application, as provided for in the ldaho 
Administrative Procedural Act  (IDAPA). ldaho 
Code $ 67-652 1 (l)(d); Evans v. Telon Cotmly, 139 
ldaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003). For purposes 
o f  judicial review o f  LLUPA decisions, a local 
agency making a land use decision, sklch as the 
Board o f  Commissioners, is treated as a government 
agency under IDAPA.  U r r u ~ i a  v. Blaine Cozm~y, 
134 ldaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000). 
In  a subsequent appeal from a district court's 
decision in which the district court was acting i n  its 
appellate capacity under the Administrative 
Procedure Act  ..., the Supreme Court reviews the 
agency record independently o f  the district court's 
decision. As to the weight of the evidence on 
questions o f  fact, this Court w i l l  not substitute its 
judginent for that o f  the zoning agency. 
The Court shall aff i rm the zoning agency's action 
unless the Court finds that the agency's finding!, 
inferences, conclusions or decisions are: "(a) it1 
violatioti o f  colistitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of' the statutory authority o f  the 
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; and (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse o i  
discretion." The party attacking a zoning board's 
action must first illustrate that tlie board erred in a 
manner specified therein arid niust then show tliat a 
substantial right o f  the paity has been prejudiced. 
Eacrel 1,. Bonner Coun~y, I 39  ldaho 780, 784, 86 
P.3d 494, 498 (2004j (internal citations omitted). 
Finally, planning and zoning decisions are entitled 
to a strong presumption of validity; this includes 
the board's application and interpretation o f  their 
Claim to Or i t .  U:S. Covt. Works 
143 ldaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 
(Cite as: 143 ldaho501, 148 P.3d 1247) 
own zoning ordinances. Sanders Orchard v. G e ~ n  
o I37  ldaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 
(2002). 
111. ANALYSIS  
[7][8] As a preliminary matter, Cowan identifies 
twenty-four separate issues in his brief to the Court. 
Nonetheless, not all o f  these issues are supported 
by argument andior authority. As such, we wi l l  not 
address those issues because this Court does not 
consider issires not supported by argument or 
authority. KEB  En~erprises. I*. P v.  S~nedley, 140 
ldaho 746, 754, 101 P.3d 690, 698 (2004) (citing 
Hei v.  Nolzer, I 39  ldaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (2003)). FN" 
FN4. Under this standard, we w i l l  not 
consider Cowan's arguments relating the 
chronological order. o f  the Board's 
decisions or his argument that the Board's 
failure l o  inform h im  o f  which wetlands 
protection requirements applied to Eagle's 
Nest violated his due process. 
Cowan addresses many issues surrounding 
Bawden's application which can be divided into 
three types. o f  arguments: ( I )  due process 
violations. (2) arbitrary and capricious actions by 
the Board, and (3) decisions by the Board not 
supported by the evidence. Additionally, Cowan 
assens that the Board's appeals fee increase violated 
his due process rights. For each error Cowan 
asserts, he argues that his substantive rights have 
been prejudiced; therefore, he concludes, this Court 
must reverse the Board's decisions approving 
Eegle's Nest and remand with instructions ro deny 
the application. 
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A. Increased Appeals Fee 
A t  the outset o f  this litigation, Fre~nont County 
charged an $80 fee for an administrative appeal, but 
i t  increased this fee to $550.00 in May 2001. This 
increase applied to Cowan's appeals fi led afrer May 
2001. Cowan argues, therefore, that this increase 
represents an "excessive appeal fee" tliat prevents 
parties from seeking review o f  planning and zoning 
decisions and thus violates due process. The Board 
contends that Cowant i i5S litcks titi: sianrii i~g i o  
make his argument and that the argument is moot 
because he did not properly appeal this legislative 
action taken by the County. 
[9][10] While such a large fee increase could 
implicate due process concerns i f  i t  were 
unreasonable or were used to discourage appeals, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction to examine the County's 
fee increase by direct judicial review. T o  begin, 
the decision to raise the appeals fee was a 
legislative act. "Legislative activity ... is 
differentiated from quasi-judicial activity by the 
result-legislative activity produces a rule or pol icy 
which has application to an open class whereas 
quasi-judicial activity impacts specific individuals, 
interests or situations." BUI-I v. Ciry of ldaho Falls, 
105 ldaho 65, 67, 665 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1983). 
While legislative actions by counties are subject to 
collateral actions such as declaratory judgments, 
they cannot he attacked by a petition for judicial 
review. Scorl v.  Gooding Counry. 137 idaho 206, 
208, 46 P.5d 23, 25 (2002). Therefore, because 
Cowan attacks a legislative action in his petition Tor 
review, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the 
issue under the procedural posture o f  Cowan's 
instant appeal. 
B. Justiciability 
We w i l l  first address Cowan's arguments relating to [ I  I] Generally, justiciability questions are divisible 
the increased appeals fee and then address the into several sub-categories: advisory op i~~ ions ,  
Board's contention that this appeal is feigned and collusive cascs, standing, ripeness, 
non-justiciable. We wi l l  then turn to Cowan's mootness, political questions and administrative 
arguments relating to the approval o f  Bawden's questions. See Miies v. Idaho Power Co., 116 
i~nnIical i~,n. Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). The . ~ r r  . - . .  - 
Board contends tliat Cowan's claims re i a t i n i t o  the 
first application are moot, and that Cowan lacks 
63 2007 Thomson/West. No  Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Page I 3  
I43 ldaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 
(Ci te 8s: 143 ldaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247) 
standing to pursue this appeal. We turn first to 
mootness and then to standing. 
Cowan argues that certain actions by the Board 
relating to the first application violate due process 
standards and Idaho statutes. The Board contends 
all the issues raised by Cowan relating to the first 
application are tnoot because Bawdell indicated by 
letter that he was withdrawing his first application 
and because the Board concluded that since the 
FCDC does not allow for multiple simultaneous 
applications Bawden's firs! application was revoked. 
[ l 2 ] [ l 3 ]  "A case is moot if i t  presents no justiciable 
controversy and a judicial determination w i l l  have 
no practical effect upon the outcome." Goodson v 
Ner Perce B d  of Cotmy Comm'rs, 133 ldaho 85 1 ,  
853. 993 P.2d 614, 616 (2000) (citation omitted). 
Here, the record shows that Bawden wrote to both 
Cowan and the Board expressing his decision to fi le 
a second application rather than continuing to 
pursue his first application and that he later wrote 
the Board another letter stating that he would not 
act upon his first application. Moreover, neither he 
nor the Board has acted upon the first application 
since Bawden filed his second application more 
than five years ago. Therefore, there is no live 
controversy, and Cowan's arguments relating to the 
first application are moot. 
[ I 4 1  The Board argues that Cowan has failed to 
allege a distiiict palpable injury or particularized 
harm he has suffered, but has instead only alleged 
generalized grievances. Therefore, the Board 
concludes Cowan lacks standing to pursue this 
appeal. In  response, Cowaii poinls out thai he has 
demonstrated his land w i l l  be adversely affected 
and presented evidence that the proposed 
developmeni would adversely impact his property 
rights and diminish his propeny value. This, he 
argues, is enough to demonstrate standing pursuant 
to Evans e. Teron Couniy, 139 ldaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 
(2003). 
[ I51  Cowarl has standing. I n  Evans this Court 
determined that in land use decisions, a parry's 
standing depends on whether his or her propeny 
w i l l  be adversely affected by the land use decision. 
See E v ~ m s ,  139 ldaho at 75, 73 P.3d at 88. This 
Court held "[tlhe existence o f  real or potential harm 
is sufficient to challenge a land use decision." Id at 
76, 73 P.3d at 89. L ike the appellants in Evans 
whosc rural homes might be adversely affected by 
the development o f  a large resort development 
adjacent to their propei?ies, Cowan's p roye lq  mig l i i  
be adversely affected by the construction o f  Eagle's 
Nest adjacent * I256  to his property. Therefore, 
Cowan has standing to pursue his claims. 
C. Due Process 
Cowail argues the County violated his due process 
by: ( I )  P & Z failing to prepare written findings 
and conclusions and the Board issuing conclusory 
findings and conclusions; (2) l imiting public 
comment; (3) issuing conrusing notices; (4) rai l ing 
to inform the public o f  which state or federal 
wetlands protectio~i requirements apply to the 
development prior to the hearing; and (5) violating 
the "appearance o f  fairness doctrine." 
Additionally, Cowan argues that the FCDC's section 
on wetlands protections is void for vagueness. For 
every violation, Cowan seeks to have this Court 
reverse the Board's determination. 
[16][17][i8][19][20] Since decisions by zoning 
boards apply general rules to "specific individuals, 
interests or situations," and are "quasi-judicial in 
nature" they are subject to doe process constraints. 
Chambers i~. Koolenai Couniy B d  of Comm'rs. 125 
ldaho 115, 118, 867 P.2d 989, 992 (1994). " 
Procedural due process requires that there must be 
some process to ensure that the individual is not 
arbitrarily deprived o f  his rights in violation o f  the 
siaie or federal constitutions." 
Aberdeen-Springj?ield Canal Co. v. Priper. 133 
ldaho 82. 91. 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999) (internal 
quotations omitted). I n  planning and zoning 
decisions, due process requires: (a) notice o f  the 
proceedings, (b) a transcribable verbatim record o f  
the proceedings, (c) specific, written findings o f  
fact, and (d) an opportunity to presenr and rebut 
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FN5. Cowan also argues that the Board 
violated this section by fail ing to make a 
transcribable recording o f  its work session 
held on Jariiiary 25, 2001. However, this 
arguinent is moot as it relates to the first 
application. 
1221 For "effective judicial review o f  the 
quasi-jirdicial actions o f  zoning boards, there must 
be ... adequate findings o f  Fact and conclusions of 
I " . . . > .  I', _., 
l a w .  r r u r n , n u r r  P'71lii;j. I 'kli ip Y .  Ciry o,f Twiri 
 fail,^. 104 ldaho 32, 36, 655 P.2d 926, 930 (1982). 
Conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead " 
[wlhat is needed for adequate judicial review is a 
clear statement o f  what, specifically, the 
decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and 
considering all o f  the evidence, to be the relevant 
and important facts upon which its decision is based. 
" i d  at 37, 655 P.2d at 93 l (quoting S. o/ 
Sunnysicle Neighborhood League v. Bd of Comm'rs, 
280 Or.  3, 21-22, 569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977)). 
However, a board o f  commissioners may adopt a 
p lanr i i~ lg and zoning commission's findings and 
conclusions because I.C. $ 67-6535 requires only 
that findings and conclusions be made. Evans, 139 
ldaho at 8.0, 73 P.3d at 93. 
[23][24][25] The Board is correct in its argument 
that I.C. 5 67-6535(b) does not apply to the 
decisioris by P & LFN6 Tlie interpretation o f  a 
statute is a question o f  law over which this Coufl  
exercises free review. See, e,g., MIarrin 11. Stale 
Furnr 1b1iit. Auto. ins. Co., 138 ldaho 244. 246, 61 
P.3d 601, 603 (2002). The objective o f  statutory 
construction is to derive the intent o f  the legislature. 
Kriso R lnr in,  P.A. v. Stale ins. F'imc!, 134 Idaho 
130. 134. 997 P.2d 591. 595 (2000). Statutory 
construction begins with the literal language o f  the 
statute. D & M Colmay Estnles Homeowners Ass'n 
v.  Rotnriell, 138 ldaho 160, 165, 59 P.3d 965, 970 
(2002). Where a statute is unambiguous, statutory 
construction is unnecessary and coirns are free to 
apply the plain meaning, Mlartin, 138 ldaho at 246. 
6 1 P.3d at 603. 
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law, as required by I.C. 67-6535." FCDC 
Ch. IIl(R). I t  also provides that the 
administrator's report "shall be presented 
in a form that can serve as a basis for jP & 
Z's] findings o f  fact" and that the " 
completed performance standards checklist 
shall be considered to constitute the 
conclusions o f  law." id 
[26] ldaho Code 67-6535(b) requires that the 
approval or denial o f  any application, among other 
things, be in writing. However, I.C. 67-6504 
reserves the authority to approve or deny land 
subdivisions to the board o f  coiinty commissioners. 
'N7 Therefore, LLUPA*1258 by its very terms 
applies the requirements o f  I.C. 6 67-6535(b) only 
to governing boards. These requirements, 
therefore, do not apply to I' & Z because i t  lacks the 
authority to finally approve or deny an application 
for a subdivision under I.C. $ 67-6504. As such, P 
& Z did not violate I.C. 5 67-6535(b). 
F N 7  ldaho Code $ 67-6504 provides in 
pertinent part: "If a governing board 'does 
not elect to exercise the powers conferred 
by this chapter, it shall establish ... a 
planning and zoning commission ..., which 
[nay act with the full authority o f  the 
governing board, e x c l ~ ~ d i n g  the authority ... 
to finally approve land subdivisions." 
[27] We turn now to Cowan's argument that the 
Board issued conclusory findings and conclusions. 
Idaho Code 5 67-6535(b) also reqirires that written 
findings be 
accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains 
the criteria and standards considered relevant, states 
the relevant contested facts relied upon, and 
explains the rationale for the decision based on the 
applicable provisions o f  tlie comprehensive plan, 
relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, 
pertinent constitutional principles and factual 
information contained in the record. 
CN6. ?'he FCDC requires that all decisions However, Cowan does not argue that the Board 
by P & Z and the Board be "reported in the failed to include any o f  this required information, 
form o f  findings of fact and conclusions o f  rather he provides examples or suggestions o f  
O 2007 ThomsonilVest. N O  Claim to Orig. U S .  Covt. Works. 
143 ldaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 
(Cite as: 143 ldaho 501,148 P.3d 1247) 
conclusory findings all related to tlie Board's 
determination that Bawden had met his burden o f  
proof. A review o f  the various wrinen findings and 
conclusions reveals that the Board complied with 
the requirements o f  I.C. S 67-6535(b) because i t  
included the criteria and standards i t  considered 
relevant, provided detailed facts, and explained its 
rationale for its decisions. Therefore, we liold that 
tlie Board's wrinen findings and conclusions did not 
violate Cowan's due process rights. We need not, 
,cab the second step o f  the znalysis to - - --h 
determine if Cowan's substantial rights were 
violated because lie has failed to demonstrate error 
in this instance. 
Cowan also argues P & Z violated his due process 
rights by ( I )  refusing to take public comments when 
considering the final plat and (2) by "unreasonably" 
l imit ing public comment to a "few minutes" for 
each speaker at hearings to considcr the preliminary 
plat. The Board points out that Cowan had 
numerous opportunities to provide comment. 
Moreover, i t  argues, the FCDC does not require 
taking public comment when considering final plats 
and also allows for l imit ing public comments so that 
P & Z w i l l  be able to finish their agenda. In 
addition, tlie Board argues, even if the limits on 
public comments were "unreasonable," Cowan's 
comments were not restricted. 
[28] Procedural due process requires: 
solne process to ensure that the individual is not 
arbitrarily deprived o f  his rights in violation o f  the 
state or federal constitutions. This requirement is 
met when the defendant is provided with notice and 
an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be 
heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner in order to satisfy the due 
process requirement. 
Aberdeen-Springpld Canal Co.. 133 ldalio at 9 I, 
982 P.2d at 926 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); see o l ~ o  Cos/u~.rrdu v. Brighion Corp., 
130 ldaho 923,926,950 P.2d 1262, 1267 (1998). 
[29] tlere. P & 2's actions d id not violate Cowan's 
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due process rights. Even assuming argztendo that P 
& Z's request to limit public comments to a few 
minutes per speaker prevented other citizens from 
presenting evidence and rebutting arguments, i t  
afforded Cowan an opportunity to be lieard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The 
record reveals that Cowan's attorney spoke at length 
and presented evidence during the hearing on the 
preliminary plat and during the appeals hearings 
before the Board. Cowan also spoke. As  such his 
due process rights were no: violated during the 
hearing on tlie preliminary plat or during the 
appeals hearings. However, although we hold that 
Cowan's due process rights were not violated, 
l imit ing public comment ro rwo minutes is not 
consistent with affording an individual a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. 
Moreover, neither the L L U P A  nor the ldaho 
subdivision statutes specifies requirements for 
notice and hearing on subdivision application 
approval. See I.C. 67-6513; $9 50-1301 to 
50-1334. The FCDC provides for notice and 
hearing when P & Z considers preliminary plats, but 
provides that "[njo public notice or hearing is 
required for final *I259 plats ...." FCDC Ch. 
ill(l)(lO)(b). However, this is not a constitutional 
violation because due process requires only an 
opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner." Cusru~ieda, 130 ldaho at 
927, 950 P.2d at 1266 (quoting Sweirrer v. Dean, 
118 ldaho 568, 573, 798 P.2d 27, 32 (1990)). 
Here, Cowan was given the opportunity to be heard 
at :hc most mcaninghl time-at :he public hearing on 
the preliminary plat-and therefore his due process 
rights were not violated. See id. Therefore, we 
liold that P & 2's actions did not violate Cowan's 
due process rights. 
4. Noricefior cerruin Board Meerings 
Cowan asserts that the notices given for the July 30, 
2001. August 23, 2001 and September I I. 2001 
Hoard iiieetings were defective. The FCDC 
requires tliat notices for subdivision permit hearings 
provide the name and address o f  the developer, the 
address and a legal description o f  the development 
site, tlie present and proposed land use o f  the 
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development site, the proposed number o f  lots and 
the average size o f  lots. FCDC Ch. I I I(K), I t  also 
requires notice that the application material is 
available for public review and that public comment 
is encouraged. Id 
[30] 1-lere, the Board concedes that both notices 
were defective. Nonetheless. Cowan has failed to 
demonstrate that. his subsiantial rights were 
prejudiced by either defective notice. First, 
Cowan's counsel anended the July 30, 2001 hearing 
and submined a brief objecting to the notice. 
Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at 
that hearing. Therefore, even if the notice were 
defective, Cowan has failed to demonstrate how this 
defect prejudiced Iris substantial rights since he 
clearly had notice o f  the meeting. 
Second, once the Board recognized that its notice 
for the August 23, 2001 meeting was defective i t  
canceled the meeting and then scheduled a properly 
noticed meeting for September l I, 2001. Cowan 
argues that because the notice for the August 
meeting was defective, the notice for the September 
meeting is also defective because i t  creates "general 
c o n f u s i o ~ ' ~  and "leaves the public bewildered.'' 
Judge Moss aptly analyzed this claim: 
This theory is not even remotely persuasive. Even 
i f  the public was left bewildered (which has not 
been shown). a bewildered public-though an 
unfortunate situation-is not the standard by which 
courts determine whether notices are adequate. 
Idaho law and [the FCDC] prescribe the 
requiiements for notices o f  public meetings and 
hearings and the notice for the September l l  
hearing complied with these requirements. 
Therefore, Cowan has failed to demonstrate that the 
Board erred by holding the defectively noticed July 
30, 2001 meeting, cancelling the August 23, 2001 
meeting or holding the properly noticed September 
meeting. 
5. Wrli~ztids ordinance 
[ j l ]  Cowan argues that the FCDC's wetlands 
protection requirement is void for vagueness 
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because the "current language is so vague that 
effectively no notice is given regarding the wetlands 
requirements." Statutes that are found to be vague. 
indefinite or uncertain are in violation o f  the 
constitutional provisions found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or 
Article I, section 13 o f  the Idaho Const i tu t io~~.  
Olsen v.  J.A. Freetncrw Co., 117 ldaho 706, 71 5, 
791 P.2d 1285, 1294 (1990). 
I t  is a general principle o f  statutory law that a 
statute miist be definite to be valid. I t  has been 
recognized that a statute is so vague as to violate the 
due process clause o f  the United States Constitution 
... where its language is such that men o f  common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. 
I d  (quoting 16A Am.Jur.2d. Consriri~~ionol Lnw S 
8 18, p. 988). 
[32] Although most decisions invoking the "void 
for vagueness" doctrine deal with criminal statutes 
and ordinances, the doctrine applies equally well to 
c iv i l  ordinances. I d  at 716, 791 P.2d at 1295. " 
However, greater tolerance is permined when 
addressing a c iv i l  or non-criminal statute as 
opposed to a criminal statute under the void for 
*I260 vagueness doctrine." Id (citing Ci7aimer.s v. 
Ciry ofLos A17geles. 762 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
[33] The wetlands protection requirement o f  the 
FCDC is not unconstitutionally vague. The FCDC 
provides: "A l l  developments shall demonstrate 
compliance with state and federal wetlands 
protection requirements." FCDC Cli. \ i l i I (D)( i) .  
A person o f  ordinary intelligence would not have to 
guess at its meaning. This section o f  the FCDC 
clearly delineates the subject o f  its 
protection-wetlands-and identifies that a developer 
must comply with al l  state and federal protection 
requirements. The fact that a developer would then 
need to determine which o f  these numerous 
protections might be applicable does not make the 
ordinance constitutionally infirm. Since many o f  
the federal wetlands protection requirements depend 
upon what type o f  development or construction is 
taking place near a wetland, the county could not 
anticipate specifically which reql~irements apply 
until a development application is submitted. 
Additionally. the core meaning o f  the ordinance is 
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clear on its face. See Olset~. 1 17 ldaho at 71 5,  791 
P.2d at 1294 (citing Corron Siaies Mvr. Ins. C o  v. 
Anderson, 749 F.2d 663 (11th Cir.1984)). FNS 
Therefore, tlie FCDC's wetlands protection 
requirement is not void for vagueness and does not 
violate the United States or ldaho constitutions. 
FN8. Additionally, as discussed i ~ f i a ,  the 
FCDC places the burden o f  proof on  the 
developer. As such, the deveioper has the 
burden o f  demonstrating compliance with 
al l  applicable state and federal wetlands 
protection requirements. 
6. Appearance of/airness docrrine 
Finally, based on a line o f  cases from Washington, 
Cowan argues that because this was a zoning 
decision, the decisionmakers and hearings on  the 
matter needed to not only be fair and impartial, but 
also appear fair and impartial. He contends that 
comments made by a Commissioner and a 
consultant, as well  as the Board's actions, which 
allegedly violated his due process, al l  indicate an 
indifference to the appearance o f  hirness. H e  
urges this Court to adopt this doctrine and reverse 
the Board's decision because o f  its indifference to 
the appearance o f  fairness and impanialily. 
In the early 1970's tlie Supreme Court o f  
Washington issued its decision in Cl~robuck iJ. 
Sno1701nish Covnry, 78 Wash.2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 
(1971). There, Atlantic Richheld Company sought 
to re-zone land embracing beach frontage on Puget 
Sound. After the county changed the 
comprehensive plan and granted the company's 
petition, Chrobuck sought judicial review o f  the 
Commissioner's action. The Court determined that 
Chrobuck's due process rights had been violated, 
despite a lack o f  evidence o f  any dishonest or 
self-serving conduct by the Commissioners, by "an 
unfortunate combination o f  circumstances ... and 
the cumulativi. impact thereof [which] inescapably 
cast an aura o f  improper influence, partiality and 
prejudgment over the proceedings." I d  at 870, 480 
?.2d at 496. Eased on an earlier case, the 
Washington Supreme Court found that under that 
state's law a hearing must be fair in both appearance 
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and substance. Id 
[34] This Court has never adopted the appearance 
o f  fairness doctrine o f  our westeriy neighbor. 
Rather, we recognize that due process "entitles a 
person to an iinpanial and disinterested tribunal[,]" 
but we require a showing o f  actual bias before 
disqualifying a decision inaker even when a litigant 
maintains a decision maker has deprived the 
proceedings o f  the appearance o f  fairness. Davisco 
Foorls itti': /tic., 14 i ldaho at 79 1,  1 18 P.3d at 123. 
Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court has 
stepped back froln this doctrine. See W.T. 
Watterson, Whar Ever Happened 10 [he Appearance 
of Fairness Docirine:' Local Land Use Decisions 
in an Age oJSrarztro~y Process, 21 Seattle U.L.Rev. 
653 9 9 8 )  We therefore decline to adopt this 
doctrine and refrain from reaching the substance o f  
Cowan's argument that certain statements and 
actions violated the appearance o f  fairness doctrine. 
D. Arbitrary and  Capricious Actions 
Cowan next argues the approval o f  Eagle's Nest 
should be reversed because the Board acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously i n  interpretingx1261 
the burden o f  proof requirement o f  the FCDC, by 
failing to enter into a development agreement w i th  
Bawden prior to approving the final plat, and by 
failing to correctly apply section 402 o f  the Clean 
Water Act, He also asserts that the Board abused 
its discretion by not rcquiring Bawden to show a 
inaster plan for all of liis propei?ies. 
The Board's actions may be reversed if this Court 
finds the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously o r  
abused its discretion. Eacrer, 139 ldaho at 784, 86 
P.3d at 498. However, planning and zoning 
decisions are entitled to a strong presumption o f  
validity, including the board's application and 
i~iterpretat~on o f  their own zoning ordinances. 
Sanders Orchard. 137 ldaho at 698.52 P.3d at 843 
I. Burden ojproof 
Cowan asserts that Bawden failed to meet the 
burden o f  proof required by the FCDC. The 
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FCDC, Cowan continues, implements the 
Comprehensive Plan and also requires Bawden, the 
developer, to "affirmatively prove" that Eagle's 
Nest has complied with all o f  the provisions o f  both 
the FCDC and the Comprehensive Plan. 
Chapter I o f  tlie FCDC provides that "[tlhe burden 
o f  proof shall, in all proceedings pursLlant to this 
ordinance, rest with the developer." FCDC Ch. 
l ( i ) .  Noticeably, this section does not define the 
,..-A e n  o f proof. i n  interpreting this c o n  the 
Boilrd concluded that tliis section does not require a 
developer to "personally and independently prove 
compliance with each code requirement at each 
stage o f  the permit procedure." instead, the 
developer "is entitled to rely upon the 
administrator's report, and tlie checklist submitted 
by the administrator in meeting hislher burden of 
p roo t "  
Here, the problem lies with the imprecise term '' 
burden o f  proof." "Burden o f  proof ,  encompasses 
both the burden o f  production and ilie burden o f  
persuasion. lniermounlain Health Care, /nc. v.  Bd. 
of County Com~n'rs of Blaine Counry, 107 ldaho 
248, 25!, 688 P.2d 260, 263 (Ct.App.1984) 
(quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 357 
(3d ed.1984)); see also Sinirh v. Angrll. 122 ldaho 
25, 31, 830 P.2d 1163, 1169 (1992) (Bistline, J., 
concurring) (citing Cole-Collister Fire Pro1 Dist v ,  
City ojBoise. 93 ldaho 558, 569, 468 P.2d 290, 301 
(1970); Harman v.  Northrvestern Mur. Lfe Ins. Co., 
91 ldaho 719, 721, 429 P.2d 849, SSI (1967); G. 
Beii, i iandbook o f  Evide~ice for tlie ldaliu iawyei .  
215 (2d ed.1972); McCormick on Evidence $ 336 
(2d ed.1982); Thayer, The Burden o f  Proof, 4 
Harv. [..Rev. 45 (1890)); Black's Law Dictionary 
209 (8th ed.2004). The Board's interpretation 
keeps the burden o f  persuasion on Bawden, but 
allows the burden o f  production to be satisfied by 
relying on evidence not introduced by Bawden. 
Tl ie issue becomes, tlien, wlietlier tlie Board's 
interpretation allowing Bawden to rely on evidence 
already before the Board is arbitrary or capricious. 
j j 5 j  W e  cannor find that the Board's inlerpreraiion 
is arbitrary or capricious. First, the FCDC creates 
a structure which anticipates using the 
administrator's report as evidence. The FCDC 
grants the administrator the dury and power to issue 
certificates o f  compliance and the ability to arrange 
for professional review o f  Class I1 permit 
applicationsfN9 As such, the developer presents 
evidence to the administrator or professional 
reviewer who, in turn, analyzes the evidence and 
compiles a report. The cost o f  this review is 
covered by the application fee. FCDC Ch. 
111(1)(4). Once the administrator receives the 
professional review report, he or she must provide a 
copy LO tlie developer and make a copy available for 
public review. IdFNi0 Second, the Board never 
removed the burden o f  persuasioii from Bawden. 
At  all times Bawden was required to persuade the 
fact finder (P & Z or the Board) that Eagle's Nest 
complied with the FCDC and the Comprehensive 
Plan. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary or 
capricious about the Board al lowing"l262 Bawden 
to rely on this evidence (which he originally 
provided) while continuing to have h im  carry the 
burden o f  versuasion. 
FN9. The FCDC creates a Zoning 
Administrator and allows him or her to " 
arrange for professional review o f  
applications for Class II permits" and to " 
issue certificates o f  compliance, based on 
site inspections ..." FCDC Ch. ll(D)(4)-(5). 
FN  10. This procedural safeguard o f  having 
the administrator's report made available 
for public review avoids the problems seen 
in Fischer v City of Kerchi~m. 141 ldaho 
349, 109 P.3d I091 (2005). 
2. Mnsrer Plan 
Cowan contends Bawden failed to show a master 
plan for his entire property because the plat does 
not show his plan ibr developing the five-acre 
parcel northwest o f  Eagle's Nest or the s ixy - two 
acres east o f  Eagle's Nest. The failure to comply 
with this "absolute requirement" to show overall 
planning, Cowan argues, is a basis to disapprove 
Bawden's application. 
[36] tiere, the Board did not err. First, while the 
FCDC requires master planning, it does not require 
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denial o f  an application for failure to meet tliis 
requirement. Rather, i t  provides: "Any application 
for a Class II permit for a subdivision (nay be 
disapproved solely on the basis that i t  fails to show 
an overall plan for the development o f  the entire 
contiguous holdings o f  the developer andlor owner." 
FCDC Ch. XI1 (D) (emphasis added). Therefore, 
the FCDC does not require tlie Board to deny 
Bawden's application. Second, tlie decision not to 
deny the application based on this section of the 
FCDC is co~~sistent with the Boarii's factual 
findings. As  discussed infia, the Board found that 
the entire 147 acres were not one development site, 
but rather two contiguous, separately-owned 
parcels. Therefore, following this logic, because 
Bawden provided a plan for the larger parcel, 
Bawden provided an overall plan for the entire 
development; the possibility o f  denial based on 
FCDC Ch. XI1 (D) never arose. 
Cowan argues that since Bawden proposed to 
develop Eagle's Nest in phases, the FCDC requires 
Bawden .lo enter into a development agreement 
before any Final Plat o f  any proposed phase can be 
reviewed or approved. In response, the Board 
contends that P & Z acted properly by 
recommending approval subject to the execution o f  
a development agreement because only the Board 
has the authority to enter into a development 
agreement. 
[37] Cowan's argument lacks suppon in both the 
FCDC and the idalio Code. 'The FCDC allows 
developers to offer pliases in developments 
pursuant to a development agreement which 
contains certain specific provisions. FCDC Ch. 
X I I l  (E). However, I .C. 67-6512(a) provides: " 
A special use permit may be granted to an applicant 
if the proposed use is condit io~ial ly perniitted by tlie 
terms o f  the ordinance ..." In turn, the FCDC 
provides that "[c]onditions may be imposed on the 
approval o f  any permit or variance ...." FCDC Ch. 
l i l (J).  I t  is iogicai, [hen, to condition approval o f  a 
plat on the acceptance o f  a development agreement. 
Additionally, a development agreement is a contracr 
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between the County and the developer and gives the 
developer vested rights in the plat. FCDC Ch. X l l l  
(E)(2)(li). Therefore, an approved plat must be in 
place before the County grants the developer vested 
rights i n  such a plat. Moreover, when examining a 
similar county ordinance providing that a wrinen 
agreement may be required, tliis Coun determined 
that tlie decision to enter into a developmeiit 
agreement is discretionary. Price v.  Payerie Co~ in l l i  
Bd of Cow~ry Colntn'rs, 13 1 Idaho 426, 43 1 ,  958 
7.2: 583, 588 (1998). Alil iough entering a 
development agreement is mandatory under the 
FCDC, i t  follows from Price that tlie decision as to 
when to enter the agreement is discretionary. Thus. 
we hold P & Z did not err by conditioning its 
approval on the acceptance o f  a development 
agreement. 
[38] After the first appeal, the district judge 
~reinaiided tlie case to tlie Board to decide only one 
narrow issue: whether' the proposed development 
complied with the FCDC's wetlands protection 
req~ i rement . '~ "  The Board then held a hearing, 
took both *I263 oral and written comments, and 
issued its findings and concliisions relating to this 
issue. Cowan first contends Bawden failed Lo 
adequately address section 402 o f  the Clean Water 
Act during the hearing on remand and failed to 
demonstrate tliat Bawden's application complied 
with that section's requirements as required by the 
FCDC. He then argues that the Board misapplied 
section 402. Therefore, Cowan continues. tlie 
Board erred in approving Bawden's application. 
F N I I .  The FCDC requires that al l  
developments demonstrate compliance 
with state and federal wetlands protection 
requirements. FCDC Cli. VIII(D). There 
are approximately three acres o f  
established wetlands on the norihsrnmost 
portion o f  the proposed development in 
Bawden's second application. 
Cowan's first argument fails. Bawdeii presented 
evidence at the hearing reiating to section 402 and 
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provided analysis as to his compliance with section 
402 i n  his subsequent briefs. Moreover, i t  would 
be i l logical to find that Bawden could not respond 
to an argomelit raised at the hearing by Cowan. 
Such a conclusion would require every developer to 
anticipate every possible argument raised and 
address those arguments prior to knowing exactly 
what they are. A search o f  case law finds no 
support for Cowan's implicit contention that a 
developer must address an issue at a hearing rather 
than thioiigh biie:<ng. Likewise, there is simply no 
reason that the Board cannot accept Bawden's 
arguments that tlie requirements o f  section 402 do 
not apply-to act as fact finder is tlie function o f  the 
Board. As such, we find no error and decline to 
reverse the Board's decision on this ground. 
[39] Next, Cowan's argument that the Board 
misapplied section 402 also fails. Cowan 
strenuously asserts that Eagle's Nest is subject to the 
requirements o f  section 402 because the 
development w i l l  disturb more than one acre o f  land 
near wetlands. However, in addition to this 
requirement, Section 402 also has more particular 
requirements. Section 402 o f  the Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. 1342, requires permits for any 
discharge of pollutants from a point source. 
iVarz1ra1 Res. Def Cuuncil, inc, v. Unired Srares 
E17vrl. Proi. Agency. 966 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th 
Cir.1992). "A 'point source' is 'any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not 
l imited to any pipe, ditch, channel ... from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.' " Id. 
(quoting 33 U.S.C. i362(14)). I t   follow^, 
therefore, that i f  a development w i l l  not discharge 
pollutants from a point source, it is not subject to 
the requirements o f  Section 402. Thus, since the 
Board found that there would be no discharge into 
the wetlands near Eagle's Nest, and such a 
conclusion is supported by the record, see infra, the 
Board reasonably applied section 402. Once again, 
we find no error and decline to reverse the Board's 
decision on this ground. 
E. Substantial  and Compcienl  Evidence 
Cowan asserts that the Board erred because certain 
o r  ics decisions lack support in the record. Cowan 
argues that Bawden failed to address certain federal 
wetlands requirements at the hearing before the 
Board, so i t  erred by determining that the 
development complied with the FCDC. Cowan 
also contends that the Board's decision that Bawden 
had not illegally split his lot is unsupported by the 
record. Finally, Cowan argues that the Board erred 
when i t  determined that the development complied 
with the FCDC's requirements regarding public 
access to public lands, protection o f  slopes. 
piotection o f  .wildlife habitat, and visually sensiti.ve 
areas. 
[40][41][42] The Board's factual determinations are 
binding on this Court, "even where there is 
conflicting evidence before the [Board], so long as 
the determi~iations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence ...." Fischer v. Ciiy of Kerchum. 
141 ldaho 349, 351, 109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005) 
(quoting Evans, 137 ldaho at 430, 50 P.3d at 445). 
Substantial and competent evidence is less than a 
preponderance o f  evidence, but more than a mere 
scintilla. Evatzs v. Hara's, lnc., 123 Idaho 473, 478, 
849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993). Substantial and 
competent evidence need not be uncontradicted, nor 
does it need to necessarily lead to a certain 
conclusion; i t  need only be o f  such sufficient 
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds 
could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder. 
See Mann e. Saferva)~ S~ores, inc., 95 ldaho 732, 
736,518 P.2d 1194, 1198(1974). 
[43] Cowan continues his arguments surrounding 
the FCDC wetlands protection requirements by 
asserting that Bawden failed * I264  to prove that 
Eagle's Nest complied with this portion o f  the 
FCDC. However, tlie Board's decision that Section 
402 does not apply and that Bawden has complied 
with the FCDC is supported by substa~itial and 
competent evidence. Two  separate, qualified 
witnesses testified that Eagle's Nest did not need 
any permits under Section 402; another witness 
presented evidence that Eagle's Nest complied wi th 
the FCDC's \vetlands protection req~irements.~" '  
Therefore, the Board's decision is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
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FN  12. As the district court noted: 
The Board received testimony from Ray 
Kagel o f  Lone Goose Environmental, 
LLC. M r .  Icagel, after reciting why he 
was qualified to speak on the matter, 
testified that he delineated the wetland 
boundary and that the Army Corp o f  
Engineers approved said delineation. Mr .  
Kagel further testified that tliere was no 
need for any federal or state permits 
because thcrc is no: a discharge in:o a 
wetland or stream. M r .  Richard Byrem, a 
surveyor who has worked on the proposed 
develop~nent, testified, "... there's no need 
for permits to be issued." Also, the 
planning and zoning administrator, Karen 
Lords, reported to the Board via written 
and oral presentation as to how the 
development complied with the [FCDC]. 
Cowan maintains that the entire 148 acres owned by 
Bawden is one lot because Bawden intends to 
develop i t  all. Cowan argues the Board should not 
have approved the final plat on Bawden's second 
application because Bawden twice split his "lot" 
illegally. First, Cowan argues, Bawden split o f f  the 
five-acre parcel now owned by his son and then " 
split" the smaller parcel, which Bawden intends to 
personally occupy, from the development.FNi' 
FN l3 .  There is some indication in the 
record that Bawden purchased the two lots 
separately and that the lots are actually 
owned by two different entities. However. 
the Board does not argue that Bawden 
does not personally own both lots so he 
cannot, therefore, have "split" them 
illegally. Thus, this section w i l l  deal only 
with the arguments raised and argued by 
the parties. 
After holding a hearing on the final plat for 
Bawden's second application, the Board determined 
that Bawden had not split Ihis lots. The Board 
found no evidence that the entire 148-acre parcel 
was one development site and no evidence that 
Bawden had split the smaller parcel he retains from 
the larger parcel that is the site o f  Eagle's Nest. 
The Board then determined neither the law nor the 
evidence supported that separately-purchased but 
contiguous parcels are a single lot for purposes of 
the FCDC. 
Here, the Board determined that Bawdell had not 
illegally split his lot. The FCDC provides: "Lot is 
used both as a generic term for a development site, 
and to refer to any parcel o f  land created and 
described by a record survey or plat." FCDC Ch. 
X IV (KK) .  A l l  o f  the evidence in the record 
indicates that Bawden separately purchased two 
parcels o f  land either personally or through his 
family or business entity and now proposes to 
develop only one o f  those parcels. Cowan, has 
never contradicted this evidence, offering only 
argument that these two parcels should be 
considered one lot or one development site. 
Additionally, the lot now owned by Eric Bawden 
was split o f f  pursuani to a Class I permit, and this 
was not an illegal lot split. Therefore, the Board's 
determination is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
3 .  Performance srandards 
When determining whether to approve or deny a 
Class I1 permit application, the FCDC sets out 
performance standards for P & Z and the Board to 
consider. FCDC Ch. V. The FCDC requires full 
compliance with certain standards, "absolute 
performance standards," and mandates rejection o f  
an application if one o f  these standards is not met. 
FCDC Ch. V(B). The FCDC also creates "relative 
performance standards." FCDC Ch. V(D). For 
each o f  these standards the proposed project earns 
or loses points based on the extent to which the 
proposed project complies with the standard. 
FCDC Ch. V(D)(2). Once the standard is scored, 
that score is then multiplied by that standard's " 
importance factor" to achieve a final score. FCDC 
Ch. V(J)(3). If the sum o f  all the scores for relative 
performance standards is zero or greater, assuming 
the project otherwise complies, the application wi l l  
be approved. FCDC Ch. V(J)(4). If the sum is 
less than zero, the application w i l l  be denied. 
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*I265 First, Cowan argues that the Board erred in 
determining that Bawden's application met the 
absolute performance standard for public access. 
Second, Cowan argues the Board erred in assigning 
Eagle's Nest a positive score for certain relative 
performance standards. We w i l l  address each of 
these standards in turii. 
a. Absolule performance slandard-public access 
Cowan argues the Board erred in approving the 
Development because tlie FCDC requires that 
historic public access to public lands not be 
eliminated, and the plat iailed to show all 
currently-used, existing roads across "the property." 
Therefore, he continues, Bawden failed to comply 
with this absolute standard. 
The FCDC provides: "No development shall 
eliminate existing public access through private 
lands to trailheads on public lands." FCDC Ch. 
V I I I (MM) ( I ) ,  I n  turn, i t  uses development "as a 
generic term covering any and all activities for 
which a permit is required'' by the FCDC. FCDC 
Ch. X I V  (V). 
Once again, the Board's decision that the road at 
issue d id not cross the development site is 
supponed by substantial and competent evidence, 
and therefore i t  did not err. As discussed 
previously, Eagle's Nest is a development on one 
parcel o f  land. While Bawden owns the 
r~eighborirlp parcel i o  the easi, these two parct.ls 
remain separate, as the Board concluded based on 
the evidence before it.  While there is some 
indication that tlie road crosses tlie parcel o f  land 
Bawden retains for his personal use, there is simply 
no evidence that it crosses the Eagle's Nest 
development and w i l l  be eliminated by the 
development. As such, this development has not 
violated tlie FCDC's prohibition on eliminating 
existing public access. 
h. ReYarive perj>rmoi?ce standards 
i. Slopes 
The FCDC encourages developers to provide open 
space on slopes between fifteen and thirty percent. 
The Administrator awarded Eagle's Nest a score o f  
+ I 2  because the use o f  bui lding envelopes, areas 
where land owners cannot build, would protect 
slopes. Cowan argues the Board should have 
accepted his expert's score o f  zero, but this request 
is nothing more than asking this Court to review a 
factual finding. 
[44] At icr  thc hcaiing on the !;rial plat, and 
considering both the Administrator's score and the 
testimony o f  Cowan's expert, tlie Board found that 
the final plat included slope information and 
determined that the project proposed building 
envelopes which prevented the development from 
disturbing slopes. Since no  slopes would be 
disturbed, the Board concluded, the score given by 
the Administrator was appropriate. 
Here, the Board heard and considered conflicting 
evidence, I t  chose to rely on the evidence 
presented by the Administrator, and such evidence 
is both substantial and competent. That i t  chose to 
rely on evidence other than the testimony o f  
Cowan's expert is not error. 
ii. Wildlife habitat 
Cowan argues that the score o f  zero for wi ldl i fe 
habitat was error, His expert testified that Eagle's 
Nest is in critical wi ldl i fe habitat. Cowan concedes 
that the development is not included at all on thc 
natural resource inventory map, but argues that this 
is because at the time the rnap was prepared the 
land was part o f  a National Forest and only private 
land was mapped. This, he contends, should have 
led the Board to conclude that the land was critical 
wi ldl i fe habitat because had tile land been privately 
owned when the map was prepared i t  would have 
been includcd as critical wildlife habitat. 
The FCDC defines critical wi ldl i fe habitat as "[ajny 
area that provides the environmental factors 
required fur the survival o f  a pariicuiar species o f  
wildlife. Critical wildlife habitat includes al l  
important habitat areas shown on the natural 
resource invento~y liiaps prepared for the county, or 
O 2007 ThomsonIWesi. No  Claim to Orig. U S .  Govt. Works. 
Page 25 of 26 
Page 24 ' 
I 43  ldaho501, 148 P.3d 1247 
(Cite as: 143 i da l to  501, 148 P.3d 1247) 
other areas so identified by the ldaho Fish and 
Game Department." FCDC Ch. X I V  (DDDD) 
(emphasis removed). 
After holding a hearing on the final plat for the 
second application, the Board determined that 
Eagle's Nest was not included on * I266  the map 
when the natural resources inventory maps were 
prepared and for that reason the development was 
not scored. I t  then determined that the 
developmeni *as not in a critical wi ldl i fe area. 
Once again, the Board's decision is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Neither the 
existing maps nor letters from the Fish and Game 
Department place the development in critical 
wi ldl i fe habitat. While Cowan's expert opined 
differently, i t  was not error for the Board to rely on 
the existing maps and letters from the Fish and 
Game Department when making its determination 
that the development was not i n  critical wildlife 
habitat. FN'4 
FN14. Indeed, ldaho law is "well 
established that an applicant's rights are 
determined by the ordinance in existence 
at the time o f  ti l ing an application for the 
permit." Pqvelle River Prop. O~i'ners 
Ass'n v Bd  of Cornm'rs o/ Yc~/!ry Cozmp, 
I32 ldaho 551, 555, 976 P.2d 477, 481 
( I  999); see aiso 
Canul/iVorcres1/Col1111~6~1s / I c~ iun  Cotnm. 
v. Ci+ of Boise, 136 ldaho 666, 669, 39 
?. id  606.609 (2001). 
iii. Visually sensitive areas 
Finally, Cowan argues that the proposed 
development w i l l  diminish the visual appeal o f  the 
Shotgun Valley. Rather than the zero awarded by 
the Administrator on this standard, Cowan contends 
certain designations and "broadly delineated . .  by 
the U.S. Forest Service." This delineation is based 
"on the view from major public roads and bodies o f  
water." FCDC Ch. X I V  ( A A A A ) .  The Board 
determined that because the development was not 
included on the forest service maps showing 
visually sensitive areas, the standard was not 
relevant and accepted the Administrator's score. 
As before. Cowan is simply displeased with the 
Bozird's decision and asks this Coiirt to review a 
factual finding However, the Board's decision is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
'There was conflicting evidence presented as to 
whether the area would be visually sensitive i f  the 
maps were redrawn. Moreover, i t  was not error for 
the Board to rely on the maps as they existed at the 
time Bawden filed his application. 
The Board did not err in approving Bawden's 
application based on the scores given for relative 
performance standards. Each of its decisions is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Therefore, this Court is bound by the Board's 
factual findings and we af f i rm the Board's decisions 
relating to relative performance standards. Since 
we affirm each individual score, we need not reach 
Cowan's argument relating to the overall relative 
score. 
I;. Attorney's Fees on  Appeal 
i45j j46J Both parties seek attorney's fees under I.C. 
$ 12-1 17, which provides for the award o f  attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party if the other party acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Since 
Cowan has not prevailed on appeal, he is not 
entitled to attorney's fees. However, Cowan did 
not act entirely without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law, so we do not award the Board attorney's fees 
pursuant to I.C. $ 12-1 17. 
Eagle's Nest should have received a negative score 
because Bawden did not propose clustered The Board also seeks attorney's fees pursuant to I .C. 
develooment as the FCDC encouraees and because 12.121 An award under this statute is " 
the de;elopment violates the policy contained in the appropriate i f  the Court is lefl with the abiding 
Comprehensive Plan to direct development away belief that the appeal was brought or defended 
from visually sensitive areas. The FCDC defines frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
visually sensitive areas as those areas containing iVul'l Union Fire ins. Co, of Pilrsburgh. P A .  v. 
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Dixon, 141 Idaho 537. 542, 112 P.3d 825, 830 
(2005). This appeal was not brought frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation; therefore we 
refrain from awarding the Board attorney's fees 
under I.C. $ 12-121. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the Board's approval of  the application 
for a Class 1 1  permit. Cowari !has eithcr fzilcd :O 
show that the Board erred or failed to demonstrate 
that the Board's errors violated his substantial 
rights. Neither party*1267 is awarded atzorney's 
fees on appeal. Costs to Kespondent. 
Chief Justice SCHKOEDER and Justices TROUT, 
EISMANN and JONES concur. 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF PLAINTIFFS/ 
PETITIONERS IN SWPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND 
PlaintiffsIPetitioners present the following points and authorities in support 
of their Motion to Amend by adding a Fourth Cause of Action in Declaratory 
Judgment. 
The dual purposes of Rule 15 (a) are to allow claims to be determined 
on the merits rather than technicalities and to make pleadings serve the 
limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts 
that are at  issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 
871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999) (citation omitted.) A court may 
consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint 
state a valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the 
complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Onc. v. Idaho First National 
Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). A court, 
however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting the 
claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend because that is 
more properly determined a t  the summary judgment stage, Christensen 
Family Trust, 133 Idaho at  872, 993 P.2d a t  1203. 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P. A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d 
557 (2062). 
I.R.C.P. 15 (a) provides that amendment to pleading may be made only 
by leave of the court or by agreement of the parties, but that "leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires." This Court has held that 
"courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend." Wickstrom v. 
North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450,453,725 P.2d 155,158 (1986). This 
Court explained Rule 15 (a) as follows: 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF PLAINTIFFS1 
PETITIONERS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND 
"Rule 15 (a) declares that leave to amend 'shall be freely given where 
justice so requires; this mandate is to be heeded. [Citation omitted.] If 
the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be 
proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test 
his claim on the merits. In  the absence of any apparent or declared 
reason-- such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part 
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, undue prejudices to the opposing party by virtue of 
the allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave 
sought should, as the rules require, "be freely given." Of course, the 
grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of 
the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any 
justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of 
discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the 
spirit of the Federal Rules. 
Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1986), quoting 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 
(1962). 
Idaho Schools for Equal Education Opportltnity v. Idaho State Board of 
Edzication, 128 Idaho 276, 284, 912 P.2d 644, 652 (1996). 
We also recognize that this Court has determined that a trial court 
properly refuses permission to amend a complaint when the record 
contains no allegations that, if proven, would entitle the party to the 
relief claimed. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l 
Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991). Nonetheless, as this Court 
indicated in Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450,725 P.2d 
155 (1986), in the interest of justice, district courts should favor liberal 
grants of leave to amend a complaint. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF PLAINTIFFS/ 
PETITIONERS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND 
Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, - (1997). 
Dated this 6th day of April, 2007. 
fl- 
Attorney for PetitionersRlaintiffs 
CLERIC'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certiijl that a copy of the above and foregoing is sent by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this 6th day of April, 2007 to: 
JOHN CAFFERTY, ESQ. 
KOOTENAI COUNTY DEPT. OF 
LEGAL SERVICES 
45 1 GOVERNMENT WAY 
P. 0. BOX 9000 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 838 16-9000 
FAX (208) 446-1621 
MISCHELLE FULGHAM 
L U I ~ S  & ANNIS, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS : AT LAW 
1600 WASHINGTON TRUST 
FINANCIAL CENTER 
717 WEST SPRAGUE AVENUE 
SPOKANE, WA 99204-0466 
FAX (509) 747-2323 
JOHN F. MAGNUSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P. 0. BOX 2350 
FAX (208) 667-0500 
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Scott W. Reed, ISB#818 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE ) Case No. CV-06-8574 
GROWTH, a non-profit, unincorporated ) 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL ) 
C O M M U N I T I E S ,  a n o n - p r o f i t  ) ALTERNATIVEMOTIONPORLEAVE 
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI ) TO AMEND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., a ) 
non-profit corporation; NORBERT and ) 
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and ) 
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA; ) 
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON; ) 
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KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political ) 
suhdivision of the STATE OF IDAHO ) 
acting through the KOOTENAI COUNTY ) 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J. ) 
"GUS" JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN, ELMER ) 
R., "RICK" CURRIE and KATIE ) 
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their ) 
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, ) 




POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, ) 
and HEARTLAND, LLC, and COEUR ) 
D'ALENE LAND COMPANY and H. F. ) 
MAGNUSON, ) 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
In the alternative, in the event that the Court determines that the Amended 
Petition for Review adding a Fourth Cause of Action for Declaratory Judgment 
should not have been filed, plaintiffsfpetitioners move pursuant to Rule 15 (a) 
1.R.Civ.P. for leave of the Court to file the identical Amended Petition for Review. 
The motion is supported by the Points and Authorities filed herewith. 
Dated this 6th day of April, 2007. 
Attorney fohPetitionersiPiaintiffs 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the above and foregoing is sent by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this 6th day of April, 2007 to: 
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PETER J. SMITH IV 
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LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
Ste 102 
250 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814-2971 
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Attorneys for Aonlicant Powderhorn Communities LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unicorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit unicorporated 
association; KOOTENAI ENVIRONMENTAI 
ALLIANCE, INC., a non-profit corporation; 
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMANN; 
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN 
MELKA; MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
NO. CV-06-8574 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiffs, 
KOOTENAI COUNTY. a nolitical subdivision / 
of the STATE OF 1 ~ ~ ~ 0 ' a c t i n ~  through the 
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON, 
CHAIRMAN: ELMER R. "RICK" CURRIE 
and KATIE BRODIE. COMMISSIONERS. in / 
their official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE: 1 
K:\F\FOXXO24912\000DS\PLDO\POWDERHORN MEMO TO STRIKE(MGS).DOC 4127107 
COMES NOW Applicants Powderhom Communities, LLC and Heartland LLC, 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84. Intervenors submit the following memorandum supporting their 
motion to this Court to strike the following: 
1. Appendix A, B, and C attached to Petitioners' Opening Brief as they are outside 
the record and Petitioners did not properly moved to supplement the record per Rule 84. 
2. Appendix A to Brief of Petitioners in Opposition to Intervenors' Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as it is outside the record. 
3 .  Exhibit A and B to Petitioners' Amended Petition for Judicial Review as 
Petitioners failed to comply with Rule 84 and did not timely move to supplement the record, 
nor did Petitioners show good cause why the materials were not presented in the public 
hearings below. 
DATED this - z?44day of April, 2007 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
BY 
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT, ISB # 691 1 
MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM, ISB #4623 
Attorneys for Applicant Powderhorn 
Communities LLC 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE: 2 
K:\F\FOXX024912\0000S\PLDG\POWDERHORN MEMO TO STRIKE(MGS).DOC 4/27/07 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ 7 ' ~  day of April, 2007, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Scott W. Reed E4 Hand-delivered 
Attornev at Law First-class Mail 
P. 0. Box A 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816 
U Overnight Mail 
U Facsimile - 208-765-5 11 7 
John A. Cafferty E4 Hand-delivered 
Kootenai County Legal Services First-class Mail 
P. 0. Box 9000 U Overnight Mail 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 El Facsimile - 208-446- 162 1 
John F. Magnuson E4 Hand-delivered 
Attornev At Law U First-class Mail 
1250 ~or thwood  Center Ct., Suite A 0 Overnight Mail 
P. 0 .  Box 2350 Facsimile - 208-667-0500 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 838 16 
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COUNTY OF KOOTENAI}SS 
'ILCD 
MISCHELLE R. FULGHAM. ISB #4623 
PETER J. SMITH IV. ISB #6997 
LUKINS & ANNIS. P.S. 
250 Northwest Blvd.. Ste 102 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814-2971 
Televhone: (208) 667-05 17 
Facsimile No.: (509) 363-2478 
Attornevs for Intervenors Powderhorn Communities LLC and Heartland LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH. a non-orofit unicornorated / NO. CV-06-8574 
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMANN; I 
association; PRES~RVE OUR'RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit unicorporated 
association; KOOTENAI ENVIRONMENTAL 
ALLIANCE, INC.. a non-profit corporation; 
GREG and JANET TORLINE; SUSAN 
MELKA; MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 1 
INTERVENORS' BRIEF IN 




KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the STATE OF IDAHO acting through the 
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON, 
CHAIRMAN; ELMER R. "RICK CURRIE 
and KATIE BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in 
their official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
Defendants, 
and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC, and 
HEARTLAND LLC, and COEUR D'ALENE 
LAND COMPANY, and H.F. MAGNUSON, 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND 
'HEARTLAND'S OPPOSITION BRIEF: 1 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES LLC and HEARTLAND LLC 
(hereinafter "Powderhorn") file this opposition memorandum seeking dismissal of the Petition 
for Judicial Review filed with this Court on November 15, 2006. and dismissal of the Amended 
Petition for Judicial Review filed with this Court on February 5,2007. To the extent the Court 
considers the third attempt by these PlaintiffIPetitioners to file an even more untimely appeal, 
submitted in the form of an "Alternative Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition" filed with 
the Court on April 6,2007, Powderhom also seeks dismissal thereof. To be clear, the entire 
case, that is each of the various "Petitions" filed by Petitioners should be denied and dismissed 
with prejudice. 
GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF PETITION 
Powderhorn seeks dismissal of all of these various Petitions because: 
1. From the inception of this matter, the Court has been without jurisdiction; 
2. Legislative matters, such as this Comprehensive Plan Amendment, are not 
subject to Petitions for Judicial Review; 
3. LLUPA has specific time deadlines and Petitioners failed to timely appeal the 
final order in this matter issued by Kootenai County on November 16,2006; 
4. The November 15, 2006, Petition was premature in that it did not appeal a final 
order and it was rendered moot by the November 16,2006, Amended Petition; 
5. Petitioners' First Cause of Action fails under I.C. 67-5279(3), because "(c ) no 
unlawful procedure deprived Petitioners af  their due process rights; (d) substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole supported the decision; and (e) the Commissioners' decision was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or the result of an abuse of discretion." Even if Petitioners established a 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND 
, HEARTLAND'S OPPOSITION BRIEF: 2 
violation of subsections (c), (d), or (e) (which they have not), their appeal must be denied 
because Petitioners failed to allege or establish that a substantial right of the claimant has been 
prejudiced; 
6. Petitioners' Second Cause of Action entitled "Unlawhl Ex Parte 
Communication" fails to state a legally cognizable claim; 
7.  Petitioners' Third Cause of Action entitled "Wichman Conflict of Interest" fails 
to state a legally cognizable claim; 
8. Petitioners' Fourth Cause of Action fails because Declaratory Relief claims 
cannot properly be joined with this LLUPA appeal and because Petitioners waived this claim 
by failing to raise it before the Commissioners; and, 
9. Petitioners seek to tortuously interfere with the business relations and business 
expectancy of Rand Wichman Planning Services LLC. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 16,2005, Powderhorn filed a Request for an Amendment to the Kootenai 
County Comprehensive Plan for the general geographic area known as the Powderhorn 
Peninsula.' R. Vol. 2, p. 310; R. Vol. 2, pp. 299-309; and R. Vol. I, p. 57. In order to amend 
the Comprehensive Plan, Powderhorn had to establish "what error was made in the original 
I Powderhorn's Comprehensive Plan Amendment as submitted and approved by the Board of County 
Commissioners deals with a broad geographic area, including approximately 3,000 acres of land. The land is 
owned by fifty some different entities (nearly ail of whom did not participate in the Application) and is comprised 
of over a hundred different parcels. No actual or specific legal descriptions exist of the Comp. Plan property 
involved, nor is there a listing of all owners anywhere in the Record. These precise details are not necessary for a 
Comp. Plan ameiidment which is legislative and of general application. 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND 
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Plan OR what substantial change has occurred in the actual conditions in the area that justifies 
an amendment." R. Vol. 2, p. 310 (Comprehensive Plan ~ ~ ~ l i c a t i o n ) . ~  
The Powderhom Amendment sought three general Comp. Plan revisions, all based upon 
substantial changes. First, the Amendment sought to update the County's Comprehensive Plan 
Future Land Use Map designation3 from an Agricultural designation to a Rural Residential 
designation. R. Vol. 1, p. 57. This revision was warranted because conditions in the area had 
changed substantially and the Powderhorn Peninsula had ceased viable agricultural production 
R. VoI. 2, pp.388-393; R. Vol. 2, pp. 240-248. Next, the Powderhorn Application sought to 
change a Timber category to a Rural Residential category because the land no longer sustained 
any viable timber operations. R. Vol. 1, p. 57; R. Vol. 2, pp. 248-255. Lastly, the Powderhom 
Application sought to include an overlay designation of Rural Residential in the Federal Lands 
category. R. Vol. 1, p. 57. The Comp. Plan Rural Residential overlay category would apply to 
the Federal Lands designation in the event ownership of these lands later became private. 
On April 19,2006, the Kootenai County Planning Department prepared its Staff Report 
evaluating the Powderhorn Application. R. Vol. 1, p. 130. In its report, Kootenai County 
admitted and confirmed this Comp. Plan Amendment was a purely legislative matter. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 13 1. County Planner Mark Mussman wrote: "The request involves numerous 
pieces of property. Because this is a legislative matter, specific property owner authorization is 
not required." R. Vol. 1, p. 1314. If the Application was not a legislative matter, then it would 
Kootenai County Resolution No. 95-03 provides for amendment of the Comprehensive Plan "to correct errors in 
the original plan or to recognize substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area." 
It is critically important to note Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use maps are not zoning maps. The two 
concepts are factually and legally distinct. Unlike zoning designations, Comp. Plan designations do not convey 
any legal rights, permits, or uses. Cooper v. BoardofCounty Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407,412 (Idaho 1980). This 
Map Amendment did not and could not seek a zoning designation, nor could it obtain any zoning rights. 
"ounty Attorney John Cafferty likewise stated that Comp. Plan amendments were "legislative" matters. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 114. 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND 
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be a quasi-judicial matter and the property owners must be identified and consent to the 
Application involving their real property. Kootenai County determined this Application was 
legislative. R. Vol. I ,  p. 13 1. As a result, no legal descriptions exist, the real property owners 
were not notified, and the real property owners were not required to consent to the County's 
approval of the Comp. Plan redesignation of their lands. 
In the April 19,2006, Staff Report, County Planner Mussman confirmed either a Rural 
Residential or a Rural designation would be appropriate for the Powderhorn Application. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 21 and R. Vol. 1, p. 137. Mussman wrote: 
It does appear that the Applicant has done a reasonable job of arguing that the 
conditions in the area have changed sufficiently to merit a different future land 
designation. However, it is questionable because of the location and the access 
issues, whether a Rural Residential designation is the most appropriate.. .The 
subject property is in close proximity to Rural designation on the west side of 
Coeur d'Alene Lake. Perhaps a Rural Designation could be appropriate in this 
location as well. 
R.Vol. 1,p.21 andR.Vol. 1,p. 137. 
On April 27,2006, the Kootenai County Planning Commission held a public hearing. 
Supp. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 1-89, The Planning Commission did not deliberate at the close of their 
public hearing but waited to rule until after considering another pending Comp. Plan 
Amendment. The Planning Commission waited because Comp. Plans "can only be addressed 
every six months" and they "had another one before them" to consider. Supp. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 88. 
On May 25, 2006, the Planning Commission deliberated on the two legal standards 
necessary for a Comp. Plan Amendment, namely I) was there an error in the original Comp. 
Plan, or 2) has a substantial change occurred in the actual conditions of the area that justifies an 
amendment. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 16, Ins. 1-7. Despite the changes in use, the Planning Commission 
recommended denial of the Application because it wanted to wait for the entire Countywide . 
Comp. Plan rewrite. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 1 - 17. 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND 
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On August 14, 2006, Powderhom requested a material and substantive revision to its 
Application. R. Vol. 1, pp.20-28. Based upon input from County staff, Planning Commission 
members, and the public at large: Powderhorn revised its Comp. Plan Application by seeking a 
Rural designation instead of Rural Residential. R. Vol. I ,  p. 20, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 31, ins. 18-25 
and p. 32, Ins. 1-9. Citing and specifically quoting the language of Mark Mussman in his Staff 
Report, i.e., "Perhaps a Rural Designation could be appropriate in this area as well," 
Powderhom changed its Application to a Rural designation. This responsive approach by 
Powderhom demonstrated a willingness to respond to public concerns by seeking a more 
conservative and less intense designation of Rural, instead of Rural Residential. R. Vol. 1, 
pp. 20-28; R. Vol. 3, p. 593; and R. Vol. 4, p. 827. Similarly, the public requested an ultimate 
density consistent with a Rural Comp. Plan designation in their "Petition Regarding Changes in 
the Existing Comprehensive Plan for Kootenai County, Idaho." R. Vol. 1, pp. 226-228. The 
revised Comp. Plan Application incorporates this request from the public citizen's "Petition." 
R. Vol. I ,  pp. 226-228. Kootenai County accepted the revised request to Rural. 
On the evening of September 14,2006, and into the very early morning hours of 
September 15,2006, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners conducted a public 
hearing. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 19-104. The Commissioners did not deliberate at that time as the 
hearing had gone past midnight. 
On September 25, 2006, the Commissioners conducted a site visit to the general area of 
the Powderhorn Peninsula. Tr. Vol. I ,  p. 106-20 1. The Peninsula covers nearly 3,000 acres, so 
the Commissioners did not walk around or view the entire site. 
' Powderhorn undertook and performed a vast public outreach program, holding 15 Town Hall workshops, 
meeting with groups of neighbors, individuals, school district representatives, sheriffs department representatives, 
EMS service providers, Kootenai County Assessor's office staff, City of Harrison officials, business groups, Jobs 
Plus, the Harrison Gem committee, Coeur d'Alene Chamber of Commerce, and NIBCA. R. Vol. 1, p. 21. 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND 
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On September 26, 2006, Petitioners objected to conduct observed during the site visit. 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 367 and 374. Petitioners accused Commissioner Brodie of improper contact with 
Powderhorn representatives. Mrs. Twillman objected to Commissioner Brodie participating in 
hrther deliberations on the case due to Brodie's alleged improper discussions with Powderhorn 
representatives during the site visit. Petitioners lodged their complaint against Commissioner 
Brodie with County Attorney John Cafferty. 
On September 28,2006, the Commissioners were scheduled to hold Deliberations, but 
in order to cure any alleged defects regarding the site visit, the Commissioners instead 
reopened public testimony and asked that a new public hearing, limited to the site visit, be set 
for October 4, 2006. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 204-209. Commissioner Brodie disclosed on the record 
that due to the objections raised by Petitioner Bev Twillman, Commissioner Brodie wanted the 
opportunity to speak with the public about those issues and to gather additional public 
testimony. Commissioner Brodie stated: 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: I have no questions, just a statement. And I offer 
to everyone in this room my humble apology first off. I need to start with that. 
For taking you away from your busy schedules, I know you have other exciting 
things to do ... at this time I would like to move to reopen the public hearing 
to give the Board the opportunity to address issues that arose during the 
site visit. 
First, I would like to move that the testimony be limited to those persons that 
were present on the site for that visit namely Bev Twillman, Janet Torline, 
Susan Melka, Jim Moore, Rand Wichman, Steve Walker and Jim Foxx and to 
also include all of the County staff. 
Further, I would like to move that to the extent that there's no additional written 
testimony germane to the site visit that be allowed into the record as well. And I 
believe there, the County has received a number of e-mails that I have not been 
privy to that I would like to make a part of the record as, kind of like to peruse 
them. See what's going on. 
INTER\'ENORS POWDEKHOKN COMMlJNITIES AND 
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Finally, as part of the motion I would move that the matter be brought back 
before this Board on Wednesday, October 4,2006 at 9 a.m. in Meeting Room 1 
and that any additional written testimony be submitted to the Planning 
Department no later than one - one o'clock on the 31d. Deliberations likely to 
take place on October 5. 
T. Vol. 1, pp. 206-208 (emphasis added). 
Commissioner Brodie further explained the parameters of her disclosure and motion to 
reopen the record for testimony at a new public hearing, stating, 
And the only testimony that we want is testimony that is germane to that site 
visit for the twenty minutes we were there. 
T. Vol. 1. p. 208, Ins. 11-13. 
On October 4,2006, pursuant to Commissioner Brodie's statement and her successful 
motion to reopen the record, the Commissioners held a pubic hearing to cure any alleged- 
deficiencies with the site visit. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 21 1-227. Chairman Johnson explained the 
purpose of the reopened public hearing, stating, "We are here.. .we are going to reopen the ' 
public hearing dealing with this issue because of some concerns of some of residents." 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 212, Ins. 7-9. "We're going to open the public meeting. Uh, what this is going to 
deal with is a site visit the Commissioners at the Powderhom site. All testimony today will be 
specific to that, there will he no new information besides what happened during the site visit." 
[sic]Tr.Vol. l ,p.212,ln.23-p.213,1n.2. 
The record was reopened without time or submittal limits on Petitioners' 
representatives. Mrs. Torline, Mrs. Twillman, and Mr. Moore testified freely and at length 
about the site visit, their objections, and the alleged exparte communications of Commissioner 
Brodie. They were allowed to submit whatever written materials they wanted into the Record. 
Tr. Vol. 1 pp. 214-220, R. Vol. 3, pp. 643-668. 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND 
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Janet Torline testified, 
I observed Commissioner Brodie speaking with Mr. Wichman from the Heartland 
group, I moved closer to hear what was being said. I had understood it was Mr. 
Mussman's role to answer any questions from the Commissioners. A few 
minutes later, I heard Mr. Walker from the Heartland Group giving inaccurate 
information regarding how recently the surrounding land had been farmed and the 
state of its agricultural status and viability. 
Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 214-215. 
Mrs. Torline failed to offer any testimony as to how or why she claimed the agricultural 
viability information was in error. Mrs. Torline requested and was granted leave to submit 
additional written evidence in Exhibit 2000. R. Vol. 3, p. 643. 
Next, Petitioner Bev Twillman testified regarding her objections to the site visit. She 
complained that Heartland Representative Steve Walker was inaccurate when he said some 
Peninsula land was not viable farm land. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 216, ins. 20-23. Mrs. Twillman 
testified at length and without any time limitations. She explained her understanding of the. 
CRP program. She requested and was granted leave to file nearly twenty pages of new 
exhibits, Exhibit 2001. Tr. Vol. I ,  pp. 215-220 and R. Vol. 3, pp. 644-662. 
During her testimony and in her submittals, Mrs. Twillman did @mention or complain 
about any alleged exparte conversations between Commissioner Brodie and Rand Wichman. 
If fact, during her testimony, it appeared that Mrs. Twillman was satisfied with the process of 
the curative hearing, and she did not seek any further review or disqualification. 
Mrs. Twillman failed to mention the need for any further curative measures and conceded that 
she had been allowed to submit all the evidence she had. 
BEV TWILLMAN: I appreciate that and I appreciate you people voting to 
allow us to come back and to talk about trying to keep the process going 
smoothly. That's all we're trying is to stay responsible to the process. So I 
appreciate your time and I insert all of my information. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 217, Ins. 15-19 (emphasis added). 
INTERVENORS POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES AND 
'HEARTLAND'S OPPOSITION BRIEF: 9 
Thereafter, James Moore spoke regarding the site visit. Tr. Vol. I ,  p. 220. He 
corroborated Commissioner Brodie's comment that no discussion of the CRP program occurred 
on site. Mr. Moore described the site visit comments he heard, stating: 
What I heard at the meeting, I was not in my car, I was walking listening to the 
people talking, I heard the comment that the farm has not been farmed for years 
and could not be farmed for profit. That's what I heard. . I heard no reference 
to CRP...." 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 220, Ins. 11-13. 
Mr. Moore went on to explain that he was a farmer from Florida and he knew farming. 
He felt the Peninsula land was "fertile and could grow crops." Tr. Vol. I, p. 220, In. 18. 
Mr. Moore submitted his additional written exhibits into the Record as Exhibit B-2002. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 221, In. 1 and R. Vo!. 3, pp. 663-668. At the conclusion of his comments, it 
appeared Mr. Moore was satisfied that he had been fully allowed the opportunity to address the 
site visit as he closed his comments to the Commissioners with, "That's all I gotta say." 
' 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 220, Ins. 22-23 (emphasis added). 
Susan Melka, a Petitioner in this action, was among the people present for the site visit, 
and she was specifically included in Commissioner Brodie's Motion to reopen the public 
hearing. Mrs. Melka failed to appear or attend the hearing. Mrs. Melka was allowed and did in 
fact submit additional written information to the Commissioners in lieu of personal testimony 
at the curative hearing. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 222, Ins. 2-4. 
In a key disclosure curing any potential conflicts, Commissioner Brodie divulged her 
site visit comments on the Record at the public hearing and she included a general description 
of the communications. 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: ... I did ask Mr. Walker at the car how long in 
fact has this property, how long has it been since this property has been 
farmed. 
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STEVE WALKER: That's correct. That's when we were talking about Stan 
Parks' property. And Stan had stopped farming that about ten years ago. 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: And your answer was sometime between seven 
and eleven years ago. 
STEVE WALKER: For Stan's property. 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Correct. 
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you very much. 
STEVE WALKER: Okay. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 222, Ins. 13-25 (emphasis added). 
The Chairman also questioned Rand Wichman about his conversations with 
Commissioner Brodie at the site: 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: ... Mr. Wichman. What questions were you asked on 
site? 
RAND WICHMAN: Commissioner Brodie asked me at the site, asked where 
we were on the map. At the time, we were in the vicinity of the firehouse. She 
also asked about what the, because the Commissioners had a smaller version of 
this map, asked me what the yellow line represented. I indicated that was the 
property that was under the control of the Applicant although the entire 
peninsula was the subject of the Application. It was the question I asked there 
and then of course after the site visit was completed, you know we were down at 
the Harrison Bridge, because there was something blocking the bridge, one of 
the Commissioners, we all got out of our, we all got out of our cars, I recall 
Commissioner Brodie asking legal counsel if it was okay to talk to me about 
a completely unrelated matter and that was when Commissioner Brodie 
asked about my availability for talking to a potential candidate for 
Planning Director position and we talked a little about that, and that 
conversation ended with Commissioner Brodie saying okay, well I'll call 
you. And there was, that was the extent of our conversation as I recall it. 
Tr. Vol. 1,p. 221, In. 14-p. 222, In. 10. 
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Before closing public testimony, each of the Commissioners made a statement on the Record 
and during the public hearing about Commissioner Brodie's conversations with Rand 
Wichman. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: ... one thing that I will add before we close the 
record. I want to have Commissioner Brodie put something on the record. For 
my part of the conversations up there, the only one that I was privy to was the 
one that we had with Mr. Wichman at the bridge. I did not hear the question. I 
had walked up the road when all that transpired. The conversation that was at 
the bridge in Harrison I had heard, I heard the conversation but as Commissioner 
Brodie and Commissioner Currie know, unless I am standing right there, my 
hearing is pretty lousy. I did hear you say you'd call him later, I asked you in 
the van, I think or shortly thereafter, what that was about and you talked about 
and at the public hearing if you remember at the end of the public hearing that 
we had on this, I asked everyone not to speak to the Commissioners on this but 
if it dealt with issues that were not about either Powderhorn or Rickel Ranch that 
did not mean they could, we could not talk to anyone we wish to talk to. Just 
don't talk about the applications. The conversation that Commissioner 
Brodie had with Mr. Wichman dealt with a totally outside the scope of what 
we were doing issue. [sic] And I will, 1 want to put that on the record. 
Commissioner Currie, did you have anything before I gave Commissioner 
Brodie her opportunity. 
COMMISSIONER CURRIE: No, I just echo exactly what you said there, 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: I have not much to add other than once again I 
would like to apologize to anybody for the inconvenience, we all have busy 
schedules and probably more exciting things to do than come and listen to why I 
asked Rand to call me or let him know that I would call him later. There 
certainly was no intent of wrong doing on my part. I was trying to gain 
information. As it turns out, all the questions I asked were also part of the 
record currently. So, again, my apologies to one and all and we will move 
forward. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 225-226 (emphasis added). 
At the conclusion of this curative hearing, Chairman Johnson repeated it was 
completely acceptable to talk to the Commissioners about unrelated matters while the 
Powderhorn Application was pending. 
CHAIRMAN JOHHNSON: ... This will be deliberated tomorrow, ten o'clock, I 
believe right here. Uh, again I will ask you not to speak to the Commissioners 
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dealing with either one of the applications that are in front of us but if you want 
to talk about hunting with Mr. Currie, Commissioner Currie, or with old cars 
with me or want to talk about uh .... 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Not anything. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You are more than welcome. Meeting adjourned. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 227, Ins. 4-1 1. 
Petitioners raised no further objections regarding Commissioner Brodie, Rand Wichman, or the 
site visit. 
On October 5,2006, the Commissioners held Deliberations on the Powderhorn 
Application. R. Vol. 3, p. 618; Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 229-234. Under the standards of Kootenai 
County Resolution No. 95-03~, the Commissioners found no error existed with the original 
Comp. Plan designations but that significant changes had occurred to the Comp. Plan 
designation over the past decade. Commissioner Brodie and Chairman Johnson determined 
that the land is not being farmed nor has it been for several years. As a result, the land is not 
agricultural anymore. R. Vol. 3, p. 61 8; Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 232 and 233 - 234. The Commissioners 
properly deliberated, weighed the evidence in the Record, and determined as follows: 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: ... we are asked for a comp plan change, an 
amendment. So, was there a mistake made in 1994. No, I believe that ground 
was ag ground and used as such. So the second question, has there been 
significant changes and circumstances since the 1994 comp plan to warrant 
a change and I believe there have been. Fact, the ground is not currently 
being farmed nor has it been for any number of years .... I believe there has 
been significant change in circumstances since 1994 to warrant a change in 
the rural designation and I would so move in Case No. CP-080-05. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 231, In. 25 - p. 232, In. 17 (emphasis added). 
' Kootenai County's Resolution No. 95-03, citing Idaho Code 67-6509, provides for amendment of the Comp. 
Plan "to correct errors in the original plan or to recognize substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area." 
The County's Comprehensive Plan states "The purpose of this designation (Agriculture) is to preserve existing 
productive agricultural lands." 
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COMMISSIONER CURRIE: ... This was not about a subdivision. It's not 
about traffic. It's not about what, what was planned there. It is about a comp 
plan amendment ... and the significant changes. I look at the map and I look at 
the peninsula and it is sort of an island out there. Uh, everything else around it 
has been, has been changed except for that, that one, point. And that obviously 
weighed heavily.. . but.. .I couldn't bring myself to uh to say that that area, the 
way it sits today, now it might change tomorrow but the way it sits today, uh, 
I'm not going to support the change. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: ... looking at this one, looking at the area, going by 
the charge that we have, has there been, was the comp plan wrong or was there a 
significant change to the area and in my opinion, this one there is a significant 
change to the area. This area is not agricultural anymore; we would all like 
to think that that's agricultural but in my opinion that is not agricultural 
area any more. That is, again, rural Idaho.. ..I do agree the prop-I will agree 
with Commissioner Currie on the point that we are not to look at what might be, 
this process is set up to change the comp plan but there will be many more bites 
at the apple as far as what those subdivisions, what the land, what the developers 
are going to do to that property. All those issues will be handled at a future 
date .... but for my two cents, that's not ag any more. I think it is, that to me is 
rural, that's rural. And so, Commissioner Brodie, if you want to go ahead and 
restate your motion at this time. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 233, in. 17 - p. 234, In. 13 (emphasis added). 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Case Number CP-080-05, I would move there 
has been a significant change to the comp plan designation and that that be 
changed to rural. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 234, Ins. 14-16. 
Commissioner Brodie and Chairman Johnson voted to approve the Comp. Plan 
designation to Rural. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 234, Ins. 17-23. Although Commissioner Currie stated he 
agreed that "everything around this area had already changed.. .significant changes," he voted 
against the Amendment. R. Vol. 1, p. 233, Ins. 3-6 and R. Vol. 1, p. 234, In. 21. 
On November 9,2006, the Commissioners signed an Order of Decision changing the 
Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use Map designation for the Powderhorn Peninsula from 
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Agricultural to Rural. R. Vol. 3, pp. 604-614; Tr. Vol. 1, p. 238. Because this was a legislative 
matter, the Board passed a Resolution adopting the new Comp. Plan designation and provided 
general notice the citizens of Kootenai County by publishing a Legal Notice of the new 
Countywide legislation. R. Vol. 1, pp. 100- 104. The Board's November 9,2006, Order is the 
only Decision Petitioners timely appealed to this Court. 
On November 15,2006, Petitioners filed their first Petition for Judicial Review of the 
November 9,2006, Decision. R. Vol. 2, pp.334-358. Scott Reed, attorney for Petitioners, 
expressly limited his appeal to the November 9, 2006, Order of Decision. R. Vol. 2, p. 358. 
Petitioners did not serve or give notice of this appeal to Powderhorn. 
On November 16,2006, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners issued new 
findings, conclusions, and signed an Amended Order of Decision. R. Vol. 3, pp. 591-600. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 244. This November 16, 2006, Amended Order, constitutes the Commissioners' 
final order. It has not been timely appealed. 
On December 8,2006, again without notice to Powderhorn or to any of the actual 
property owners who submitted zone change applications, Petitioners asked the Court to stay 
all matters including the upcoming public hearings set in the following five zone change 
applications: 
1. Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-787-06, In Re: Powderhorn Zone Change 
Application; 
2. Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-788-06, In Re: Charles R. Blakley Zone 
Change Application; 
3. Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-789-06, In Re: H.F. Magnuson and 
Coeur d'Alene Land Company Zone Change Application; 
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4. Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-890-06, In Re: East Point Farms Zone 
Change Application; and, 
5. Kootenai County Planning Case No. 2-791-06, In Re: Bla Bar Inc. Zone Change 
Application. 
None of these five zone change applications are part of this case. The zone change applications 
are separate applications, contained in separate files, unrelated to the Comp. Plan Amendment 
and not part of the pending Petition for Judicial Review appeal in any way. The zone change 
requests do not involve the same real properties as the Comp. Plan Amendment. The five zone 
change applications were for properties of a different and much more limited and specific 
ownership. 
Again, without notice to Powderhorn and without notice to any of the five landowners 
whom had pending zone change cases, the Court granted Petitioners a hearing, set for 
December 18,2006, on their motion to stay all proceedings in Kootenai County Case 
Nos. 2-787-06, In Re: Powderhorn Zone Change Application; 2-788-06, In Re: Charles R. 
Blakley Zone Change Application; 2-789-06, In Re: H.F. Magnuson and Coeur d'Alene Land 
Company Zone Change Application; 2-890-06, In Re: East Point Farms Zone Change 
Application; and, 2-791-06, In Re: Bla Bar Inc. Zone Change Application. 
On December 12,2006, just seven days before the hearing on the stay, Powderhorn 
casually and informally learned of the Motion to Stay from Kootenai County Legal Counsel 
John Cafferty. Neither the Petitioner nor the Court had provided Powderhorn or the land 
owners notice that the five zone change hearings could be stayed. 
On December 14,2006, in response to Mr. Cafferty's informal notification of the 
upcoming stay hearing, Powderhorn moved to intervene. Petitioners opposed Powderhorn's 
intervention in the case. 
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On December 15,2006, without waiting for permission to intervene as there was no 
time to do so, Powderhorn filed its opposition to the stay of its zone change hearing. 
On December 18,2006, the Court granted Powderhorn leave to intervene, but the Court 
immediately imposed a stay barring Powderhorn (and all of the other landowners) from 
proceeding with the pending zone change cases, which zone change Applications were 
unrelated and not part of the issues raised in this Appeal. The Court refused to impose any 
terms or bond when staying the separate zone change applications for the duration of this 
Appeal. 
On January 29,2007, Powderhorn moved to dismiss the Petition for lack ofjurisdiction, 
in part because Petitioners failed to timely appeal the final order of November 16,2006. 
On February 5,2007, Petitioners responded to Powderhorn's Motion to Dismiss by 
attempting to correct their failure to timely file an appeal of the November 16,2006, final 
order. Petitioners filed a purported Amended Petition for Judicial Review. Because this is a 
legislative decision, the new Petition sought to add a Declaratory Relief action to their Petition. 
More than 28 days had passed since the order being appealed was issued, so the Amended 
Petition, including the Declaratory Relief claim, was therefore untimely. 
On February 14, 2006, Petitioners filed their Opening Brief. Petitioners attached 
Appendixes A, B, and C comprising nearly 50 pages of documents outside the Record on 
appeal. Petitioners failed to object or move to supplement the Record before the Court on 
appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 846) and (I). The time for objecting to the Record (14 days) or 
augmenting the Record, (21 days) has long since expired. I.R.C.P. 846) and (1). These 
materials are outside the Record and cannot be considered on appeal. 
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On February 16,2007, Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H.F. Magnuson moved to 
intervene in order to protect their interests in the Comp. Plan approval. Petitioners did not 
oppose the intervention. 
On February 27,2007, Powderhorn objected to and moved to strike the improperly filed 
Amended Petition as it failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 15. The Court has not ruled on this 
Motion to Strike. It is set for hearing on June 6, 2007. 
On February 27,2007, the Court denied Powderhorn's Motion to Dismiss. No written 
order bas been entered. 
On March 6,2007, the Court granted Coeur d'Alene Land Company and 
H.F. Magnuson's motion to intervene. The Court strongly cautioned against any of the other 
landowners seeking to intervene or participate in this case despite these landowners being 
deprived of their zone change hearings due to the stay imposed by the Court for the duration of 
this appeal. 
On March 14, 2007, Kootenai County filed its Respondents' Brief. 
On April 6,2007, Petitioners filed their Opposition to Powderhorn's Motion to Strike. 
Also on April 6, 2007, Petitioners attempted to file yet a third Petition, attaching it to a pleading 
entitled "Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend." 
Herein, Powderhorn submits its Intervenor's Opposition Brief. Powderhorn 
simultaneously filed an objection and motion to strike the following documents which are 
outside the Record and not part of this Appeal: 
1. Petitioners' Opening Brief Appendixes A-C; 
2. Petitioners' Amended Petition Appendixes A-C; and, 
3. Petitioner's Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend, attached Petition, 
and Appendixes A-C. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person to seek judicial 
review of an approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for in the Idaho 
Administrative Procedural Act (APA). I.C. 5 67-6521(1)(d); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 
7l,74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003). For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, a local 
agency making a land use decision is treated as a government agency under the APA. Evans, 
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: "(a) in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of 
the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole; and (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion." I.C. 5 67-5279(3). The party attacking a zoning board's action must 
first illustrate that the board erred in a manner specified therein and must then 
show that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced. 
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780,784, 86 P.3d 494,498 (2004) (internal citations 
omitted). Petitioners herein only seek review pursuant to subsections (c ), (d), and (e) of Idaho 
Code 67-5279(3). 
Local government planning actions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity; this 
includes the governing body's application and interpretation of its own ordinances. Sanders 
Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695,698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002). It is not the role of the 
reviewing court to weigh the evidence. This Court must defer to the agency's decisions that are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding 
County, 141 Idaho 784,790, 1 18 P.3d 1 16, 122 (2005). 
Powderhorn responds to Petitioners' arguments in the general order raised in the 
Opening Brief. 
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LEGAL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
A. The Court Must Dismiss Petitioners,' Second and Third Causes of Action for 
fail in^ to State a Leeallv Co~nizable  Claim. As a Matter of Law, No "Unlawfuf 
Ex Parte Communication" Claim Exists and No "Conflict of Interest" Claim 
Exists. None of the Al le~ed Violations Allow or  Reauire a Judicial Remand of the 
Approval. 
Petitioners' lead argument claims their Second and Third Causes of Action are 
interrelated and dispositive of this case. Powderhorn agrees these two issues are interrelated 
and dispositive, however, the unavoidable outcome is dismissal. Both Causes of Action fail to 
state any legally cognizable claim and must be summarily dismissed as a matter of law. 
Petitioners' case focuses on allegedly improper comments and conduct involving 
Commissioner Brodie and Powderhorn representatives. Specifically, Petitioners cite and rely 
on alleged exparte comments of Commissioner Brodie during a site visit and the employment 
of Rand Wichman as a private consultant as their primary grounds to set aside the Comp. Plan 
Amendment. Even taking Petitioners' unsupported factual allegations and their exaggerated 
descriptions as true for purposes of legal argument, no legal claims exist. Based upon clearly 
established Idaho law, nothing illegal or unlawful occurred or is alleged. As a result, no legal 
basis exists for this Court to remand the Powderhorn approval, and the Petition should be 
dismissed. 
In their Second Cause of Action, Petitioners complain that during a site visit on 
September 24,2006, Commissioner Katie Brodie had improper exparfe communications. See 
Petition, p. 15, para. 42 - 45. As a result of these alleged exparfe conversations by 
Commissioner Brodie, Petitioners argue the Powderhorn Comp. Plan amendment "should be 
declared null and void, ... and remanded back to the Board of County Commissioners." See 
Petition, p. 15 ,  para. 45. 
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1. No Ex Parte Communications Invalidated the Powderhorn Approval. 
Petitioners' "Ex Parte Communication" Claim completely ignores the curative remedy 
expressly set out in Idaho Code 67-5253 and more fully described and applied by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Eacret v. Bonner County, 130 Idaho 780,786,86 P.3d 494,501 (2004) and 
in Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. City Council of City ofBoise, I34 Idaho 65 1 ,8  P.3d 
646 (2000). 
Idaho Code 3 67-5253, entitled "Ex parte communications" provides: 
Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters specifically authorized by 
statute, a presiding officer serving in a contested case shall not communicate, - - 
directly or indirectly, regarding any substantive issue in the proceeding, with 
any party, except uDon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate 
in the communication. 
Idaho Code 67-5253 (emphasis added). 
Even assuming the Powderhorn Application was a "contested case," i.e., a quasi- , 
judicial7 matter (which it was not), the Commissioners cured any due process defects arising 
from the site visit by giving "notice and opportunity for all parties to participate in the 
communication." 1.C. 67-5253. By disclosing and discussing the site visit communications on 
the Record during the October 4,2006, public hearing, the Commissioners provided notice and 
the opportunity to participate, thereby curing any due process defect. Id. 
In describing the curative means of correcting due process violations, the Supreme 
Court in Eacret v. Bonner County, held: 
' EX pane comments are not prohibited in legislative matters, only in contested or quasi-judicial matters. 
I.C. 67-5252; Idaho Historic Pres. Council v. City Council of Boise, 134 Idaho 651; 654,s P.3d 646,659 (2000) 
The Powderhorn Application was a legislative matter, and therefore the alleged exparte comments are of no legal 
significance. However, even under a quasi-judicial standard of review applicable to contested decisions such as 
variances or special use permits, the Commissioners acted properly in disclosing and describing the site visit 
comments. The Kootenai Commissioners properly and legally went out of their way to cure any perceived issues 
by reopening the public testimony to those who attended the site visit. 
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C. Exparte communications and impermissible view. The second question 
raised by Harris's argument on appeal is whether Commissioner Mueller's 
decision was based, as the district court found, on evidence that was beyond the 
record. At issue are the exparte communications between Mueller and Harris 
and the impermissible view of the subject boathouse site. 
When exparte contacts are present in the context of quasi-judicial zoning 
decisions, such as variances and special use permits, courts will be more 
receptive to challenges to decisions on grounds of zoning bias." McPherson 
Landjll, Inc., supra, 49 P.3d at 533, quoting 32 Proof of Facts 53 1, 5 16. Idaho 
Code, Section 67-5253 addresses ex parte communications in contested 
administrative cases: 
Unless required for the disposition of exparte matters specifically authorized by 
statute, a presiding officer serving in a contested case shall not communicate, 
directly or indirectly, regarding any substantive issue in the proceeding, with 
any party, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate in the 
communication. 
A quasi-judicial officer must confine his or her decision to the record produced 
at the public hearing. Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. City Council of 
City ofBoise, 134 Idaho 651,s P.3d 646 (2000). Any exparte communication 
must be disclosed at the public hearing, including a "general description of 
the communication." Id. at 656,8 P.3d at 651. The pnrpose.of the disclosure 
reauirement is to afford opposine parties with an opportunity to rebut the 
substance of any ex oarte communications. In a similar vein, the opportunity 
to be present at a view provides opposing parties the opportunity to rebut facts 
derived from the visit that may come to hear on the ultimate decision and create 
an appearance of bias. 
Eacret, 130 Idaho at 786 (emphasis added). 
A similar curative remedy was adopted and applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Idaho Historic Pres. Council v. City Council of Boise, 134 Idaho at 655-656, 8 P.3d at 650-651 
(2000), holding: 
Even if this Court were persuaded that Tierney and Neuburger express the better 
~ l e ,  the requirements of procedural due process under Cooper and Chambers, 
supra, were not met. The members of the City Council who accepted phone 
calls failed to disclose the name and other identifvin~ information of the 
callers, and also failed to reveal the nature of the conversation, making it 
impossible for the Commission to effectively respond to the arguments that the 
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callers may have advanced. See Tierney, 536 P.2d at 443. While the district 
court found that it "[did] not appear that any of these telephone contacts 
improperly influenced any ultimate opinion given by the individual [City] 
Council members," there was no evidence to support this conclusion because of 
the City Council's failure to sufficiently identify the callers and provide a 
general description of what they said in favor of or  in opposition to the 
destruction of the Foster Building. We hold, therefore, that the receipt of 
phone calls in this case, without more specific disclosure, violated 
procedural due process. 
C. Whether The City Council Is Held To A Standard Of Judicial 
Disinterestedness In A Quasi-Judicial Proceeding. 
This decision does not hold the City Council to a standard ofjudicial 
disinterestedness. As explained above, members of the City Council are free 
to take phone calls from concerned citizens and listen to their opinions and 
arguments prior to a quasi-judicial proceeding. In order to satisfy due 
process, however, the identity of the callers must be disclosed, as well as a 
general description of what each caller said. 
- - - - - - - - - - - ---Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 Other relevant identifying information might include the caller's employment 
or affiliation with a business or organization with a stake in the matter before the 
governing body. 
Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. City Council of City of Boise, 134 Idaho at 655- 
656, 8 P.3d at 650-651 (2000). 
Herein, the Kootenai County Commissioners, unlike the Bonner County Commissioners 
in Eacret and unlike the Boise City Council members in Idaho Historic, properly "disclosed the 
ex parte communications at a public hearing and disclosed a general description of what was 
said." Id. As a rcsult, no due process violation occurred. Any error brought about by the 
alleged exparte contact was cured because Petitioners were given "notice and the opportunity 
to participate in the discussion." Id.; see also I.C. 67-5253. 
A review of Janet Torline's comments, Bev Twillman's comments, and James Moore's 
comments, along with their Exhibits submitted during the curative October 4,2006, hearing, 
indicates they were provided "notice and the opportunity to participate in the discussion." 
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Torline, Twillman, and Moore (and Susan Melka if she had attended) were allowed to say all 
they wanted about the site visit comments and were allowed to submit all the evidence they 
wanted to submit. No further curative measures were necessary and no violation remained. 
Their own comments confirm they had notice and the opportunity to respond. 
Because Comp. Plan amendments are legislative and not quasi-judicial, Kootenai 
County generally allows exparte communications in Comp. Plan Amendments. See Tr. Vol. 1, 
p. 1 14, Ins. 10-14. During the ride to the Powderhom site visit, Commissioner Brodie asked 
about the Comp. Plan amendment process occurring as part of the Countywide "Meeting in a 
Box" campaign. Id. Pursuant to the "Meeting in a Box" process, local neighborhood groups 
hold Comp. Plan meetings in their local grange halls, garages, living rooms, or wherever to 
discuss proposed amendments to the Comp. Plan. No public notices are required for these 
"Meetings in a Box," and the County provides the Comp. Plan meeting materials, which 
include a bag of microwave popcorn. Because Comp. Plan amendments are legislative, 
Commissioner Brodie was told by two County representatives (Planner Mark Mussman and 
Legal Counsel John Cafferty) that the Commissioners could properly receive Comp. Plan 
amendment comments outside the hearing during a local Comp. Plan "Meeting in a 
Box." Id. 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: ... the hearings, the Comp Plan Meetings in a 
Box ... 
* * * 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Are we allowed to go to those, or not? 
MARK MUSSMAN: I don't see why you wouldn't be allowed. 
COMMISSIONER BRODIE: Okay. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. l l I, Ins. 3-15. 
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COMMISSIONER BRODIE: ... So, anyway, the answer of, can the Commissioners 
attend any of the Meetings in a Box, the answer at this time is yes. 
MARK MUSSMAN: Yeah. 
JOHN CAFFERTY: It is a legislative issue. 
MARK MUSSMAN: Yeah, and its just fact finding ... 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 114, Ins. 10-15 (emphasis added). 
As Mr. Cafferty indicates, Comp. Plan amendments are legislative matters. As both 
Mr. Mussman and Mr. Cafferty advised Commissioner Brodie, with Comp. Plan amendments, 
comments to the Commissioners outside the public hearing, i.e., exparte comments, are 
allowed. 
2. No Violation of Appearance of Fairness Occurred or Exists under Idaho 
Law. 
Petitioners' Third Cause of Action entitled "Wichman Conflict of Interest" contends a 
legal claim for "conflict of interest" exists regarding Rand Wichman. Petitioners assert this 
"conflict of interest" theory requires the Court to remand Powderhorn's approval back to the 
Board of County Commissioners. See Petition for Judicial Review, pp. 16-1 8. Petitioners' 
"conflict of interest" cause of action claims that based upon his previous position as Planning 
Director, Rand Wichman's subsequent work as a private consultant for Powderhorn renders the 
Commissioners' approval "ethically and legally void." See Petition, p. 17, para. 54. Petitioners 
complain about an "unfair advantage to the applicants" as a result of hiring Wichman. See 
Petition, p. 17, para. 53. Petitioners further assert that by having or allowing Wichman to 
participate at public hearings, even though no objections were raised at the time, the County 
violated the "appearance of fairness" doctrine. See Petition, p. 17, para. 55. 
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In their Opening Brief as their primary legal theory, Petitioners argue: 
It is generally recognized that it is an ethical violation for a public employee 
upon leaving public employment to participate in any manner in any proceeding 
which was going on at the time of his or her departure. 
Petitioners Opening Brief, p. 12. 
Although this "appearance of fairness" theory is key to Petitioners' case, no legal authority is 
cited or exists to support their argument. Instead, what Petitioners apparently recognize8 but 
intentionally ignore is the legal reality that Idaho law does not preclude the activity of which 
they complain. Even if Petitioners' exaggerated allegations about Commissioner Brodie's 
conversations and past working relationship with Rand Wichman are true, no "appearance of 
fairness" violation exists as a matter of law. Cowan v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Freemont County, - Idaho __ 148 P. 3d 1247, 1260 (2006). 
In Cowan, the Idaho Supreme Court considered and rejected this Petitioners' argument. 
In a unanimous decision, Justice Burdick wrote: 
Finally, based on a line of cases from Washington, Cowan argues that because 
this was a zoning decision, the decision makers and hearings on the matter 
needed to not only be fair and impartial, but also appear fair and impartial. He 
contends that comments made by a Commissioner and a consultant, as well 
as the Board's actions, which allegedly violated his due process, all indicate 
an indifference to the appearance of fairness. He urges this Court to adopt 
this doctrine and reverse the Board's decision because of its indifference to the 
appearance of fairness and impartiality. 
In the early 1970's the Supreme Court of Washington issued its decision in 
Chrobuck v. Snohomish Counfy, 78 Wn.2d 858,480 P.2d 489 (Wash. 197 1). 
There, Atlantic Richfield Company sought to re-zone land embracing beach 
frontage on Puget Sound. After the county changed the comprehensive plan and 
granted the company's petition, Chrobuck sought judicial review of the 
Commissioner's action. The Court determined that Chrobuck's due process 
rights had been violated, despite a lack of evidence of any dishonest or self- 
serving conduct by the Commissioners, by "an unfortunate combination of 
Petitioners expressly concede that "the federal statutes and city codes submitted earlier have no comparable 
match in Idaho.. .." See Opening Brief, p. 13. 
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circumstances . . . and the cumulative impact thereof [which] inescapably cast 
an aura o f  improper influence, partiality and prejudgment over the proceedings." 
Id. at 496. Based on an earlier case, the Washington Supreme Court found that 
under that state's law a hearing must be fair in both appearance and substance. 
Id. 
This Court has never adopted the appearance of fairness doctrine of our 
westerly neighbor. Rather, we recognize that due process "entitles a person 
to an impartial and disinterested tribunal[,]" hut we require a showing of 
actual bias before disqualifying a decision maker even when a litigant 
maintains a decision maker has deprived the proceedings of the appearance 
of fairness. Davisco Foods Int'l, Inc., 141 Idaho at 791, 118 P.3d at 123. 
Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court has stepped back from this 
doctrine. See W.T. Watterson, What Ever Happened to the Appearance of 
Fairness Doctrine? Local Land Use Decisions in an Age of Statutory Process, 
21 SeattleU. L. Rev. 653 (1998). We therefore decline to adopt this doctrine 
and refrain from reaching the substance of Cowan's argument that certain 
statements and actions violated the appearance of fairness doctrine. 
Cowan, 148 P.3d at 1260. (emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court then refused to set aside the Freemont County Commissioners' land use 
decision despite exparte statements and alleged bias. Id. 
A similar result must follow in this action. As was the case in Cowan, the alleged 
exparte communications between Commissioner Brodie and Rand Wichman do not establish 
any basis to invalidate the decision because they were cured. Likewise, the fact that Wichman 
previously worked for the County does not give rise to a reversal or remand. No statewide 
restrictions prohibit this employment, and no County restrictions prohibit this employment. 
Actual bias must be shown, and no such allegation or evidence exists. Petitioners' Second and 
Third Causes o f  Action fail and must be dismissed. 
3. No Actual Bias Shown or  Alleged. 
Petitioners continue this theme by complaining that because Commissioner Brodie 
worked well with Planning Director Wichman for fourteen years, it necessarily follows that she 
is incapable o f  fairly deciding this Application. Nothing in the Record support Petitioners' 
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argument. So, lacking any legitimate evidence, Petitioners attempt to create some evidence by 
improperly attaching materials outside the Record on Appeal to their Petition. Powderhom 
moved to strike these improper materials, but to the extent the Court considers the comments, 
Powderhom hereby preserves its argument that such comments do not demonstrate bias 
sufficient to overturn this Comp. Plan approval. 
Petitioners rely upon Commissioner Brodie's statement from an unrelated case several 
yeas ago: 
I have worked with our Planning Director for fourteen years. And, most of 
those have been great warn, wonderful exchanges. And I know Rand gives this 
job and his responsibility the utmost of, I mean, none of it is taken lightly. Um, 
I feel that 1 need to uphold Rand's decision .... 
See Petition, p. 9. 
In a wild leap of logic lacking any factual or legal support, Petitioners contend because 
Brodie and Wichman worked well in the past when he was Planning Director, it necessarily 
follows that the Commissioners' Powderhom decision is legally invalid. Idaho Courts have 
repeatedly rejected such claims of bias, even where the facts show more egregious conduct. 
Davisco Foods IntY, Inc. v. Gooding County Commissioners, 141 Idaho 784, 791, 118 P.3d 
1 16, 123, (2005). In Davisco, prior to issuing a decision and outside the public hearing context, 
Gooding County Commissioner Sauer made statements to the local media that he was opposed 
to the Petitioner's cheese operation waste disposal proposal. He then voted to deny Petitioner's 
application following a public hearing. In response to complaints of bias seeking to set aside 
the denial, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the arguments of bias against Commissioner 
Sauer. Id. 
In the same case, Davisco, the Court also rejected the Petitioners' claim that ex parte 
communications required the recussal of Commissioner Elexpunt. Petitioner Jerome Cheese 
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argued that Commissioner Elexpuru relied on information gained from improper exparte 
contacts outside the public hearing context. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's 
dismissal of the exparte claim for remand and expressly held that Commissioner Elexpuru, like 
Commissioner Sauer, was not impermissibly biased. Id., 141 Idaho at 792, 118 P.3d at 124. 
In Eacret v. Bonner County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 780,86 P.3d 494, (2004), 
Commissioner Mueller made statements indicating he had predetermined the outcome of the 
public hearing and that he had engaged in exparte communications which would cause him to 
vote in favor of a variance, even before hearing any evidence at any public hearing. Id. In 
setting new law on actual bias standards necessary to set aside an approval and remand, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held: 
A decision maker is not disqualified simply because he has taken a position, 
even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a 
showing that the decision maker is "not capable of judging a particular 
controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances." Horfonville Joint 
School Distr. No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482,493,49 L. Ed. 
2d l , 9 6  S. Ct. 2308 (1941). Prehearing statements by a decision maker are not 
fatal to the validity of the zoning determination as long as the statement does not 
preclude the finding that the decision maker maintained an open mind and 
continued to listen to all the evidence presented before making the final 
decision. See generally McPherson LandJill, Inc, v. Board of Commrs of 
Shawnee County, 274 Kan. 303,49 P.3d 522,531 (Kan. 2002). By way of 
explanation then, prehearing statements by a decision maker are fatal to the 
validity of the zoning determination if the statements show that the decision 
maker: (a) has made up his or her mind regarding the facts and will not listen to 
the evidence with an open mind, or (b) will not apply the existing law, or (c) has 
already made up his or her mind regarding the outcome of the hearing. 
Eacret, 139 Idaho at 785,86 P.3d at 499, 
Commissioner Brodie's prehearing statements in another case, involving different 
parties occurring years earlier that she has enjoyed many "great warm, wonderful exchanges 
with Wichman," in no way showed she "was incapable of judging this case on the basis of its 
own circumstances." Nor do her comments demonstrate she "(a) has made up her mind 
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garding the facts of this case and would not listen to the evidence with an open mind, (b) she 
ould not apply the existing law, or (c) she had already made up her mind regarding the 
utcome of the hearing." Id. None of the necessary elements are met, and Petitioners failed to 
ulfill the prima facie elements of a bias claim against Commissioner Brodie. As a matter of 
law, no basis exists to remand the Powderhorn approval, and Petitioners' claim must be 
dismissed. 
4. No Prohibition Against Ex Parte Communications Exists in Legislative 
Matters. 
Even if the exparte contacts were not remedied by the curative hearing, the 
Commissioners are not legally precluded trom obtaining ex parte information when dealing 
with a legislative matter. Only quasi-judicial matters require strict adherence to due process 
requirements. That is, only when deciding quasi-judicial matters, and not when crafiing a 
legislative Comp. Plan Amendment, are the Commissioners limited to information contained 
in the Record. 
The test for determining whether a local governing body sits in a quasi-judicial 
capacity was expressed in Cooper v. Board ofCounty Commissioners ofAda 
County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). In that case, this Court stated: 
Basically, this test involves the determination of whether action produces a 
general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interest 
(sic), or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general rule or 
policy to specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the fonner determination 
is satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the 
action is judicial. 
Id. at 41 0,614 P.2d at 950 (quoting Fasano v. Boardof County Comm'rs, 264 
Ore. 574,507 P.2d 23,27 (Or. 1973)). Since S-Sixteen's appeal of the 
Commission's decision to deny the certificate of appropriateness required the 
City Council to apply a general rule to specific parties and interests, the City 
Council was sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity. 
This Court has held that when a governing body sits in a quasi-judicial capacity, 
it must confine its decision to the record produced at the public hearing, and that 
INTERVENORS POWDERMORN COMMUNITIES AND 
HEARTLAND'S OPPOSITION BRIEF: 30. 
failing to do so violates procedural due process of law. See Chambers, 125 
Idaho at 118, 867 P.2d at 992 (citing Cooper, 101 Idaho at 41 1,614 P.2d at 951; 
Gay v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,629,65 1 
P.2d 560,563 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
ldaho Historic Pres. Council v. City Council of Boise, 134 ldaho 651 655,8 P.3 646, 
648 (2000). 
Unlike a quasi-judicial matter, this Comp. Plan Amendment merely "produced a general 
rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interest (sic), or situations." 
Id. That is why none of the property owners had to be notified or consent to the Application. 
The general Comp. Plan designation would be applied generally to an open class of individuals 
and situations. Had it been a quasi-judicial matter, which evidence and testimony must be 
confined to the record, then the property owners would have been required to consent because 
as a quasi-judicial matter, it would have "entailed the application of a general rule or policy to 
specific individuals, interests, or situations." Id. During the ride to the site visit, Kootenai. 
County Legal Counsel John Cafferty and Planner Mark Mussman agreed and expressly stated 
that the Commissioners were allowed to hear exparte comments (i.e., from the Comp. Plan 
"Meeting in a Box") when dealing with legislative matters. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 114, Ins. 10-14. 
B. Petitioners' First Cause of Action Should be Disn~issed because Any Alleged 
Defects with the Site Visit \#'ere Cured and No \'iolations of Due Process or 
"Unlawful Procedure" under ldaho Code 67-5279(3)(c) Occurred. 
Because any alleged defect with the site visit was cured and because no legal standard 
or legal authority precluded Rand Wichman's involvement, no "unlawful procedure" occurred 
in approving the Powderhorn Application. Pursuant to Idaho Code 67-5279(3)(c), Petitioners' 
claim fails. The Court should dismiss Petitioners' First Cause of Action which cites and relies 
upon I.C. 67-5279(3)(d) "unlawful procedure" as Petitioners have failed to meet this standard. 
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C.  Petitioners First Cause of Action Should Also be Dismissed pursuant tu Idaho 
Code 67-5279(3)(d) and (e). Substantial Evidence in the Record as a M'hole 
Supports the Commissioners' Decision. As the Commissioners Properly Applied 
the Correct Leeal Standards, Their Decision was not Arbitrary. Capricious, or an 
Abuse of Discretion. 
The Comp. Plan amendment was proper because substantial evidence in the record as a 
whole supports the Commissioners' determination that no viable farming is occurring on the 
subject lands and the area is unsuitable for timber production. R. Vol. 2, pp. 388-389; 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 394-395; R. Vol. 2, pp. 240-248; and, R. Vol. 2, pp. 249-255. Regarding the lack 
of any viable agricultural production, the record shows without any credible contradiction that 
area farmers were unable to make a living off these lands. R. Vol. 2, pp. 240-248; R. Vol. 2, 
pp. 394-395; and, R. Vol. 2, pp. 388-389. 
Mr. Charles R. Blakley wrote to the Commissioners and explained the lack of any 
viable farming on the Peninsula: 
I want to set the record straight, as land on the Powderhom Peninsula is not 
viable farmland any longer. 
I was the last major landowner on the Peninsula who tried to make a living 
farming the land and know for a fact that you cannot make a living farming this 
land. My land included 658 acres of which 270 acres were tillable farm land 
and the last several years I farmed it, I was only able to break even with direct 
farming expenses. I didn't make any money, couldn't have paid a mortgage on 
the land, and could not provide for my family by farming it. 
Although parts of the Peninsula were historically considered productive land for 
raising livestock and harvesting small cereal grains, for the past decade, the 
farming activity has totally stopped because of the lack of economic feasibility 
for its landowners. The last other major farm on the Peninsula, East Point 
Farms, ceased operations about eleven years ago. I pretty much stopped farming 
my land seven years ago and did no farming on any of the land for the last five 
years. When the railroad and the Harrison elevator and dump stations closed 
about 12 years ago, the producers in the area were forced to either haul their 
crops to the Worley elevators located 55 miles away, or invest in silos and store 
them on the farm until the crop could be shipped. Also, repair parts, seed, 
chemicals and fertilizer stopped being available in the immediate area and this 
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required the farmers to have these items trucked in from Worley, Post Falls and 
the Spokane area. The increased costs of production and shipping and a low 
crop yield (wheat yield of 49 bushels to the acre on the Peninsula versus 70 to 
100 bushels per acre in the Worley and Plummer area) produces a net return that 
basically only covered the cost of farming and left nothing to pay the carrying 
cost of the land or income to the farmer. The economics simply made it 
impractical to continue farming on the Peninsula. 
For example, the yield for an acre of wheat was $1 50. However, the cost for 
fertilizer, seed, and chemicals was $1 18.50. This left a net gain of $31.50 per 
acre or a total of $7,087 for the year on a 225-acre crop of wheat. After also 
deducting the expenses of property taxes, equipment costs and repairs, fuel, 
freight on the fertilizer, seed, and chemicals, and outside labor, this left very 
little to cover living expenses or my own labor costs. 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 394-395. 
Stan Parks, who attempted to farm the East Point Farms property up until ten years ago, 
similarly wrote of his inability to make money farming on the Powderhorn Peninsula. 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 388-389. 
I farmed the land on the peninsula that is referred to as East Point Farms. The 
total property consists of approximately 600 acres of which 400 were 
farmable .... During my five years of farming the land, 1 grew wheat, barley and 
alfalfa ... I stopped farming the land over ten years ago. I stopped farming it 
because I could not make any money farming it. Frankly, I had to take money 
from my other businesses to pay for the cost I incurred to farm it. Not a very 
smart way to do business. 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 388-389. 
The Agriculture Viability Analysis of Powderhorn Peninsula performed by Chad 
Goldsmith, an expert from Washington State University with a degree in Crop and Soil 
Science, (R. Vol. I ,  pp. 240-248) also concluded "traditional crops that have been grown on the 
Powderhorn Peninsula are no longer viable." R. Vol. 2, p. 246. Mr. Goldsmith also analyzed 
the viability of some alternative crops for future production such as alfalfa hay, canola 
seedlrapeseed, Kentucky bluegrass seed, and lentilstpeas but concluded these crops were not a 
realistic option for the Powderhorn Peninsula. He wrote as follows: 
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Alfalfa Hay 
Not an option because of "more cost involved to raise quality to compete in 
regional markets. Also distance to regional markets would consume all increased 
pricing potential." R. Vol. 2, p. 246. 
CanolaIRapeseed 
Would not be successful because "Not very profitable to grow in major 
agricultural areas. The distance for crop inputs and end delivery point are a 
concern." R. Vol. 2, p. 246. 
Kentucky Bluegrass Seed 
"Not a viable option with the weeds and the current state of the land. It would be 
cost prohibitive to make the ground suitable for meaningful bluegrass production. 
There is also a potential issue with burning harvest residue in the future." 
R. Vol. 2, p. 246. 
Lentils and Peas 
"Not very profitable to grow in major agricultural areas and the distance for crop 
inputs and end delivery point are a concern." R. Vol. 2, p. 246. 
CRP program 
Mr. Goldsmith reported that CRP is "an option and some Powderhorn land is in 
the CRP Program; however this is not profitable for the area as most payments 
would not cover property taxes." R. Vol. 2, p. 246. 
Nothing in the record refutes or contradicts the above evidence that farming is no longer 
viable on the Peninsula. The Commissioners were correct, and their Decision that land uses on 
the Peninsula are no longer agricultural is substantially supported by substantive, competent 
evidence in the Record. 
The same result follows for timber. It is no longer a viable crop on the Peninsula. 
R. Vol. 2, pp. 249-255. Lany Eisenburg, a forestry expert with Synergistic Solutions, Inc., 
performed a Timber Analysis of the Powderborn Peninsula and reported as follows: 
The Powderhorn Peninsula is not a suitable site for commercially viable timber 
production because of the combination of shallow soils and previous logging. 
The physical evidence of the poor timber capacity on the Peninsula is obvious 
when one examines the remaining trees. A healthy tree is characterized by a 
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pointed, vigorously growing crown, pushed upward by the leader in the very 
top, known as the apical meristem. It is in the apical meristem that the tree's 
growth hormones are created, allowing thetree in a natural state, to grow in 
height and effectively compete with adjacent trees for sunlight.. .Most of the 
remaining trees on the Peninsula have instead, either poor leaders or flat tops, 
which means they are neither healthy, nor rapidly growing. From a practical 
standpoint, the area is better suited to shallow plants such as grasses, bushes and 
smaller trees than it is for deeper rooted plants such as trees suitable for 
commercial harvesting. Even though young trees will regenerate, they will 
struggle to grow and will not mature into commercially valuable trees within 
any economically acceptable time frame. 
Based upon substantial evidence in the record, the Commissioners' decision was 
correct. Pursuant to Idaho Code 67-5279(3)(d), the granting of the Amendment, "was 
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." The Court should dismiss 
Petitioners' First Cause of Action which cites and relies upon I.C. 67-5279(3)(d). 
Next, pursuant to Idaho Code 67-5279(3)(e), the Court should dismiss Petitioners' 
claim that the Commissioners' decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
The Commissioners properly considered and applied the correct legal standards, specifically 
that the Comp. Plan can only be amended "to correct errors in the original plan or to recognize 
substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area.. .." See Kootenai County Resolution 
95-03. The overwhelming evidence showed the actual conditions on the Peninsula had 
changed such that agriculture and timber were no longer viable uses. 
Additionally, the proper standards are set out in the Comp. Plan land use descriptions 
for Agricultural Areas and Timber Areas. The Kootenai County Comp. Plan, Part 1, p. 17, 
states as follows: 
Agricultural Areas 
The purpose of this designation is to preserve existing productive 
agricultural lands. Agricultural lands are defined as areas where the 
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primary use is agricultural with dwellings incidental to the primary use. 
Generally, agriculture is defined as the growing o r  raising of agricultural 
commodities. This includes livestock, dairy, poultry, fruit, and 
fur-bearing animals. Incidental processing of agricultural products is 
contemplated. Mining may be construed as a compatible use in this 
designation. 
Agricultural production from existing viable farm lands is a significant 
part of the County's economy. Continued viability requires that these areas 
remain in relatively large land units and that agricultural lands be 
buffered and protected from encroachment by incompatible land uses. 
Services and infrastructure are not expected to be improved in these areas. 
Subdivision development is discouraged. 
Comp. Plan, Part 1, p. 17 (emphasis added). 
Timber Areas 
The purpose of this designation is to preserve and protect existing 
productive timber lands. Timber lands are  defined as areas where the 
primary use is timber production with dwellings incidental to the primary 
use. Generally, timber production is defined as the growing and harvesting 
of trees of a marketable species. 
Similar to agriculture, timber production and processing also represents a 
significant part of the County's economy. Uses allowed in areas designated for 
timber production should be consistent with a goal of long term, sustainable 
harvest. services and infrastructure are not expected to be improved in these 
areas. Subdivision development is discouraged. 
Comp. Plan, Part 1, p. 17 (emphasis added). 
Based upon these Comp. Plan definitions, the Commissioners properly applied the legal 
standards of Resolution 95-03 and found the Powderhorn Peninsula land no longer fit the 
Comp. Plan categories and amended them to Rural. As a result, the Commissioners' Decision 
is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. This Court should dismiss Petitioners' 
First Cause of Action which cites and relies upon Idaho Code 67-5279(3)(e). The 
Commissioners applied the proper standards of review, adequate evidence supports it, and their 
Decision should be upheld. 
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D. Petitioners Indirectly Seek an Unlawful Remedy; Tortiuus Interference with 
M'ichman's Prospective Economic Advantage and L'nconsfitutional lnterference 
with Wichman's Liberty Interest. 
Without naming Wichman directly and without bringing him in as a party so he can 
defend himself, Petitioners indirectly seek to put Wichman out of business. Petitioners are 
demanding the Court overturn this Decision based upon Wichman's involvement, which they 
contend is improper. However, nothing-that is no contract, no covenant limiting future 
employment, no Idaho statute, and no Idaho case law precludes Wichman from doing exactly 
what he did. Yet, if Petitioners are successful in getting Powderhom's approval sent back, then 
they have interfered with Wichman's private land use consulting business. If successful in this 
Appeal, Petitioners could be liable to Wichman for intentional interference with a prospective 
economic advantage. 
The elements of the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic 
advantage are as follows: I )  The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 2) 
knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional 
interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4) the interference was 
wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the 
defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5) 
resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. 
Highland Enters. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338,986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999), 
As we discussed in Bliss Valley Foods, in order to recover for the tort of 
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must 
establish that the intentional interference by the defendant resulting in injury 
was wrongful. This may be shown by proof that either: (1) the defendant had an 
improper motive to harm the plaintifg or (2) the defendant used a wrongful 
means to cause injury to the prospective advantage. Id. at 286, 824 P.2d at 861. 
To be actionable, the means used to cause injury must be wrongful by reason of 
a statute, regulation, recognized common law rule, or an established standard of 
a trade or profession. Downey Clinic v. Nampo Resfaurant Corp., 127 idaho 
283,286,900 P.2d 191, 194 ( I  995) (citing Top Sew. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate, 
283 Ore. 201,582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Or. 1978)). What may be wrongful for an 
unprivileged defendant in a given situation, however, may not be so when the 
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defendant is acting under a recognized privilege. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 
at 286, 824 P.2d at 861. 
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins, Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178,923 P.3 416,424 (1996). 
On a constitutional level, Petitioners are asking Kootenai County to violate its former 
employee's liberty interest in earning a living in his chosen occupation. 
Idaho has primarily relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Bd ofRegents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564,33 L. Ed. 2d 548,92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972) to describe the 
amount of process due where there is a deprivation of a liberty interest 
associated with employment. See Olson, 125 Idaho at 180, 868 P.2d 508. Roth 
determined that due process was required where "a person's good name, 
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing . . ." Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. 
Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904,952, 140 Idaho 904,911 (2004). 
E. The Amended Petition and the Alternative Amended Petition were Not Filed 
within 28 Davs of the Order Appealed. As a Result, this Court Lacks Jurisdiction 
to Consider a LLUPA Appeal of the November 16,2006, Amended Order. 
Powderhorn seeks dismissal of the Amended Petition and the Alternative Amended 
Petition as being untimely filed. Absent a timely filed appeal of a final decision, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider land use decisions issued by a local governmental agency.9 
Section 67-6521(1)(d) authorizes a person aggrieved by a local government's final action to 
seek judicial review by filing within 28 days. 
(d) An affected person aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight (28) 
days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial 
review as provided by Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho code." 
Section 67-6521(1)(d). 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code (IDAPA) 
also governs judicial review of local administrative decisions." A person aggrieved by a "final 
ldaho Code 5 67-6521 (2006). 
ldaho Code 5 67-6521(l)(d). 
" Stevenson v. Blab?e Cty., 137 Idaho 756,759.9 P.3d 1222 (2000) 
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order" or "final agency action" must comply with the timely filing requirements of Idaho Code 
$567-5271-67-5278." A person must wait until all administrative remedies are exhausted 
before filing an appeal of a final order or final agency action.I3 Any appeal filed before a final 
order or final agency action is premature and does not vest the Court with jurisdiction to review 
a non-final order.I4 Only after the exhaustion of remedies provided under the Act [the Local 
Planning Act of 19751 and under local ordinances may an unsuccessful applicant or an affected 
person seek judicial review." Id. 
Petitioners herein failed to comply with Idaho Code 967-6521(1)(d) and Idaho Code 
$§67-5271 - 67-5278. The Board's November 9,2006, Order was not a final order; it was 
replaced by the Board's subsequent Amended Order issued one week later on November 16, 
2006. Thus, Petitioners sought judicial review of an agency decision that was not a final order 
or a final agency decision in violation of I.C. 5 67-5271. Petitioners subsequent and repeated 
attempts at appeal-the Amended Petition filed February 5,2007, and the Alternative 
Amended Petition filed April 6, 2007-are extremely untimely in that Petitioners failed to 
comply with I.C. 5 67-6521(1)(d) in failing to file within 28 days of the November 16,2006, 
Amended Order of Decision, of which they seek judicial review. Petitioners' failure to file 
within 28 days of the Board's final order deprives this Court of jurisdiction and mandates 
dismissal of the Petition for Judicial ~eview."  
The 28-day period for filing an appeal of the Commissioners' final order began running 
on November 16, 2006, when the Board issued their "written findings, conclusions, and 
l2  Idaho Code $67-5270(2)-(3). 
'' Idaho Code 67-5271(1). 
"Jerome County by Board of Comm'rs v. Holloway, 11 8 Idaho 681,685, 799 P.2d 969,974 (1990); Palmer v. 
Board ofcounty Com'rs, I 1  7 Idaho 562,565,790 P.2d 343,346 (1990). 
I s  Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854,993 P.2d 617 (Ct. App. 2000); Enright v. Blaine County, 127 Idaho 
498,903 P.2d 87 (1995). 
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order."I6 Thus, a timely filed and served notice of appeal was due no later than December 14, 
2006. Petitioners have not timely appealed the Commissioners' November 16,2006, "final 
order" by filing in February and April. It is simply too late. If Petitioners are allowed to 
disregard the 28-day deadline and have their February and April Petitions considered by this 
Court, then one wonders why even have a 28-day filing deadline. 
F. There is No "Proiect" and No "Zoning Decision" as Part of the Powderhorn 
Application to Amend the Como. Plan's Future Land Use Map Desi~nation. 
Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use designations are not zoning determinations, nor 
do Future Land Use designations determine any specific project standards. See Kootenai 
County Comp. Plan, Part. 1, p. 16, entitled "Land Use Designations." The concept of a Future 
Land Use designation is completely factually and legally distinct from any zoning rights or 
standards and is completely factually and legally distinct from any project-related design 
standards. Unlike zoning designations or project approvals, Comp. Plan designations do nat 
convey any legal rights, permits, or uses. Seegenerally Cooper v. Board ofCounty Comm'rs, 
101 Idaho 407,412 (Idaho 1980). The Powderhorn Future Land Use Map Amendment did not 
and could not seek a zoning designation, nor could it obtain any zoning or project rights. The 
Comp. Plan sets out the following description for Future Land Use Designations, expressly 
excluding any specific project rights or standards, stating: 
The Future Land Use component of the Comprehensive Plan broadly addresses 
the general direction and type of development within the County. It is not 
intended to specify exact standards that must be met (e.g. minimum lot sizes, 
specific allowed uses, setbacks, etc.) Ordinances address the precise standards 
and regulations to guide development in the direction outlined in the 
Comprehensive Plan. 
Kootenai County Comp. Plan, Part. 1, p. 16, entitled "Land Use Designations." 
'' ln the context of local land use planning decisions pursuant to the LLUPA, Idaho Code 5 67-6501, el seq., Idaho 
Courts have previously held the date on which the decision is made corresponds to the date of the written findings, 
conclusions and order, which starts the time for filing an appeal. See While v. Bannock County Comm'rs, 139 
ldaho 396.80 P.3d 332 (2003); Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 ldaho 349,355 (Idaho 2005). 
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Petitioners throughout their Opening Brief repeatedly and erroneously refer to the 
'owderhom Application as involving a "project" and "zoning." There is no "project" as part of 
he Comp. Plan Future Land Use designation, nor is there any "zoning." Instead, this 
Application and the Commissioners' decision properly and correctly dealt with "the Future 
Land Use component of the Comprehensive Plan [which] broadly addressed the general 
direction and type of development in the County. It [was] not intended to specifL exact 
standards that must be met ..." Id. 
G This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Judicially Review the Board of Countv 
Commissioners' Comprehensive Plan Amendment, including the Future Land Use 
Map Designation. as it is a Legislative Matter. 
Powderhorn's approved Comprehensive Plan Amendment is a legislative matter. The 
Application applied to the entire geographic area known as the Powderhom Peninsula. 
Kootenai County Planner Mark Mussman admitted and documented that this Application was a 
"legislative matter" involving "numerous pieces of property." R. Vol. 1, p. 13 1 (emphasis 
added). 
"Promulgation or enactment of general plans and ordinances is a legislative action."I7 
"Action is legislative when it affects a large area consisting of many parcels of property in 
disparate ownership. Conversely, action is considered quasi-judicial when it applies a general 
rule to a specific interest, such as a zoning change affecting a single piece of property,'8 a 
variance, or a conditional use permit."'9 
I' Burt v. Cify oflduho Fulls, I05 Idaho 65,665 P.2d 1075 f 1983). 
18 Contrary to the "single piece of property" requirement for a quasi-judicial matter, this Application dealt with 
approximately 186 pieces of property. 
19 Id at 68 n.4.; citing Marrin Cy. v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Ela. 1997). 
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In Martin Cy. v.   us ern:^ the Court held that legislative actions "result in the 
formulation of a general rule of policy," and quasi-judicial actions "result in the a ~ ~ l i c a t i o n  f a 
general rule of policy." The comprehensive plan formulates the general rules of policy and is 
therefore legislative. A subsequent permit or development approval may actually apply the 
comprehensive plan rules and is therefore quasi-judicial. 
The Court in Yusem, held: 
We expressly conclude that amendments to comprehensive land use plans are 
legislative decisions. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the 
amendments to comprehensive land use plans are being sought as part of an 
application in respect to only one piece of property. 
* * * 
. . .[T]here is no reason to treat a county's decision rejecting a proposed 
modification of a previously adopted land use plan as any less legislative in 
nature than the decision initially adopting the plan. 
* * * 
Our conclusion that amendments to comprehensive plans are legislative 
decisions is fu-@her supported by the procedures for effecting such amendments 
under the Act."' 
In Burt v. City of Idaho ~ a l l s , ~ ~  the Supreme Court of Idaho specifically held that "the 
annexation of land, the subsequent amendment of the comprehensive plan and the zoning of 
the annexed land" was a leeislative function, as opposed to quasi-judicial function. Id. at 68.23 
The ldaho Court further held that "such lleeislativel actions are not subject to direct judicial 
review."24 "Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and 
widely felt impact on the theory that an appropriate remedy can be had at the polls."25 As with 
all legislative matters, Powderhorn's Comp. Plan Amendment certainly and undeniably had 
20 690 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1997). 
" Morfin Cy v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1293 (Fla. 1997). 
22 Burt v. Ciry ofldoho Falls, 105 ldaho 65,665 P.2d 1075 (1983). 
" Because the subject land was being annexed into the City of Idaho Falls, it obviously involved "a specifically 
identiiiable property." However, simply because the comprehensive plan amendment dealt with "specifically 
identifiable land," it did not mean that the comprehensive plan amendment somehow became a quasi-judicial 
decision. It did not, it remained a legislative decision. 
24 Id, 
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"high visibility and widely felt impact" throughout Kootenai County. R. Vol. 2-6. An 
appropriate remedy could certainly be had at the polls. 
In Burt, the Court expressly stated as follows: 
We hold that in the annexation of land, the subsequent amendment of the 
comprehensive plan and the zoning of the annexed land, I.C. F) 67-6525, the 
city council acted in a legislative manner, see Cooper, supra; Dawson, supra; 
Harrell, supra; see also City of Louisville v. District Court In and For County of 
Boulder, 190 Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (Colo.1975); Golden v. City ofoverland 
Park, 224 Kan. 591,584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978), and that such actions are not 
subiect to direct iudicial review. See, e.g., Dawson, supra. Costs awarded to 
defendants-respondents.26 
Powderhom's Comprehensive Plan Amendment is likewise legislative and is not subject to 
direct judicial review. 
Aside from Burt, which held that Comprehensive Plan Amendments are legislative 
matters not subject to judicial review, no other Idaho appellate decisions appear to have 
addressed this issue. However, by analogy, numerous courts in other jurisdictions have 
similarly ruled that amendments to a comprehensive plan are legislative actions. For example, 
in Coastal Development v. City ofJacksonville the Court expressly held that glJ 
comprehensive ~ l a n  amendments, including comorehensive plan amendments to only the 
future land use map, are Iegisiative. The comprehensive plan amendment at issue in Coastal 
Development did not involve a proposed change to comprehensive plan goals, policies, and 
objectives, but, as was the case with the Powderhorn Peninsula Comprehensive Plan 
Amendment, the Application only sought a land use change to the Comprehensive Plan's 
Future Land Use Map (FLUM) designation. Id. In holding that the Comprehensive Plan 
Future Land Use Map amendment was legislative, the Court stated as follows: 
"Burt  v, Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,68,665 P. 2d 1075 (1983). 
27 Coastal Development v. Cify of Jacksonville Beach, 788 So.2d 204,2001 Fla. LEXIS 743 (200 I ) ,  
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A comprehensive plan is composed of several elements. One element of the 
comprehensive plan is the future land use element. The future land use element 
designates "proposed future general distribution, location, and extent of the uses 
of land for residential uses, commercial uses, industry, agriculture, recreation, 
conservation, education, public buildings and grounds, other public facilities, 
and other categories of the public and privates uses of land." The future land use 
map (FLUM) is a component of the future land use element of the 
comprehensive plan. See Yusem, 690 So.2d at 1292. The FLUM is a pictorial 
depiction of the future land use element and is supplemented by written "goals, 
policies, and measurable objectives." The FLUM must be internally consistent 
with the other elements of the comprehensive plan. 
* * * 
In Yusem, we held that all comprehensive plan amendments are legislative 
decisions. * * *  
made of partichar tract of land. Rather, the comprehensive plan as a whole, 
including the future land use map and all of the other policies of the plan, 
consists of legislative policies that must be applied to determine what uses can 
be made of a specific tract of land.28 
Additional courts have similarly so held. In Holbrook v. Clark c',~~ the Washington 
Court of Appeals held that the adoption of an area-wide comprehensive plan designation was 
legislative, despite the fact that the comprehensive plan designation adversely affected specific 
and identifiable landowners. The Court ruled as follows: 
No bright line separates judicial from legislative actions. Rayaes v. 
Leavenworth, 118 Wn.2d 237,243,821 P.2d 1204 (1992). But area-wide 
actions, such as the adoption of comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances, 
involving the e x e r c s o f  the le~islative body's policv-making role, are 
enerallv considered legislative . . . . And such actions are not made quasi- 
?udicial simply because they affect specific individuals, even if the method 
khosen by t&<legislative bddy to acquire input from the property owners allows 
the owners to discuss their own properties. . . The determining factor is whether 
the decision is a policy-making one: "Although legislative decisions may appear 
adjudicatory when groups focus on how the particular decisions will affect their 
28 See Coastal Development v. Cify ofJacksonville Beach, 788 So.2d 204,2001 Fla. LEXIS 743 (2001), citing 
Martin Cy. v. Yusem, 690 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1997) and Thomas G. Pelham, Quasi-Judicial Rezonings: A 
Commentary on the Snyder Decision and the Consistency Requirement, 9 .I. Land Use & Envtl. L. 243, 300-3001 
( I  994). 
29 112 Wn. App. 354,365,49 P.3d 142 (2002), 
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individual rights, all yolicy decisions begin with the consideration and balancing 
of individual rights." ' 
In Jones v. King c~.," the Washington Court of Appeals likewise held that revisions to 
comprehensive plans (even for a specific designated neighborhood) are legislative 
determinations. In defining and explaining what local land use decisions should not be 
considered quasi-judicial, the Court wrote as follows: 
Quasi-judicial actions of local decision-making bodies are those actions of the 
legislative body, planning commission, hearing examiner, zoning adjuster, board 
of adjustment, or boards which determine the legal rights, duties, or privileges of 
specific parties in a hearing or other contested case proceeding. Quasi-judicial 
actions do not include the legislative actions adopting, amendinv. or 
revising comprehensive, community, or neighborhood plans or other land 
use planning documents or the adoption of area-wide zoning ordinan5:s or 
the adoption of a zoning amendment that is of area-wide significance. 
Numerous other courts have followed these rulings in concluding that amendments to 
comprehensive plans are legislative decisions.33 
In conclusion, Kootenai County, through its Planner Mark Mussman and its Legal 
Counsel John Cafferty, has documented, admitted, and confirmed that not only is Powderhorn's 
Comprehensive Plan Amendment a legislative matter, but the other Comp. Plan amendments 
" Id. (internal citations omitted). 
3 1  74 Wn. App. 467,874 P.2d 853 (1994) 
32 Jones v. King Cy., 74 Wn. App. 467,874 P.2d 853 (1994) (emphasis original). 
33 See e.g., Yusem, 690 So.2d at 1293 ("...we expressly conclude that amendments to comprehensive land use 
plans are legislative decisions. This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the amendments to the 
comprehensive land use plans are being sought as part of a rezoning application in respect lo only one piece of 
property"); see City Envtl. Servs. LandrfiN, Inc. v. Holntes Cy,, 677 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. IS' D.C.A. 1996) (Court held, 
"The resolution of this case hinges on whether the board of county commissioners' denial of petitioner's proposed 
amendments to the comprehensive land use plan was a legislative action ... or a quasi-judicial action ... The case 
law indicates that the board of county commissioner's action in this case [amending the comprehensive plan] was 
legislative."); See Summit Ridge Develop. Co. v. City oflndependence, 821 S.W.2d 51 6 (1991) (the "exercise of 
the zoning powers delegated to the cities including the enactment of ordinances amending the comprehensive plan 
is a legislative function"); See Martin Cy. v. Section 28 Partnership, Lld., 676 So.2d 532 (Fla. 4Ih D.C.A. 1996); 
Bd. of Cty. Comm 'rs v. Karp. 662 So.2d 718 (Fla. 2d. D.C.A. 1995) (Pursuant to a comprehensive plan, the board 
of county commissioners adopted a corridor plan for a specific area of respondent's property, and included in the 
corridor plan, a conditional easement that was applicable only to respondents' property. The court held that the 
adoption of the corridor plan by the board of county commissioners as part of the comprehensive plan, was a 
legislative, not quasi-judicial, act.) 
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being proposed around the County through the "Meeting in a Box" process are likewise 
legislative. Because this legislative matter is not subject to judicial review, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction. The Petitions should be dismissed. 
H. Declaratorv Relief is Not Recoverable in this Petition for Judicial Review. 
Petitioners' Declaratory Relief claim was not only waived by Petitioners' failure to raise 
it before the Commissioners, but it is not a proper claim for a Petition for Judicial Review. 
Idaho Code 67-5270 and Urrutia v. Blaine County Board ofCommissioners, 134 Idaho 353, 
360,2 P.3d 738 (2000). Petitioners seek to put in all kinds of new evidence to obtain 
declaratory relief, but the exhibits outside the Record should be stricken and the declaratory 
relief claim fails. See Powderhorn's Motion to Strike evidence outside the Record on Appeal. 
1. Powderhorn is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
Powderhorn seeks an award of attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. 3 12-12], The mandatory 
statute provides: 
3 12-1 17. Attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses awarded in certain 
instances: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial 
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
(2) If the prevailing party is awarded a partial judgment and the court finds the 
party against whom partial judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law, the court shall allow the prevailing party's attorney's fees, 
witness fees and expenses in an amount which reflects the person's partial 
recovery. 
Idaho Code 5 12- 1 17. 
The statute is not discretionary but provides that the court must award attorney's fees 
where a party did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a 
person who prevails in the action. See Depft of Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 
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Idaho 282,284, I P.3d 783, 785 (2000). An award under this statute is appropriate if the Court 
is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation. Nat'I Union Fire Ins. Co. ofpittshurgh, P.A. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 
542, 112 P.3d 825,830 (2005); Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 
(2005). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 12-1 17, Powderhorn is entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
and costs. No Idaho case law is cited or supports Petitioners' case. As a whole, this is a 
frivolous suit brought without any reasonable basis in fact or law. Petitioners admit that Idaho 
has no law supporting their so-called "conflict of interest" claim. In a lack of  candor to the 
Court, Petitioners not only failed to point out the unfavorable authority of Cowan, which is 
directly on point, hut Petitioners seek to have the Court make or create a contrary rule herein. 
Additionally, Petitioners continue their personal attack on Commissioner Brodie 
without a reasonable basis in law or fact. The curative measures set out in Idaho Code 67-5253 
the Eacret, and in Idaho Historic demonstrate Commissioner Brodie properly disclosed the 
disputed communications and properly gave public notice and the opportunity to address the 
comments. No legal authority exists holding that these curative measures did not resolve any 
due process issues. 
Similarly, Petitioners have absolutely no facts in this Record to show any evidence of 
bias. Instead, they rather desperately grasp at straws by improperly attaching and referencing 
another case, another application, from years ago about "warm exchanges" with Rand 
Wichman. These comments do not show bias, and they certainly do not show actual bias as 
required by Idaho law. Thus, no facts in the Record, or even outside the Record from another 
case, provide any reasonable basis for Petitioners' claim. 
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Next, no facts or law support Petitioners' claim that the Commissioners' Decision 
lacked factual support in the Record or was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
Farmer after farmer testified the land was no longer viable for agriculture. The expert Chad 
Goldsmith agreed. Similarly, the timber expert Lany Eisenberg submitted his report in the 
Record that timber production was also no longer viable on the Peninsula. Thus, Petitioners' 
claim that substantial evidence in the Record failed to support the change from Agriculture and 
Timber redesignations to Rural is completely meritless. Petitioners failed to support their 
claims with a reasonable basis in law or fact and attorney's fees should be awarded under 
I.C. 12-1 17. 
CONCLUSION 
Powderhorn seeks dismissal of all Petitions because: 
1. From the inception of this matter, the Court has been without jurisdiction; 
2. Legislative matters, such as this Comprehensive Plan Amendment, are not 
subject to Petitions for Judicial Review; 
3. LLUPA has specific time deadlines and Petitioners failed to timely appeal the 
final order in this matter issued by Kootenai County on November 16,2006; 
4. The November 15, 2006, Petition was premature in that it did not appeal a final 
order and it was rendered moot by the November 16,2006, Amended Petition; 
5. Petitioners' First Cause of Action fails under I.C. 67-5279(3), because "(c ) no 
unlawful procedure deprived Petitioners of their due process rights; (d) substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole supported the decision; and (e) the Commissioners' decision was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or the result of an abuse of discretion." Even if Petitioners established a 
violation of subsections (c), (d), or (e) (which they have not), their appeal must be denied 
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because Petitioners failed to allege or establish that a substantial right of the claimant has been 
prejudiced; 
6. Petitioners' Second Cause of Action entitled "Unlawful Ex Parte 
Communication" fails to state a legally cognizable claim; 
7. Petitioners' Third Cause of Action entitled "Wichman Conflict of Interest" fails 
to state a legally cognizable claim; 
8. Petitioners' Fourth Cause of Action fails because Declaratory Relief claims 
cannot properly be joined with this LLUPA appeal and because Petitioners waived this claim 
by failing to raise it before the Commissioners; and, 
9. Petitioners seek to tortuously interfere with the business relations and business 
expectancy of Rand Wichman Planning Services LLC. 
The Petition should be denied with costs and attorney's fees awarded to Powderhorn. 
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DATED this 27th day of April, 2007. 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
Attorneys for Intervenors Powderhom 
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ELMER R. "RICK CURRIE and KATIE 
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their 
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
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and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
HEARTLAND, LLC, COEUR D'ALENE 
LAND COMPANY, and H. F. 
MAGNUSON, 
COME NOW Intervenors, Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson, pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 84 and I.C. 5 67-5276, and join in the "Motion to Strike" filed by Intervenors 
Powderhorn and Heartland on April 27,2007. 
Dated this 41h day of May, 2007. 
w Attorney for Intervenors Coeur d'Alene Land Co. 
and Harry F. Magnuson 
JOINDER IN MOTION TO STRlKE - Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
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Fax: 509\747-2323 
John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attorney 
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Legal Services 
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Fax: 208\446-1621 
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Attomey for Intervenors Coeur d'Alene Land Company and 
H. F. Magnuson 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated 
association; PRESERVE OUR RURAL 
COMMUNITIES, a non-profit 
unincorporated association; KOOTENAI 
ENVIRONMENTAL ALLIANCE, INC., 
a non-profit corporation; NORBERT and 
BEVERLY TWILLMANN; GREG and 
JANET TORLINE; SUSAN MELKA; 
MERLYN and JEAN NELSON, 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho acting 
through the KOOTENAI COUNTY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; S.J. 
"GUS" JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN; 
ELMER R. "RICK" CURRIE and KATIE 
BRODIE, COMMISSIONERS, in their 
official capacities; and KATIE BRODIE, 
personally and individually, 
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RESPONSE BRIEF OF MTERVENORS COEUR D'ALENE 
LAND COMPANY AND H. F. MAGNUSON --PAGE 1 
and 
POWDERHORN COMMUNITIES, LLC, 
HEARTLAND, LLC, COEUR D'ALENE 
LAND COMPANY, and H. F. 
MAGNUSON, 
COMENOW Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. Magnuson, intervenors in the above- 
captioned matter pursuant to the Court's March 6,2007 "Order Granting Motion to Intervene," by 
and through their counsel of record, John F. Magnuson, and respectfully submit this Memorandum 
in response to the "Opening Brief' filed by Petitioners on February 14,2007 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This proceeding arises out of a "Petition for Judicial Review" filed by the Petitioners 
pursuant to I.C. 9 67-6251. See Petition at 7 7.' The Petition specifically seeks review from the 
County's November 9,2006 Order of Decision amending Kootenai County's Comprehensive Plan. 
Id. at $/ 33. -
Intervenor/Respondent Powderhom Communities, LLC (hereafter "Powderhorn"), with the 
assistance of Heartland, LLC (hereafter "Heartland"), initially requested that the County amend its 
'Although the initial Petition ostensibly set forth two (2) "causes of action," it seems that 
the Petitioners have in actuality alleged two (2) alternative bases for appellate reversal of the 
Kootenai County's November 9,2006 Order of Decision. The two (2) "causes of action," labeled 
as "Remand of Order of Decision" and "Unlawful Ex Parte Communications," are raised under 
I.C. $9 67-5279(3) and 67-5263, respectively, both found in the Idaho Administrative Procedures 
Act (1.C. $9 67-5201 et seq.). Aside from their alternative theories for reversal and vacatur of the 
November 7,2006 Order, as advanced to this Court in its appellate capacity under the applicable 
provisions of the IDAPA, Petitioners have yet to properly procedurally plead an independent 
claim for declaratory relief, whether under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (I.C. 5 10- 
1201, et seq.) or otherwise. 
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Comprehensive Plan to change the designation of 2,725 acres from Agricultural to Rural Residential. 
R., Vol. I, pp. 20-23, 141-152. IntervenorsIRespondents Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. 
Magnuson (hereafter collectively referred to as "Magnuson") own approximately four hundred 
seventy (470) of the acres made subject to the request. d. at p. 32. The remaining owners include 
Bla Bar, Inc. and Charles R. Blakley (219 acres), Eastpoint Farms, Inc. (533 acres), and Powderhorn 
Communities, LLC. R., Vol. I, pp. 30, 32,64. 
Following multiple hearings, described more fully below, and based on substantial and 
significant evidence, the County approved the requested amendment to its Comprehensive Plan. In 
so doing, the County clearly acted in its legislative capacity. Notwithstanding the same, the 
Petitioners, who own land within the area subject to the amendment, have petitioned this Court 
for appellate review, under the IDAPA, improperly seeking appellate review of a legislative 
determination. In support of their request, the Petitioners have filed and lodged reams and reams of 
written submittals in a shot-gun approach to distract the Court's attention from the fact that this 
proceeding is jurisdictionally defective and substantively meritless. The Petitioners attempt to paint 
a picture that seemingly resembles Peyton Place when in actuality it smacks more of Fantasia. For 
the reasons set forth below, and for those separately advanced by Powderhorn and Heartland (which 
are incorporated herein as though set forth in full), Intervenor Magnuson respectfully requests that 
the subject Petition be dismissed with prejudice and in its entirety. 
11. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Administrative Backeround. 
On December 16, 2005, Heartland, as agent for the owners of approximately 2,725 acres 
(including Magnuson), requested that the County amend the designation for said acreage, as 
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contained in the Comprehensive Plan, from Agricultural to Rural Residential. R., Vol. I, p. 57.' 
The County's Planning Commission, following an April 27,2006 hearing on the Application, 
recommended denial of the same. R., Vol. 111, pp. 569-72. The Commissioners, without passing on 
the merits of the request in detail, recommended that the applicants involve themselves in a 
subsequent legislative process to "update" the County's existing Comprehensive Plan. Id. 
Approximately thirty (30) days after the Planning Commission's recommended denial, Rand 
Wichman, then Kootenai County Planning Director, resigned. Three (3) months after Wichman's 
resignation, the matter came on for hearing anew before the County's Board of Commissioners. 
Wichman, having entered private practice in Kootenai County as a consultant following his 
resignation from the County, provided professional services to the applicants with respect to various 
issues, including the subject Application. 
Approximately ten (10) days after the September 26, 2006 public hearing concluded, the 
County Commissioners conducted a site visit to the property encompassed by the proposed 
amendment. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 106-201. The Commissioners were accompanied on their inspection by 
Petitioner Twillman, representatives of the applicants, and County Attorney John Cafferty. 
The day after the visit (September 26,2006), Petitioners objected to alleged exparte conduct 
during the visit which, although notwithstanding the intimations and conjecture of Petitioners, 
occurred in their plain view. R., Vol. 11, pp. 367,374. 
On September 28,2006, the Commissioners convened to hold deliberations on the subject 
requests. Given the allegations raised by Petitioners, including the allegations of Petitioner 
2The Application was subsequently amended so as to request an amendment from 
Agricultural to Rural. R., Vol. 111, pp. 682-83. 
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Twillman, the Commissioners determined to reopen public testimony for a new public hearing, 
related to the issues arising out of the site visit, and set the same for October 4,2006. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 
204-09.j 
On October 5,2006, the County Commissioners held deliberations on the subject application. 
R., Vol. 111, p. 618; Tr., Vol. I, pp. 229-234. Following deliberation and weighing of the evidence, 
Chairman Johnson and Commissioner Brodie voted to approve the requested amendment to the 
County's Comprehensive Plan, changing the designation of the subject property from Agricultural 
to Rural. Tr., Vol. I, p. 234. 
On November 9, 2006, the Commissioners signed an Order of Decision changing the 
Comprehensive Plan Use Map designation for the subject property from Agricultural to Rural. R., 
Vol. 111, pp. 604-14. As this was a legislative matter, the Board contemporaneously passed a 
Resolution adopting the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. R., Vol. I, pp. 100-04. 
On November 16, 2006, the Board of Commissioners modified their November 9, 2006 
Decision, and adopted an Amended Order of Decision which superseded the November 9, 2006 
Order of Decision. R., Vol. 111, pp. 591-600. The November 16, 2006 Amended Order constituted 
the final action taken by the Commissioners with respect to the subject application and amendment 
to the Comprehensive Plan. For purposes of this Memorandum, the November 9, 2006 Order of 
Decision (R., Vol. 111, pp. 604-1 3) will be referred to as "the Initial Order." The November 16,2006 
Amended Order of Decisioil (R., Voi. 111, pp. 591-600) shall be referred to as "the Final Order." 
31ntervenors/Respondents Powderhorn and Heartland have fully and accurately 
summarized the course of proceedings at the October 4,2006 re-opened public hearing in their 
Opposition Brief at pp. 7-12. That summary will not be repeated here. It is incorporated as 
though set forth in full. 
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On November 9,2006, the County's Board adopted the Initial Order (R., Vol. 111, pp. 604- 
13). Contemporaneously therewith, the Board, by unanimous decision, adopted ResolutionNo. 2006- 
92, which legislatively modified the County's Comprehensive Plan, pursuant to I.C. 5 67-6509, as 
to the property at issue. Six days later, the Petitioners filed their "Petition for Judicial Review" which 
sought the following: 
"review of the issuance on November 9, 2006 of Findings of Fact, 
Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law, Comprehensive 
Plan Analysis and Order of Decision in Case No. CP-080-05 granting 
arequest by Powderhorn Communities, LLC . . .for acomprehensive 
Plan amendment from Agricultural to Rural. . . ." 
See Petition for Judicial Review at p. 2. The statutory authority upon which the action was brought -
was identified as I.C. 5 67-6521 and $ 5  67-5270-67-5277.4 
Petitioners thereafter, on an ex parte basis as to aif owners of property within the area 
encompassed by the Initial Order, including Intervenors Magnuson, moved to stay further 
proceedings before the County Board, including Intervenor multiple applications for zone changes 
consistent with the newly-adopted amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. The authority for the 
motion was IRCP 84(m).' 
'LC. 5 67-6521 is included in the "Local Land Use Planning Act." Section 67-6521 
provides for a judicial appeal from a final decision regarding the "denial of a permit authorizing . 
. . development. . . ." Pursuant to 5 67-6521(1)(d), the & must be filed within twenty-eight 
(28) days after the decision is entered. If timely filed, the appeal is to be processed under I.C. $5 
67-5270 through 67-5277 of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA). 
$Rule 84(m) authorizes a stay of agency action during an appeal provided no less than 
two conditions are met. First, the appeal must be one with jurisdiction (i.e., it cannot be an appeal 
from a purely legislative act of the "agency"). Second, any stay must be "on appropriate terms." 
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Powderhorn and Heartland thereafter moved to intervene. Powderhorn and Heartland also 
sought to oppose the stay requested by the Petitioners. Following hearing, the Court entered its 
December 19, 2006 Order authorizing Powderhorn and Heartland to intervene and granting the 
Petitioners' Motion for Stay without any corresponding security, bond, or other ~ndertaking.~ 
On January 29,2007, Powderhorn and Heartland moved the Court to dismiss the Petitioners' 
"Petition for Judicial Review," asserting that this Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Initial Order 
in that it constituted a legislative determination of the Board. The Intervenors also argued that the 
Petition had been rendered moot since it sought judicial review of the Initial Order, which was 
thereafter superseded by the Final Order (entered November 15,2006). 
Recognizing the legal infirmity created by their request for judicial review from a legislative 
action, the Petitioners, sua soonte, filed an "Amended Petition for Judicial Review" on February 5, 
2007. The attempted Amended Petition sought judicial review from the November 16,2006 Final 
Order even though the Petition was filed well outside of the twenty-eight (28) date limitations set 
forth in the Local Land Use Planning Act (I.C. 5 67-6521(1)(d)). Further, the Amended Petition 
sought to "skirt" the jurisdictional defect (i.e., an attempted appeal from a legislative determination) 
by adding a claim for declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (I.C. 5 10- 
1201 et seq ). 
'jIn addition to arguing that no stay should enter given that the Petition was improperly 
filed from a legislative determination, Intervenors Powderhorn and Heartland argued that any 
stay needed to be supported by an appropriate undertaking given that the owners of the subject 
property had spent in excess of $30,000.00 getting ready for the public hearings (which were 
enjoined by the Court) and .the additional estimated canying costs of $20,000.00 in interest 
expense as a result of what was then thought to be a three (3) month delay. 
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In any and all events, the attempted filing ofthe Amended Petition ran directly afoul of IRCP 
15. Under the circumstances, as discussed more fully below, the Petitioners could only amend their 
pleading by leave of Court. Under any and all events, said leave cannot be granted when it would 
revive a claim otherwise barred by the intervening running of the applicable statute of limitations 
(which in this case is the twenty-eight (28) day period set forth in I.C. 5 67-6521). 
Landowners Coeur d'Alene Land Company and Magnuson thereafter petitioned the Court 
for permission to intervene as parties actually owning property subject to the Board's Final Order 
of November 16,2006. Intervenors Powderhorn and Heartland objected to the Amended Petition 
which the Petitioners had attempted to file and contemporaneously moved to strike the same. On 
February 27, 2007, following hearing, the Court granted Magnuson's Motion for Permissive 
Intervention. The Court also denied the PowderhorniHeartland Motion to Dismiss the Petitioners' 
Initial Petition on the ground of mootness. While reserving ruling on the propriety of an appeal from 
a legislative action and the propriety of the Petitioners' sua monte attempted filing of an Amended 
Petition, the Court appeared to hold that the Board's issuance of a Final Order after the Initial Order 
which did not modify or change the ultimate outcome of the Initial Order did not render the initial 
Petition for Review moot. Given the Court's observations, the Petitioners followed the hearing by 
filing an "Alternative Motion for Leave To Amend," seeking leave of the Court to file the Amended 
Petition for Review which they had lodged or attempted to file some two months prior. 
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111. ARGUMENT. 
A. The Petition for Review Should Be Dismissed On Jurisdictional Grounds In 
that It Imuroperly Seeks Judicial Review of A Legislative Determination. 
1. There is no statutom right for direct appellate review of a 
Countv's amendment to its Comurehensive Plan. 
The provisions of the Local Land Use Planning Act (I.C. $ 67-6501 et seq.) make clear that 
a county board's adoption and subsequent amendment of a Comprehensive Plan is a legislative 
matter. The Act further makes clear that there is no right to seek direct judicial review, through the 
appellate process, of such a legislative determination 
Section 67-6508 authorizes counties to develop Comprehensive Plans applicable to all land 
within the given county's jurisdiction. See I.C. $67-6508. Such Plan is to "consider previous and 
existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations" for each 
applicable planning component. Id. The adoption of the Plan, by the county's governing board, must 
be by resolution and is in and of itself a legislative act. &g I.C. 5 67-6509(b). See also Gumurecht 
v. Citv of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615,661 P.2d 1214 (1983). Such a plan, once adopted, may be 
amended upon proper notice and hearing. See I.C. $ 67-6509(a). As with the initial adoption of a 
Comprehensive Plan, the subsequent amendment thereof is equally a legislative act. A plan or part 
of a plan may only be amended by resolution. &g I.C. $ 67-6509(c). 
The Local Land Use Planning Act makes clear that one who claims to be aggrieved by a 
county board's adoption of a resolution to amend a portion of a Comprehensive Plan may not seek 
direct judicial appellate review. I.C. 3 67-6521 provides for direct judicial review under the Act, but 
that right to review is limited to determinations related to "the issuance or denial of a permit 
authorizing. . . development." See I.C. $ 67-6521(1)(a). There has been no decision by the County 
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either issuing or denying a permit so as to allow development on any of the property encompassed 
by the amendment adopted by the Initial Order or the Final Order. Indeed, any such further action 
has been stayed by this Court. Only those persons claiming to be adversely affected by the "issuance 
or denial of a permit authorizing. . . development," as opposed to persons claiming to be adversely 
affected from a legislative determination to amend a Comprehensive Plan, may seek judicial review. 
Even so, those seeking judicial review must do so within twenty-eight (28) days after entry of the 
challenged Order. 
2. Idaho Case Law Makes Clear that the Act of Amending A 
Comprehensive Plan is A Legislative Act. 
The Local Land Use Planning Act was first adopted in 1975. Every appellate decision 
thereafter entered which has addressed the issue, either directly or inferentially, has held that the 
adoption or amendment of a Comprehensive Plan is a legislative act. For example, in Gumprecht v. 
Citv of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 61 5,661 P.2d 1214 (I 983), the Supreme Court was called upon 
to determine "whether local zoning ordinances may be .  . . amended in Idaho through an initiative 
election." Gummecht, 104 Idaho at 61 6. The Court rejected the contention that a local zoning 
ordinance could be amended through the,initiative process. In so doing, the Court commented at 
length upon the nature of Idaho's local (county) zoning power and its legislative basis. 
"The power of counties . . . to zone is a police power authorized by 
Article 12, Section 2, of the Idaho Constitution . . . ." Article 12, 
Section 2, of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
LOCAL POLICE REGULATIONS AUTHORIZED - 
- Any county . . . may make and enforce, within its 
limits, all such local police, sanitary and other 
regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or 
with the general laws. 
. . .  
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In 1975, the Idaho Legislature adopted a comprehensive 
recodification and revision of the laws of the State relating to 
planning and zoning, in the Local Planning Act of 1975. See, I.C. $3  
67-6501 et seq. . . . . Exercise of the authority to zone and plan, 
whether by governing board or by the established commissions, is 
made mandatory by I.C. 5 67-6503. 
Statutes must be interpreted to give effect to legislative intent and 
purpose . . . . The Legislature clearly intended that the authority to 
enact comprehensive plans, establish zoning districts and adopt 
amendatory ordinances be exercised exclusively by City and County 
legislative or governing bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed 
procedures . . . ." 
Gum~recht, 104 Idaho at 61 7-1 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In Burt v. Citv of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,665 P.2d 1073 (1983), decided three months 
after Gum~recht, the Court conclusively resolved the issue at bar. The City Council of Idaho Falls, 
after conducting hearings and other required procedures, amended its Comprehensive Plan. 
Following said amendment, the City annexed certain property, zoning the same consistent with the 
amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. The plaintiff, John Burt, owned a portion of the annexed 
land and filed a Petition for Review in the District Court pursuant to LC. 3 67-6521 (the same 
statutory authority relied upon by the Petitioners at bar). The Court specifically found the City's 
actions to be legislative in nature and that the plaintiff had no right of appellate review from the 
same. In so doing, the Court affinned the trial court's decision that "the questioned activity [was] 
legislative and therefore not subject to direct judicial review." Burt v. Citv of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 
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The Court analyzed the issue as follows: 
"To determine if the appellant, Burt, has an avenue of appeal from the 
decision of the City Council requires an examination of the 
provisions of the "Local Planning Act of 1975," Title 67, Chapter 65, 
I.C., and a determination of whether the questioned activity is 
legislative or quasi-judicial. Burt contends that pursuant to I.C. 5 67- 
6521 that he was entitled to bring an appeal to the District Court. We 
disagree. 
"[P]romulgation or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances 
is legislative action.". . . . 
In Cooper v. Board of Countv Commissioners of Ada County, m, 
we were faced with determining the procedural due process 
requirements necessary to support a rezoning decision. In that case, 
the applicants for the rezoning appealed to the District Court from a 
denial of their application. We held that the action of the Board of 
Commissioners in acting upon a rezoning request was quasi-judicial 
in nature. Legislative activitv bv a zoning entitv is differentiated from 
auasi-iudicial activitv by the result - - legislative activity uroduces a 
rule or policv which has application to an open class whereas auasi- 
judicial activity impacts specific individuals. interests. or situations 
. . . . Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by "its 
high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate 
remedy can be had at the polls.". . . . 
Burt v. Citv of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 67-68 (citations omitted) (quoting, Cooper v. Board of 
Countv Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980)). 
The foregoing authorities make clear that the action embodied in the Initial Order, and the 
Final Order as well, was purely legislative, is not subject to direct judicial review pursuant to I.C. 
5 67-6521, and is not subject to the provisions of I.R.C.P. 84 (formerly I.R.C.P. 83(c).' 
'Accordingly, the stay of further proceedings before the County, as ordered by this Court 
under the authority of I.R.C.P. 84(m), should be dissolved. Burt v. Idaho Falls makes clear that 
since no direct judicial review may be had from the legislative action at issue, that I.R.C.P. 84, 
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3. Consistent With the Local Land Use Planning Act and Idaho 
Law, the Countv Recognized and Amreciated that Its Actions 
Were Legislative in Nature. 
Kootenai County's attorney acknowledged and advised that the amendment to the 
Comprehensive Plan was legislative in nature. Tr., Vol. I, p. 114. The Kootenai County Planning 
Department recognized that its action was legislative in nature. R., Vol. I, p. 130. The County 
Coinmissioners, in adopting ResolutionNo. 2006-92, explicitly acknowledged that their action was 
legislative in nature as capable of only being accomplished through a resolution. R., Vol. 111, pp. 
602-03. 
The Petitioners cannot seriously challenge that neither the Initial Order (from which they 
have appealed) nor the Final Order (from which they have not timely appealed) are anything but 
legislative. Apparently, they are dissatisfied that the Commissioners did not wait for a county-wide 
Comprehensive Plan update process to be completed, which is still apparently incomplete and 
perhaps a year away. Petition for Judicial Review at 1 10. Yet at the same time, Petitioners 
speak out of both sides of their mouths. Specifically, in adopting the amendment, the County 
Comn~issioners made a legislative determination that, with respect to the property encompassed by 
the amendment, "There has been substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area to warrant 
a change in the future land use designation. . . ." R., Vol. 111, p. 602. The Petitioners acknowledge 
including the stay provisions therein, do not apply. Moreover, even if Rule 84 applied, the 
Petitioners wholly-failed to comply therewith. Rule 84(b) requires that Petitions for Judicial 
Review be concurrently served upon the agency "and all other parties to the proceeding before 
the agency . . . ." Further, proof of service on "all parties" shall be filed with the Court in the 
form required by I.R.C.P. 5(f). This Court enjoined Intervenors Magnuson and Coeur d'Alene 
Land Company from pursuing their requested zone change application (Kootenai County 
Planning Case No. 2-789-06) without any notice, service, opportunity to be heard, or other due 
process protections. 
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these substantial changes, admitting that "rapidly increasing growth and development" has far 
exceeded "projections at the time of the adoption of the last Comprehensive Plan in 1994. . . ." See 
Petition for Judicial Review at 1 1 1. In other words, Petitioners acknowledge both the significance 
and the rapidness of the changes that were relied upon by the County in determining to grant the 
requested amendment and not to wait for the completion of an update with an undetermined delivery 
date. 
B. Dismissal of These Proceedings is Procedurallv Reauired. 
1. The Petitioners' Initial "Petition for Review" Is 
Jurisdictionallv Defective. 
The Petitioners' initial Petition for Review, which seeks review exclusively under I.C. $ 5  67. 
6521, 67-6270 through 67-5277, and I.R.C.P. 84 (Petition for Judicial Review at p. 2), is 
jurisdictionally defective. As has been shown, it is beyond question that the Initial Order was purely 
and exclusively a legislative act not susceptible to judicial review under either the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act or the Local Land Use Planning Act (the very authority cited by 
Petitioners). 
2. The Amended Petition Is An Improver Pleading and Should 
Be Stricken. 
The Amended Petition, which Petitioners attempted to file on February 5, 2007, is a 
procedurally improper pleading and should be stricken. As with the initial Petition for Review, 
Petitioners predicate the same causes of action (as contained in the original Petition) upon Idaho 
Code 5 67-6521, $5 67-5270 through 67-5277, and I.R.C.P. 84. See Amended Petition for Judicial 
Review at 7 2. As to these claims (which essentially represent alternative efforts to assail a 
legislative act), they should be dismissed. 
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Further, Petitioners have failed to adhere to the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure (specifically Rule 15) by sua suonte and in the absence of a motion or order, filing the 
Amended Petition. Rule 15(a) requires a party to obtain leave of court to file an amended pleading 
if a pleading has been filed in response to the initiating pleading to which the amendment pertains. 
In this case, following Petitioners' filing of their Petition for Judicial Review, Intervenors 
Powderhorn and Heartland filed a responsive pleading. Motion to Dismiss (filed January 29, 
2007).' Pursuant to Rule 15(a), given the responsive pleading filed by Heartland and Powderhorn, 
Petitioners could not unilaterally and sua sponte amend their Petition for Judicial Review as they 
have attempted to do, 
In an attempt to cure this patent defect, Petitioners now ask the Court, alternatively, for leave 
to file an amended Petition pursuant to Rule 15(a). However, at this juncture in the proceedings, said 
Motion should be denied for failure to comply with Rule 15(c). 
Rule 15(c) precludes a party from amending a prior pleading to assert a claim that is now 
time-barred based upon the running ofthe applicable statute of limitations. In this particular instance, 
Petitioners seek leave pursuant to Rule 15(a) to amend their Petition, in the form filed or lodged, as 
the case may be, on February 5, 2007. To the extent that the Amended Petition seeks to raise any 
claim arising from or under the Final Order, entered by the County on November 16,2006, it must 
fail. The statute of limitations applicable to a petition for review under the Local Land Use Planning 
Act and the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is twenty-eight (28) days. k 1 . C .  $67-6521(1)(d). 
Since the Amended Petition was filed after the statute of limitations had run on the right to appeal 
81.R.C.P. 12(b) provides that a defense of lack ofjurisdiction over the subject matter may 
be interposed as a defense, by motion, in response to a pleading. 
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from the Final Order, the granting of the Motion to Amend, insofar as it seeks to resuscitate an 
appeal applicable to the Final Order, must be denied. 
The Petitioners are stuck with an appeal from an Order that no longer applies. They cannot 
now, after the period within which to appeal from the Final Order has run, seek to correct the error. 
It is too late. Their remedy would have been one of the following, none of which were accomplished: 
(1) the filing of an Amended Petition in this proceeding, within the twenty-eight (28) days following 
entry of the November 16, 2006 Order and prior to filing of any responsive pleading (such as a 
motion to dismiss); or (2) the filing of a motion to amend prior to the expiration of the twenty-eight 
(28) day limitations, after entry of the November 16,2006 Order; or (3) the initiation of a separate 
judicial proceeding, also brought under the IDAPA in a timely manner under the November1 6,2006 
Order, with a subsequent motion to consolidate that proceeding with this proceeding. None of the 
foregoing occurred. It is too late for them to occur now. 
Petitioners may argue that the Amended Petition should relate back because Powderhorn or 
Heartland knew or should have known that the action had been timely initiated based upon the Initial 
Order and that but for a mistake on the part of Petitioners, the action should have included the Final 
Order. See Rule 15(c) (providing for a relation back if a party received notice of the institution of 
the action in a timely manner and the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the 
merits). The problem with this argument, if advanced, is that Petitioners have, arguing that 
jurisdiction lies under the Local Land Use Planning Act, IDAPA, and Rule 84, failed to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 84. 
Specifically, Rule 84(b) requires that the party filing the petition for judicial review 
"concunently serve copies of the notice of petition for judicial review upon the agency . . . 
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other parties to the proceeding before the agency . . . ." (Emphasis added). Proof of service on "all 
parties" shall be filed with the Court in the form required by Rule 5(f). 
While Heartland, Powderhorn, and Magnuson have intervened notwithstanding the fact that 
they were never served by Petitioners, there is no evidence that the other parties to the requested 
amendment (Charles Blakley, Eastpoint Farms, Inc., or Bla Bar, Inc.) were ever served or that any 
proof of service was ever filed. The time for now serving those other parties has long-since passed. 
Under Rule 4(a)(2), the time for effecting service is six (6) months after filing of the action 
Accordingly, dismissal as to those parties, at this juncture, is effectively required. Hincks v. Neilson, 
137 Idaho 610,51 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2002). Further, given the jurisdictional time frame involved, 
and the intervening running of the statute of limitations (twenty-eight (28) days), as to those parties, 
the action cannot now be re-instituted by either an amendment in this proceeding or by the filing of 
a subsequent petition for review. 
3. The Petitioners' Attempted Amended Petition Is Procedurallv 
Improper. and Anv Attempt to Now Advance Claims for 
Declaratorv Relief Should Be Denied. 
Through their attempted Amended Petition for Review, the Petitioners seek to include a 
claim for declaratory relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, I.C. § 10-1201 ei 
seq. The bases upon which to deny the Motion, insofar as it seeks to create an appellate right from 
a legislative act, are set forth above. Insofar as the declaratory judgment claim is concerned, the 
Motion should be denied on separate but equally significant grounds. 
What the Petitioners have attempted to do here is to join a petition for appellate review with 
a claim for a declaratory relief. Different evidentiary standards and burdens of proof apply to the 
same. As the Court can well appreciate, the Petition for Judicial Review requires that this Court sit 
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in its appellate capacity. As such, its review is limited to the matters properly included in the record. 
Specific statutory and procedural authorities limit a party's ability to throw extraneous materials into 
the mix for consideration on appeal. See I.R.C.P. 84(1) and I.C. $ 5  67-5276 and 67-5277. 
In any and all events, any motion to present additional evidence must be timely made (within 
twenty-one (21) days of the filing of the transcript and record), it must be supported by affidavit 
evidence as to why the materials were not included in the record in the first place. Neither 
requirement has been met in this case. Yet, Petitioners seek to throw materials into the mix, 
ostensibly in aid of their declaratory judgment claim, with the hope that said materials have some 
sub-silentio impact on the appellate side of the equation. 
Given the divergent evidentiary standards, and the divergent standards for admissible proof, 
these Intervenors submit that it is procedurally improper, under the facts at bar, to allow for the 
joinder of a claim for declaratory relief with a claim for appellate review. That is not to say that the 
Petitioners cannot, should they so choose, advance a claim for declaratory relief in a separate 
proceeding. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the availability of such a remedy. See Burt v. 
Citv of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,66,665 P.2d 1075 (1983). 
While we hold that a legislative zoning decision is not subject to 
direct judicial review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of 
collateral actions such as declaratory actions . . . . In such instances, 
the decision will not be disturbed absent a clear showing that it is 
confiscatoni, arbitraw, unreasonable or cawricious. 
Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By referring to 
such an avenue of relief as "collateral," the Supreme Court implicitly ifnot explicitly acknowledged 
the impropriety of including the two claims (for appellate review and declaratory relief) in the same 
proceeding. Should these Petitioners choose to initiate such a proceeding, they will be held to the 
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weighty evidentiary standards therein. Further, I.R.C.P. 84 will not apply and should the Petitioners 
seek a stay of any further proceedings, so as to cause further unnecessary expense and delay to the 
Intervenors, they will he subject to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 65, including the necessity of posting 
an undertaking. 
C. There is No Factual or Legal Basis for Voiding the Board's Decision Based 
On the Ex Parte Contact Described bv Petitioners. 
1. Petitioners Have Cited No Legal Authoritv to Suaoort the 
Proposition that A Legislative Act Can Be Voided Based on 
Ex Parte Contact. 
All authorities cited by Petitioners in support of their exparte argument are inapplicable and 
do not support the Petitioners' request for relief. The act undertaken by the Board was, for the 
reasons set forth above, clearly legislative. &Burt v. Citv of Idaho Falls, m. The only "contrary" 
authority cited by Petitioners are I.C. 5 67-5253 and Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 86 
P.3d 494 (2004). Neither of the cited authorities supports the Petitioners' argument. 
First, 5 67-5253 applies lo prohibit ex parie communications, except upon notice and 
opportunity for all parties to participate in the communication, to "a presiding officer serving in a 
contested case." The proceedings below were a contested case. The Board is not a "hearing 
officer." The Board is an elected body. Further, a "contested case" is determined exclusively by entry 
of an order. I.C. 5 67-5201(6). The proceedings below were neither a "case" nor were they 
determined by the issuance of an "order." They were determined by an elected body's legislative 
enactment of a resolution. 
Second, the case of Eacret v. Bonner County, suora, does not apply. In w, the Court 
heard an appeal from an individualized request for a variance submitted to the Bonner County Board 
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by a property owner. The Board, in the application for the rezone, sat in a quasi-judicial capacity. 
As such, the hearing, unlike the hearing at bar, was a "contested case" that resulted in entry of an 
"order," and was subject to the requirements of I.C. 5 67-5253. The holdings and discussion set forth 
in &g@ do not apply to legislative acts nor could they. Do Petitioners suggest that all state 
legislators, upon the convening of a legislative session, insulate themselves from their constituents 
in toto so as to wholly-mitigate against any exparte contact that may have a bearing on any proposed -- 
legislation? Certainly not. The result is no different here. 
2. There is No Evidence that Anv Recorded Ex Parte Contact 
Had Anything to do With the Subiect Amendment. 
While Petitioners go to great lengths to describe some nefarious plot evidenced by three 
pages of transcript prepared from the recording of the on-site visit of September 26,2006, a careful 
review of the transcript reveals the rather banal and innocuous nature of the banter. For example, 
Wichman stated that he planned to go mule deer hunting in October. Tr., Vol. I, p. 62. That exchange 
certainly had a lot to do with the matter at hand. 
The next recorded exchange between Wichman and Commissioner Brodie and Chairman 
Johnson dealt with Wichman's willingness to meet with Ken Covalchik, an applicant for a position 
with the Kootenai County Planning Department. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 62-64. Covalchik had apparently 
made application to the County while Wichman was in the County's employ. Id. Covalchik 
apparently remained interested in the position and since his contact had been with Wiclunan, the 
Board requested that Wichman informally discuss the job duties with the candidate. Id. That 
certainly had a lot to do with the subject of the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan. 
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The Petitioners apparently argue or contend that no one can talk with an elected official about 
anything unrelated to a legislative matter white the legislative matter is under consideration. This 
would preclude individuals from engaging in nonnally civil or friendly exchanges commonplace in 
a small community. Apparently, this reasoning would extend to preclude counsel from, for example, 
discussing Vandal football with Judge Mitchell while the parties await for opposing counsel who 
may be running late for a hearing. Such a suggestion is unworkable, preposterous, and ludicrous. 
There is no authority that supports the Petitioners' position whatsoever. 
3. Petitioners Have Produced No Evidence of Anv Unrecorded 
Ex Parte Conduct that Caused Anv Harm or Error. 
Petitioners further allege that certain unrecorded exchanges took place between members of 
the Commission and representatives of the landowners during the on-site inspection of September 
26,2006. Ignoring for the moment the fact that the Board was undertaking a legislative exercise, the 
conversations, as alleged, created no prejudice and were fully disclosed and rectified in any event. 
When the issue of the unrecorded exparie exchange was brought to the Board's attention 
the Petitioners, the Board reopened the public hearing and allowed the Petitioners, without limitation 
as to time, to fully refute or comment upon the complained of exchange and to supplement their 
testimony with any written materials of any nature that they deemed probative. This process, and the 
exactitude and detail with which it was followed, is h l ly  described in the Opposition Brief of 
Powderhorn and Heartland at pages 7 though 13, and will not be repeated here. The cited briefing 
is incorporated herein as though set forth in full and is adopted by these Intervenors. 
Even if (as is not the case) it was improper for the Board to receive comment when 
considering a legislative matter, and even if 1.C. § 67-5253 applies (which it does not), this is truly 
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a case of "no harm, no foul." Based upon the Board's determination to reopen the public hearing, 
and to accept the Petitioners' written and oral submissions, without limitation, any "defect" was fully 
cured. Petitioners' reliance upon Eacret v. Bonner County, is misplaced. 
Any exparte communication must be disclosed at the public hearing, 
including a "general description of the communication." . . . . The 
purpose of the disclosure requirement is to afford opposing parties 
with an opportunity to rebut the substance of any ex parte 
communications. 
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho at 786 (citing Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. Cit, 
Council of Citv of Boise, 134 Idaho 65 1, 8 P.3d 646 (2000)). 
D. There is No Basis For Voiding the Board's Decision Based Uuon Petitioners' 
Allegations of "Conflict of Interest" or "Bias." 
1. Wichman's Claimed "Conflict of Interest" Is An Argument 
Lacking In Practicalitv, Substance. and Legal Suuuort. 
Without articulating legal basis or supporting authority, Petitioners claim that it was 
unfair, untoward, and a conflict of interest for Wichman to leave his employ with Kootenai County 
and thereafter enter into private practice as a consultant on this request. According to Petitioners, 
Wichman is some sort of Svengali who hypnotized the County Commissioners into making a 
decision wholly inconsistent with the position previously adopted by the Planning Department orthe 
Planning Commission. Not only does the Petitioners' argument lack in legal support, it doesn't 
square up with the facts. 
In April of 2006, Staff Planner Mussman analyzed the request as follows: 
It does appear the applicant has done a reasonable job of arguing that 
the conditions in the area have changed sufficiently to merit a 
different future land use designation. However, it is questionable 
because of the location and the access issues, whether a Rural 
Residential designation is the most appropriate . . . . The subject 
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property is in close proximity to Rural designation on the west side 
of Coeur d'Alene Lake. Perhaps a Rural designation could be 
appropriate in this location as well. 
R., Vol. I, p. 137. 
The Planning Commission thereafter recommended denial of the application for different 
reasons. Tr., Vol. I, pp. 1-17. The Commission, while not disagreeing with Mussman's analysis, 
believed it appropriate to wait until the entire Countywide Comprehensive Plan was re-written. Id. 
Hence, the merits of the application were acknowledged by the County prior to Wichman's exodus 
and were not thereafter changed, modified, or recreated while acting under his spell. 
The Commissioners disagreed with the Commission that the applicant should wait for the 
re-write of the entire Comprehensive Plan. The Commissioners' decision was based upon 
"substantial changes in the actual conditions in the area to warrant a change in the future land use 
designation." R., Vol. 111, p. 602. These include the same changes acknowledged by Petitioners 
(described as "rapidly increasing growth and development far exceeding projections at the time of 
the adoption of the last Comprehensive Plan in 1994"). Petition for Judicial Review at f/ 11. 
What Petitioners essentially posit is that Wichman, as a former County employee, and with 
no legal proscriptions or limitations on his ability to thereafter seek private employment, cannot 
represent in front of the County, or be employed as a private consultant for such matters, 
because he used to work for the County. Does this mean Wichman can no longer engage in planning- 
related services in Kootenai County and must either relocate or find a new profession? Does this 
mean that his training and experience may only be utilized bv the Countv for the rest of time? 
Petitioners seem to ignore the fact that Wichman, in the context of being a consultant for 
Powderhorn, was not a decision-maker for the County. This is not the same scenario as if Wichman, 
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having previously been employed in private planning practice for a client, then went to work for the 
County with the opportunity to pass upon the propriety of projects for which he previously served 
as a private planning consultant. Wichman, except for his alleged Svengali powers, had no ability 
to issue or cause to be issued the decision of which the Petitioners complain. The same legislative 
determination would likely have been made even if the Petitioners had hired Wichman, which they 
were free to do. 
2. The Unarticulated Brodie "Bias" Is Unsupported. 
Petitioners argue that the entire process was apparently tainted due to a comment made by 
Commissioner Brodie, in a record of other proceedings held years ago, while Wichman was in the 
County's employ, wherein she acknowledged that she had worked with Wichman for fourteen years 
and that "most" of their dealings had "been great, warm, wonderful exchanges." Petitioners' 
argument is a stretch to say the least. It is unsupported in fact, law, and practical reality. Is Wichman 
forever precluded from representing a client in a planning matter involving Kootenai County until 
the last person at Kootenai County, with whom Wichman previously worked, has left? For that 
matter, is every member of the judiciary incapable of sitting in any matter wherein the judge 
previously worked or socialized with one of the counsel and had "pleasant exchanges" during those 
times? Are we to all assume that business can only be undertaken if we deal with people we have 
never met? Petitioners have shown no & bias m a n y  indication that any actual bias ever existed. 
The record is simply devoid of any supporting evidence and Petitioners have cited to no supporting 
authority. 
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E. The Petitioners Have Otherwise Failed to Demonstrate Any Basis for 
Reversal or Vacatur of the Board's Decision. 
1. Aooeal Under the IDAPA. 
Petitioners urge reversal under I.C. 67-5279(3)(c), (d), and (e). Under these standards, 
reversal is appropriate Q& if the Court finds that the Commissioners' action was "made upon 
unlawful procedure," "not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole," or "arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Since Petitioners seek to challenge a legislative act, the cited 
provisions do not apply. Nonetheless, in the event the Court chooses to find the provisions 
applicable, then Petitioners have failed to make a satisfactory showing warranting reversal or 
vacatur. The grounds and bases which support the Intervenors' position in this regard were 
adequately set forth by Powderhorn and Heartland in their Opposition Brief, including pages 3 1 
through 36, and will not be repeated here. Said provisions are incorporated herein as though set forth 
in full. 
2. The Claim for Declaratow Relief. 
As set forth above, the claim for declaratory relief has been improperly joined with an 
attempted petition for review under th IDAPA and Local Land Use Planning Act. In the event the 
Court sees fit to nonetheless proceed to address the merits of the claim, through this proceeding, then 
the claim must fail. The Petitioners bear the burden of making "a clear showing" that the Board's 
action was "confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious." Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 
Idaho at 66. For the reasons separately set forth in the Opposition Brief of Powderhorn and 
Heartland, said argument must fail. 
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IV. ATTORNEY FEES. 
Intervenors Coeur d'Alene Land Company and Magnuson respectfully request an award of 
attorney fees incurred in defending Petitioners' claims. The basis for said claim is I.C. 5 12-1 17. 
Petitioners have persisted in this action without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and an award of 
attorney fees is merited. The facts and circumstances which support this claim include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
(1) Petitioners filed a Petition for Review from a non-appealable legislative act; 
(2) Petitioners filed a Petition for Review from the Boards' interim Order rather than 
from the Board's Final Order; 
(3) Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 84 by effecting 
personal service ofthe Petition on the parties who requested the subject amendment; 
(4) Without the required personal service and through improper means, for the purposes 
of causing Intervenors' delay and undue expense, Petitioners sought an inappropriate 
stay (under Rule 84 which does not apply to challenges to legislative acts), without 
notice, through personal service or otherwise, to all affected parties; 
(5) Having been advised of the procedural and jurisdictional impropriety of their 
Petition, Petitioners nonetheless improperly attempted to unilaterally amend the 
same, in violation of Rule 15, to join therein claims for declaratory relief which 
would otherwise be required to be the subject of a separate action; and 
( 6 )  Petitioners refused to dismiss this actiqn and to separately file an action for 
declaratory relief, thereby negating the need for Intervenors to incur the expense and 
cost of defending this proceeding. 
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V. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, and those separately set forth by 
Powderhorn and Heartland, Intervenors Magnuson and Coeur d' Alene Land Company respectfully 
request that the Court deny the subject Petition for Review in its entirety, dismissing the same with 
prejudice. Intervenors further request an award of their reasonable attorney fees and costs to hereafter 
be supported in conformity with I.R.C.P. 54. 
Dated this 4Ih day of May, 2007. 
Attom&& Intervenors Coeur c$/Alene Land Co. 
and Harry F. Magnuson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 
following, via facsimile and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid this 41h day of May, 2007: 
Scott W. Reed 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box A 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16 
Fax: 208\765-5117 
Mischelle Fulgham 
Lukins & Annis, PS 
1600 Washington Trust Financial Center 
7 17 W. Sprague Avenue 
Spokane, WA 99201-0466 
Fax: 509\747-2323 
John A. Cafferty, Sr. Staff Attorney 
Kootenai County Department of 
Legal Services 
45 1 Government Way 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16-9000 
Fax: 208\446-1621 
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